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A

DISSERTATION

ON

DIVINE JUSTICE:

OR,

The Claims of Vindicatory Juſtice aſſerted.

In this Work that ESSENTIAL PROPERTY of the Divine Nature is demonſtrated from the Sacred Writings, and clearly defended againſt SOCINUS and his Followers: Likewiſe, the NECESSARY Exerciſe thereof; together with the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of the Satisfaction of Chriſt for the Salvation of Sinners is eſtabliſhed againſt various celebrated Writers.

NOW FIRST TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN

OF

Dr. JOHN OWEN,

Sometime VICE CHANCELLOR of the Univerſity of OXFORD.

WITH

A RECOMMENDATORY PREFACE,

By the Rev. JOHN STAFFORD, DD. and Others.

LONDON:

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TO THE PUBLIC.

THE numerous and valuable writings of Dr. Owen, have, long ago, ſecured his praiſe in all the Churches, as a firſt-rate writer upon Theological ſubjects. Any recommendation, therefore, of the preſent work, ſeems unneceſſary. As the Treatiſe, however, now offered to the public, has long been locked up in a dead language, it may not be improper to ſay, what will be granted by all competent judges, that the Author diſcovers an uncommon acquaintance with his ſubject; that he has clearly explained the nature of Divine Juſtice, and demonſtrated it to be, not merely an *arbitrary* thing, depending upon the ſovereign pleaſure of the ſupreme Lawgiver but eſſential to the divine nature. In doing this, he has overthrown the arguments of the Socinians and others againſt the atonement of Chriſt,

and

and proved, that a complete ſatisfaction to the law and juſtice of God was neceſſary, in order that ſinners might be pardoned, juſtified, ſanctified, and eternally ſaved, conſiſtently with the honour of all the divine perfections.

Whoever makes himſelf maſter of the Doctor's reaſoning in the following Treatiſe, will be able to anſwer all the objections and cavils of the enemies of the truth therein contended for. It is therefore earneſtly recommended to the attention, and careful peruſal of all, who wiſh to obtain right ideas of God, the nature and extent of the divine law, the horrid nature and demerit of ſin, &c. but eſpecially to the attention of young divines. The tranſlation, upon the whole, is faithful. If it have any fault, it is, perhaps, its being too literal.

That it may meet with that reception which it juſtly merits from the public, and which the importance of the ſubject demands, is the earneſt prayer of the ſervants in the Goſpel of Chriſt.

S. STAFFORD, D. D.
J. RYLAND, ſen. M. A.
ROB. SIMPSON.

THE

PREFACE

TO THE

READER.

AS perhaps, *learned Reader*, you will think it ſtrange, that I, who have ſuch abundance of various and laborious employment of another kind, ſhould think of publiſhing ſuch a work as this; it may not be improper to lay before you a ſummary account of the reaſons that induced me to this undertaking: And I do it the rather, that this little production may eſcape free from the injurious ſuſpicions, which the manners of the times are but too apt to affix to works of this kind. It is now four months and upwards, ſince in the uſual courſe of duty in defending certain *Theological Theſes* in our Univerſity, it fell to my lot, "To diſcourſe and diſpute on the vindicatory "juſtice

" juſtice of God, and the neceſſity of its exer-
" cife, on the ſuppoſition of the exiſtence of
" ſin." Although theſe obſervations were directed to the beſt of my abilities immediately againſt the Socinians, yet it being underſtood that many very reſpectable Theologians entertained ſentiments on this ſubject very different from mine, and although the warmeſt oppoſers of what we then maintained were obliged to acknowledge that our arguments are quite deciſive againſt the adverſaries, yet there were not wanting ſome who not altogether agreeing with us, employed themſelves in ſtrictures upon our opinion, and accuſed it of error, while others continued wavering, and in the diverſity of opinions, knew not on which to fix. Much controverſy enſuing in conſequence of this, I agreed with ſome learned men to enter, both in writings and converſation upon an orderly and deliberate inveſtigation of the ſubject. And after the ſcruples of ſeveral had been removed by a more full conſideration of our opinion; (to effect which, the following conſiderations chiefly contributed, *viz.* that they clearly ſaw

this doctrine conduced to the eſtabliſhment of the neceſſity of the ſatisfaction of Jeſus Chriſt, a precious truth which theſe worthy and good men, partakers of the *grace and gift of righteouſneſs* through means of the blood of Chriſt, not only warmly favoured, but dearly venerated as the moſt *honourable treaſure* of the church, the ſeed of a bleſſed immortality, and the darling jewel of our religion,) I was greatly encouraged in the conferences with theſe gentlemen to take a deeper view of the ſubject, and to examine it more cloſely for the future benefit of mankind.

Beſides ſeveral of thoſe who had before examined, and were acquainted with our ſentiments, or to whom, in conſequence of our ſhort diſcourſe in the Univerſity on the ſubject, they began to be more acceptable; and theſe too conſiderable both for their number and rank, ceaſed not to urge me to a more cloſe conſideration and accurate review of the controverſy. For in that public diſſertation, it being confined, according to the general cuſtom of ſuch exerciſes in Univerſities, within the narrow limits of an hour, I could only ſlightly

ſlightly touch on the nature of *vindicatory juſtice*; whereas the rules and limits of ſuch exerciſes would not permit me to enter on the chief point, the great hinge of the controverſy, *viz.* " concerning the *neceſſary* exer- " ciſe of that juſtice:" This is the difficulty that requires the abilities of the moſt judicious and acute to inveſtigate and ſolve. In this ſituation of matters, not only a more full view of the whole ſtate of the controverſy, but likewiſe of the weight of thoſe arguments on which the truth of that ſide of the queſtion which we have eſpouſed depends, as alſo an explanation and confutation of certain ſubtilties, whereby the opponents had embarraſſed the minds of ſome enquirers after Truth, became objects of general requeſt. And, indeed, ſuch were the circumſtances of this controverſy, that any one might eaſily perceive that a *ſcholaſtic* diſſertation on the ſubject muſt take a very different turn, and could bear no farther reſemblance, and owe nothing more to the former exerciſe than the having furniſhed an opportunity, or occaſion, for its appearance in public.

Although then I was more than ſufficiently full of employment already, yet being excited by the encouragement of good men, and fully perſuaded in my own mind, that the truth which we embrace, is ſo far from being of trivial conſequence in our religion, that it is intimately connected with many, the moſt important articles of the Chriſtian doctrine concerning the *attributes* of God, the *ſatisfaction* of Chriſt, and the nature of ſin, and of our *obedience*; and that it ſtrikes its roots deep through almoſt the whole of Theology, or, *the acknowledging of the truth, which is according to Godlineſs*; fully perſuaded, I ſay, of theſe facts, I prevailed with myſelf, rather than this doctrine ſhould remain any longer neglected or buried, and hardly even known by name; or be held captive by the reaſonings of ſome *enſlaving the minds of mankind, through philoſophy and vain conceits*, to exert my beſt abilities in its declaration and defence. Several things, however, which, with your good leave, Reader, I ſhall now mention, almoſt deterred me from the taſk when begun: the firſt and chief was the great difficulty of the ſubject itſelf, which

among the more abſtruſe points of truth, is by no means the leaſt abſtruſe. For, as every divine truth has a peculiar majeſty and reverence belonging to it, which debars from the ſpiritual knowledge of it, (as it is in Chriſt,) the *ignorant and unſtable*; that is, thoſe who are *not taught of God*, or become *ſubject to the truth*; ſo thoſe points which dwell in more intimate receſſes, and approach nearer its immenſe fountain, *the Father of Light*, darting brighter rays, by their exceſs of light, preſent a confounding darkneſs to the minds of the greateſt men, *and are as darkneſs to the eyes breaking forth amidſt ſo great light.* For what we call *darkneſs* in divine ſubjects, is nothing elſe than their celeſtial *glory* and *ſplendour* ſtriking on the weak ball of our eyes, the rays of which we are not able, in this life, which *is but a vapour, and which ſhineth but for a little*, to bear. Hence God himſelf, who *is light*, and in whom *there is no darkneſs at all, who dwelleth in light inacceſſable*; and *who cloatheth himſelf with light as with a garment*; in reſpect of us, is ſaid, "*to have made darkneſs his pavilion.*"

Not, as the Roman Catholics ſay, that there is any reaſon that we ſhould blaſphemouſly accuſe the Holy Scriptures of obſcurity: "For "the law of the Lord is perfect, converting "the ſoul: the teſtimony of the Lord is ſure, "making wiſe the ſimple. The ſtatutes of "the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; the "commandment of the Lord is pure, en-"lightening the eyes." Nor is there reaſon to complain that any one part of the Truth hath been too *ſparingly* or *obſcurely* revealed: for even the ſmalleſt portion of the Divine Word is, by the grace of the Holy Spirit aſſiſting to diſpoſe and frame the ſubject, or our hearts, ſo as to view the bright object of Divine Truth in its proper and ſpiritual light, ſufficient to communicate the knowledge of truths of the laſt importance: for, it is owing to the nature of the doctrines themſelves, and their exceeding ſplendour, that there are *ſome things hard to be conceived and interpreted*, and which ſurpaſs our capacity and comprehenſion. Whether this article of Divine Truth, which we are now enquiring into, be not akin to thoſe which we have now mentioned, let

the learned * judge and determine. I have, therefore, determined to place my chief dependance on his aid, "who giveth to all "liberally and upbraideth none." For thoſe unhappy gentlemen only loſe their labour, and may not improperly be compared to the artiſts, who uſed more than common exertions in building Noah's † ark, and who, like bees, work for others, and not for themſelves, in the ſearch of Truth, who, relying on their own abilities and induſtry, uſe every effort to aſcertain and comprehend Divine Truths, while at the ſame time, they continue regardleſs, "Whether he who commanded the light to "ſhine out of darkneſs, hath hitherto ſhone "into their hearts, to give them the light of "the knowledge of his glory, in the face of "Jeſus Chriſt:" For, after all, they can accompliſh nothing more, by their utmoſt

* Eſpecially thoſe, ſays the Author, who ſhall reflect what a cloſe connection there is between it, and the whole doctrine concerning the *nature of God, the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, the deſert of ſin*, and every one of the dark and more abſtruſe heads of our religion.

† Thereby haſtening their own deſtruction.

efforts,

efforts, but to diſcover their *technical* or artificial ignorance.

Setting aſide then the conſideration of ſome *phraſes*, and even of ſome *arguments*; yet, as to what relates to the principal point of the controverſy, I hold myſelf bound in conſcience and in honour, not even to imagine that I have attained a proper knowledge of any one article of Truth, much leſs to publiſh it, unleſs through the Holy Spirit I have had ſuch a taſte of it, in its ſpiritual ſenſe, as that I may be able, from the heart, to ſay, with the Pſalmiſt, " I have believed, and there-" fore have I ſpoken." He, who in the inveſtigation of Truth, makes it his chief care to have his mind and will rendered *ſubject* to the *faith*, and obedient to the *Father of lights*, and who with attention waits upon him, *whoſe throne is in the heavens*; " he alone attains to " true wiſdom, the others walk in a vain " ſhew." It has then been my principal object, in tracing the depths and ſecret nature of the ſubject in queſtion, while I a poor worm contemplated the majeſty and glory of him, concerning whoſe perfections I was treating,

treating, to attend to and obey with all *humility and reverence*, " What the great God, " the Lord hath ſpoken in his word:" Not at all doubting, but that whatever way he ſhould incline my heart, by the *power* of his ſpirit and truth, I ſhould be enabled, in a dependance on his aid, to bear *the contradictions* of a falſe knowledge, and all human and philoſophical arguments.

And to ſay the truth, as I have adopted the opinion which I defend in this diſſertation, from no regard to the arguments of either one or another learned man, and much leſs from any ſlaviſh attachment to authority, example, or traditionary prejudices, and from no confidence in the opinion, or abilities of others. but, as I hope, from a moſt humble contemplation of the *holineſs*, *purity*, *juſtice*, *right*, *dominion*, *wiſdom*, and *mercy* of God; ſo by the guidance of his ſpirit alone, and power of his heart-changing grace, filling my mind with all the fulneſs of Truth, and ſtriking me with a deep awe and admiration of it, I have been enabled to ſurmount the difficulty of the reſearch. Theology is " the wiſdom that is from

" from above, a *habit* of grace and ſpiritual " gifts, the manifeſtation of the ſpirit report- " ing what is conducive *to happineſs*". It is not a ſcience to be learned from the precepts of man, or from the rules of arts, or method of other ſciences, as thoſe repreſent it, who alſo maintain that a *natural man* may attain all that artificial and methodical theology, even though in the matters of God, and myſteries of the Goſpel, he be blinder than a mole. What a diſtinguiſhed theologian muſt he be, " who receiveth not the things of the " Spirit of God ! !"

But again, having ſailed through this ſea of troubles, and being ready to launch out upon the ſubject, that gigantic ſpectre, " *It is every where ſpoken againſt*," ſhould have occaſioned me no delay, had it not come forth inſcribed with the mighty names of *Auguſtin*, *Calvin*, *Muſculus*, *Twiſs*, and *Voſſius*. And although I could not but entertain for theſe divines that honor and reſpect which is due to ſuch great names, yet, partly by conſidering myſelf as entitled to " *that freedom wherewith* CHRIST *hath made us free*," and partly by oppoſing to theſe, the

the names of other very learned theologians, viz. *Parcus, Piscator, Moluneus, Lubertus, Rivetus, Cameron, Maccovius, Junius*, and others, who, after the spreading of the poison of Socinianism, have with great accuracy and caution investigated and cleared up this truth, I easily got rid of any uneasiness from that quarter.

Having thus surmounted these difficulties, and begun the undertaking by devoting to it a few leisure hours stolen from other engagements, the work prospered beyond all expectation; and by the favour of the "Father of "lights, who worketh in us both to will and "to do of his good pleasure," in a few days it was brought to a conclusion.

And now that the labour of composing was ended, I again entertained doubts, and continued for some time in suspense, whether, considering the manners of the times in which we live, it would not be more prudent to throw the papers, with some other kindred compositions, on other subjects of divinity, into some secret coffers, there to be buried in eternal oblivion, than bring them forth to public discussion.

For

For even all know, with what vain arrogance, malice, party-ſpirit, and eager luſt of attacking the labours of others, the minds of many are corrupted and infected. Not only then was it neceſſary, that I ſhould anticipate and digeſt in my mind the *contempt* and ſcoffings, which theſe bantering, ſaucy, dull-witted, ſelf-ſufficient deſpiſers of others, or any of ſuch a contemptible race, whoſe greateſt pleaſure it is to diſparage all kinds of exertions, however praiſe-worthy, might pour out againſt me; but I likewiſe foreſaw, that I would have to contend with the ſoured tempers and prejudiced opinions of others, who being carried away, by party-zeal and rouſed by the unexpected ſtate and condition of public * affairs, and who " thinking themſelves " to be the men, and that wiſdom was born " and will die with them," look down with contempt upon all who differ from them; and not with theſe only, but I likewiſe knew, that I had a more ſevere ſcrutiny to undergo

* This treatiſe was written in the time of the Common wealth.

from

from ſome *learned* men, to whom, it was eaſy to conjecture this work, for many reaſons would not be acceptable. For there are ſome by whom all labour employed in the ſearch of any more obſcure or difficult truth, is accounted as miſemployed: nor do theſe want the ingenuity of aſſigning honourable pretences for their indolence. I ſhould however be aſhamed to enter into any ſerious argument with ſuch, nor is it worth while to enter upon a review of their long declamations. And although theſe and many other things of ſuch a kind, may appear grievous and hard to be borne to your dainty gentlemen, who eagerly court ſplendour and fame; yet ingenuouſly to ſay the truth, I am very fully perſuaded, that no man can either think or ſpeak of me, and my works, with ſo much diſregard and contempt, as I myſelf, from my ſoul both think and ſpeak; and having in no reſpect any other expectation than that of contempt to myſelf and name, provided divine truth be promoted, all theſe conſiderations had long ago become not only of ſmall conſequence to me, but appeared as the *mereſt trifles*. For why ſhould

ſhould we be anxious about what ſhall become either of ourſelves or our names: "if "only we commend our ſouls to God as to "a faithful Creator in well doing," and by continuing in well doing, "ſtop the mouth of "ignorant bablers." God careth for us: "Let us caſt our burdens upon him, and he "will ſuſtain us." Let but the truth tri-"umph, vanquiſh, rout, and put to flight its enemies. "Let the word of the croſs have "free courſe and be glorified." Let wretched ſinners learn daily more and more "of fellow-"ſhip with Chriſt in his ſufferings;" of the neceſſity of ſatisfaction for ſins, by the blood of the Son of God, ſo "that he who is white "and ruddy, and the chiefeſt among ten "thouſand, may appear ſo to them, yea, alto-"gether lovely;" till being admitted into the chambers of the Church's huſband, "they "drink love that is better than wine, and be-"come a willing people in the day of his "power, and in the beauty of holineſs," and I ſhall very little regard, "being judged *of* "*man's judgment*."

Since

Since then, I *not only have believed what I have ſpoken*, but as both my own heart, and God who is greater than my heart, are witneſſes, that I have engaged in this labour for the truth, under the influence of the moſt ſacred regard and reverence, for the *Majeſty, purity, holineſs, juſtice, grace, and mercy* of God, from a deteſtation of that abominable thing which his ſoul hateth; and with a heart enflamed with zeal for the honour and glory of our *deareſt Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, who is fairer than the ſons of men and altogether lovely*, whom with my ſoul and all that is within me I worſhip, love and adore, whoſe *glorious coming* I wiſh and long for, (come Lord Jeſus, come quickly,) for *whoſe ſake I count all things but as loſs and dung*; ſince, I ſay, I have engaged in this labour from theſe motives alone, I am under no anxiety or doubt, but it will meet with a favourable reception from impartial judges, from thoſe acquainted with the terrors of the Lord, the curſe of the law, the virtue of the croſs, the power of the Goſpel, and the riches of the glory of divine grace.

There

There are, no doubt, many other portions and ſubjects of our religion, of that bleſſed truſt committed to us for our inſtruction, on which we might dwell with greater pleaſure and ſatisfaction of mind. Such I mean as afford a more free and wider ſcope of ranging, through the *moſt pleaſant meads* of the Holy Scripture, and contemplating in theſe the tranſparent *fountains* of life, and *rivers* of conſolation: ſubjects which unencumbered by the thickets of *ſcholaſtic terms and diſtinctions*, unembarraſſed by the impediments and ſophiſms of an *enſlaving Philoſophy, or falſe knowledge*, ſweetly and pleaſantly lead into a pure, unmixed and delightful *fellowſhip with the Father, and with his Son*, ſhedding abroad in the heart, the inmoſt loves of our beloved, with the odour of his ſweet ointment poured forth.

This truth likewiſe has its *uſes*, and ſuch as are of the greateſt importance to thoſe who are walking in the way of holineſs and evangelical obedience. A brief ſpecimen and abſtract of them is added, for the benefit of the pious reader, in the end of the diſſertation, in order to excite

excite his love towards our beloved High Prieſt and Chief Shepherd, and true fear towards God, *who is a conſuming fire*, and whom we cannot ſerve acceptably, unleſs with *reverence and godly fear*.

There can be no doubt, but that many points of doctrine ſtill remain, on which the labours of the godly and learned may be uſefully employed. For, although many reverend and learned Divines, both of the preſent and former age, have compoſed from the Sacred Writings a Synopſis, or methodical Body of Doctrine, or heavenly Truth, and publiſhed their compoſitions under various titles; and, although, other theological writings, *catechiſtical, dogmatical, exegetical, caſuiſtical, and polemical*, have encreaſed to ſuch a maſs, that the *world can hardly contain the works that have been written*; yet, ſuch is the nature of Divine Truth, ſo deep and inexhauſtible the *fountain* of the Sacred Scriptures, whence we draw it, ſo innumerable the ſalutary remedies and antidotes propoſed in theſe to diſpel all the poiſons and temptations wherewith *the adverſary* can ever attack either the

minds

minds of the pious, or the *peace of the Church*, and the true doctrine, that ſerious and thinking men can entertain no doubt, but that we perform a ſervice praiſe-worthy and profitable to the Church of Chriſt, when, under the direction of the Spirit of *Wiſdom and Revelation*, we bring forward, explain, and defend the moſt important and *neceſſary* articles of evangelical Truth.

But, to be more particular: How ſparingly, for inſtance, yea, how obſcurely, how confuſedly, is the whole *œconomy* of the Spirit towards believers, (one of the greateſt myſteries of our religion! a moſt invaluable portion of the ſalvation brought about for us by Chriſt,) deſcribed by divines in general? Or rather, by the moſt, is it not altogether neglected? *In their catechiſms*, *common-place books*, *public and private theſes*, *ſyſtems*, *compends*, &c. and even, in their *commentaries*, *harmonies*, and *expoſitions*, concerning the indwelling, ſealing teſtimony, unction and conſolation of the Spirit. Good God! concerning this ineſtimable fruit of the Death and Reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt! This invaluable treaſure

treasure of the godly, though copiously revealed and explained in the Scriptures, there is almost a total silence. And, with regard to *union* and *communion* with Christ, and with his Father, and our Father, and some other doctrines respecting his person, as the husband and head of the church, the same observation holds good.

For almost, from the very period in which they were capable of judging even of the first principles of religion, the *Orthodox* have applied themselves to clear up and explain those articles of the Truth, which *Satan*, by his various artifices, hath endeavoured to darken, pervert, or undermine. But as there is no part of Divine Truth, which, since the eternal and sworn enmity took place between Him and the Seed of the Woman, he hath not opposed, with all his might, fury, and cunning; so he hath not thought proper, wholly to entrust the success of his interest to instruments delegated from among mankind, though many of them seem to have discovered such a wonderful promptitude, alacrity, and zeal, in transacting his business, that one would think they had been formed and fashioned for the purpose;

poſe; but he hath reſerved for that *power* which he hath over *darkneſs and all kind of wickedneſs*, a certain portion of his work to be adminiſtered in a peculiar manner by himſelf. And, as he has, in all ages, reaped an abundant crop of tares from that part of his *Lordſhip* which he hired out to be improved by man, though from the nature of human affairs, not without much *noiſe*, *tumult*, *blood*, and ſlaughter; ſo from that which he thought proper to manage himſelf, without any delegated aſſiſtance, he has received a more abundant and richer crop of infernal fruit.

The exertions of Satan againſt the truth of the Goſpel may be diſtinguiſhed into two diviſions. In the firſt, as the God of this world, he endeavours to darken the minds of unbelievers, " that the light of the glorious Goſ-" pel of Chriſt may not ſhine into them." With what ſucceſs he exerciſes this ſouldeſtroying employment we cannot pretend to ſay; but there is reaſon to lament that he hath ſucceeded, and ſtill ſucceeds, beyond his utmoſt hope. In the other, he carries on an implacable war, an unremitting ſtrife, not as formerly

formerly with Michael about the *body of Moſes*, but about the *Spirit of Chriſt*; about ſome of the more diſtinguiſhed articles of the Truth, and the application of each of them, in order to cultivate communion with God the Father and with his Son, our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, againſt the hearts of the Godly, and the new creature formed within them.

In this ſituation of affairs, moſt Chriſtian writers have made it their ſtudy to oppoſe that firſt effort of the Devil, whereby, through means of his inſtruments, he openly endeavours to ſuppreſs the light, both natural and revealed; but they have not been equally ſolicitous to ſuccour the minds of Believers, "when wreſtling, not againſt fleſh and blood, "but againſt principalities and powers, againſt "the rulers of the darkneſs of this world, "againſt ſpirits of wickedneſs in high places," and almoſt ready to ſink under the conteſt. Hence I ſay, a very minute inveſtigation hath been ſet on foot by many, of thoſe articles of religion which he has openly, through the inſtrumentality of the ſlaves of error and darkneſs, attacked, and the vindication of them

made clear and plain. But thoſe, which, both from their relation to practice, and a holy communion full of ſpiritual joy, to be cultivated with God, the Old Serpent hath reſerved for his own attack in the hearts of believers, moſt writers, partly either becauſe they were ignorant of his *wiles*, or partly becauſe they ſaw not much evil publicly ariſing thence, and partly becauſe the arguments of the Adverſary were not founded on any general principle, but only to be deduced from the private and particular ſtate and caſe of individuals, have either paſſed over, or very ſlightly touched upon.

As to what pertains to *Theology* itſelf, or that *knowledge of the Truth which is according to Godlineſs*, wherewith being filled, "we "ourſelves become pure and perfected to "every good work," and fit Miniſters of the New Teſtament, *not of the letter, but of the Spirit, apt to teach, rightly dividing the word of truth*; that ſubject, I ſay, though a common and chief topic in the writings both of the *Schoolmen* and others on religion, many have acknowledged to their fatal experience, when too

too late, is treated in too perplexed and intricate a manner to be of any real and general ſervice.

For while they are warmly employed in diſputing, Whether *Theology* be an *art* or a *ſcience*, and whether it be a *ſpeculative* or *practical art* or *ſcience?* And while they attempt to meaſure it exactly by thoſe *rules*, *laws*, and methods, which human reaſon has deviſed for other ſciences, thus endeavouring to render it more plain and clear, they find themſelves, to the grief and ſorrow of many candidates for the Truth, entangled in inextricable difficulties, and left in poſſeſſion only of a *human ſyſtem of doctrines*, having little or no connection at all with true theology. I hope, therefore, "if I live and the Lord will," to publiſh, but from no deſire of gainſaying any one, ſome ſpecimens of evangelical truth on the points before-mentioned, as well as on other ſubjects.*

As to the work that I have now in hand, the firſt part of the Diſſertation is, *concerning the Cauſe* of the Death of Chriſt; and in the execution of which I have the greateſt plea-

* See Owen on the Spirit.

ſure and ſatisfaction, (though proudly defied by the adverſaries, ſo conceited with themſelves and their productions are they) becauſe " I have determined to know nothing " but Jeſus Chriſt and him crucified:" at leaſt, nothing that could divert my attention from that ſubject.

But now, *learned reader*, leſt, as the ſaying is, " *the gate ſhould become wider than the* " *city*," if you will bear with me, while I ſay a few things of myſelf, however little worthy of your notice, I ſhall immediately conclude the Preface.

About two years ago, the *Parliament* of the *Commonwealth* promoted me, while diligently employed, according to the meaſure of the *gift* of *Grace* beſtowed on me, in preaching the Goſpel, by their authority and influence, though with reluctance on my part, to a chair in the very celebrated *Univerſity of Oxford*. I mean not to relate what various employments fell to my lot from that period; what frequent journies I became engaged in; not, indeed, expeditions of pleaſure, or on my own or private account; but ſuch as the unavoidable neceſſities

ſities of the Univerſity, and the commands of Superiors, whoſe authority was not to be gainſaid, impoſed upon me. And now I clearly found, that I, who dreaded almoſt every academical employment, as being unequal to the taſk*, and at a time too when I had entertained hope, that through the goodneſs of God, in giving me leiſure and retirement, and ſtrength for ſtudy, that the deficiency of *Genius* and penetration, might be made up by *Induſtry* and diligence, was now ſo circumſtanced that the career of my ſtudies muſt be interrupted by more and greater impediments than ever before.

For, to mention firſt, what certainly is moſt weighty and important, the taſk, of lec-

* For what, ſays our author, in *a long parentheſis*, could be expected from a man not far advanced in years, who had for ſeveral years been very full of employment, and accuſtomed only to the popular mode of ſpeaking, who being altogether devoted to the inveſtigation and explanation of the "Saving Grace of God through Jeſus "Chriſt," had taken leave of all ſcholaſtic ſtudies, whoſe genius is by no means quick, and who had even forgot, in ſome meaſure, the portion of polite learning that he might have formerly acquired?

turing in public was put upon me, which would ſtrictly and properly require the whole time and attention even of the moſt grave and experienced *Divine*; and in the diſcharge of which, unleſs I had been greatly aſſiſted and encouraged by the *candour, piety, ſubmiſſion, and ſelf-denial* of the auditors; and *by their reſpect for the divine inſtitution, and their love of the truth*, with every kind of indulgence and kind attention towards the *earthen veſſel*, which diſtinguiſh moſt academicians of every rank, age, and deſcription, beyond mankind in general; I had long loſt all hope of diſcharging that province, either to the public advantage, or my own private ſatisfaction and comfort.

And as moſt of them are endowed with a pious diſpoſition and Chriſtian temper, and well furniſhed with ſuperior gifts, and inſtructed in learning of every kind, which in the preſent imperfect and depraved ſtate of human nature is apt to fill the minds of men with prejudices againſt "*the fooliſhneſs of preaching*, "and to diſapprove *the ſimplicity that is in* "*Chriſt*," I would be the moſt ungrateful of

of mankind, were I not to acknowledge that the humility, diligence, and alacrity with which they attended to, and obeyed the *words of the Croſs*, indulging neither pride of heart, nor animoſity of mind, or itching of ears, though diſpenſed by a moſt unworthy ſervant of God in the Goſpel of his Son, have given, and ſtill give me great courage in the diſcharge of the different duties of my office.

However then, the moſt merciful Father of all things ſhall, in his infinite wiſdom and goodneſs diſpoſe of the affairs of *our univerſity*. I could not but give ſuch a public * teſtimony

* Here our Author introduces the following obſervation in a very long parentheſis: "As reports are every "where ſpread abroad, concerning the abolition and "deſtruction of the *Colleges*, and efforts for that purpoſe "made by ſome who being entire ſtrangers to every "kind of literature, or at leaſt ignorant of every thing "of greater antiquity than what their own memory, or "that of their fathers can reach, and regardleſs of the "*future*, imagine the whole globe and bounds of human "knowledge to be contained within the limits of their "own little cabins, ignorant whether the ſun eve ſhone "beyond their own little iſland or not, *neither knowing* "*what they ſay, nor of whom they make their aſſertions*; "and

teſtimony, as a regard to truth and duty required from me, to theſe very reſpectable and learned men, (however much theſe treacherous calumniators and falſifying ſycophants may rail, and ſhew their teeth upon the oc-

" and by others who are deeply ſunk in the baſeſt of " crimes, and who would therefore wiſh all light *diſ-* " *tinguiſhing* between good and evil entirely extinguiſhed. " *For evil doers hate the light, nor do they come to the light,* " *leſt their deeds ſhould appear*;' that they (mean lurchers " hitherto) may fill up the meaſure of their iniquity with " ſome kind of eclat; to which alſo may be added thoſe, " who never having become candidates for literature " themſelves, yet, by puſhing themſelves forward, have " unſeaſonably thruſt themſelves into ſuch ſervices and " offices, as neceſſarily require knowledge and learning; " theſe, I ſay, like the fox who had loſt his tail, would " wiſh all the world deprived of the means of knowledge, " leſt their own *ſhameful ignorance, deſpicable indolence,* " and *total unfitneſs* for the offices which they ſolicit or " hold, ſhould appear to all who have the leaſt degree " of underſtanding and ſenſe; and laſtly too, by a deſpi- " cable herd of prodigal idle fellows, eagerly gaping for " the revenues of the Univerſity." For theſe reaſons, our Author ſays, he could not but give the above character of the heads and other members of that venerable body: a character which both the truth of the caſe, and the duty of his office required.

caſion)

caſion) the heads of the colleges, who have merited ſo highly of the Church, for their diſtinguiſhed candour, great diligence, uncommon erudition, blameleſs politeneſs; many of whom are zealouſly ſtudious of every kind of literature, and many who by their conduct in the early period of their youth give the moſt promiſing hopes of future merit: ſo that I would venture to affirm, that no impartial and unprejudiced judge will believe that our Univerſity hath either been, for ages paſt, ſurpaſſed, or is now ſurpaſſed, either in point of a proper reſpect and eſteem for *piety*, for the *ſaving knowledge* of our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt; *manners*, orderly, and worthy of the Chriſtian vocation; and for a due regard to *doctrines*, *arts*, *languages*, and all ſciences that can be ornamental to *wiſe*, *worthy*, and *good* men, appointed for the public good, by any ſociety of men in the world.

Relying then on the humanity, piety, and candour of ſuch men, (*who may be afflicted, but not ſtraitened*; *perſecuted, but not forſaken*; *caſt down, but ſhall not be loſt*; who carry about with them the life and death of the Lord

Lord Jesus Christ), though destitute of all strength of my own, and devoting myself entirely to Him "*who furnisheth seed to the* "*sower*; and *who from the mouths of babes and* "*sucklings ordaineth strength*;" who hath appointed Christ a perpetual source of help, and who furnishes a seasonable aid to every pious effort, I have, in conjunction with my very learned colleague*, a very eminent man, and whose equal in the work of the Gospel, if the *Parliament* of the *commonwealth* had conjoined with him, they would have attended to the best interests of the University, continued in the discharge of the duties of this laborious and difficult province.

But not on this account alone, would I have been reluctant to return, after so long an interval of time, to this darling *University*. But another care, another office, and that by far the most weighty, was, by the concurring voice of the *Senate* of the University; and notwithstanding my most earnest requests to the contrary, entrusted and assigned to me, and by the undertaking of which, I have

* Mr. T. Goodwin President of Magdalen College.

know-

knowingly and wittingly compounded with the loſs of my peace, and all my ſtudious * purſuits.

Such, candid reader, is the account of the Author of the following little Treatiſe, and of his ſituation when compoſing it: a man not wiſe in the eſtimation of others, in his own very fooliſh; firſt called from rural retirement and the noiſe of arms to this Univerſity, and very lately again returned to it from excurſions in the cauſe of the Goſpel, not only to the extremities of this iſland, but to coaſts beyond the ſeas, and now again deeply engaged in the various and weighty duties of his ſtation; whether any thing exalted or refined can be expected from ſuch a perſon, is eaſy for any one to determine.

With regard to our manner of writing, or Latin diction, as ſome are wont to acquire great praiſe from their ſublimity of expreſſion, allow me but a word or two. Know then, reader, that you have to do with a perſon, who provided his words, but clearly expreſs the ſentiments of his mind, entertains a fixed

* In the year 1651, Dr. Owen was ſettled in the Deanry of *Chriſt's College*; and in 1652 choſen Vice-Chancellor of that Univerſity.

and

and abſolute diſregard for all elegance and ornaments of ſpeech. For,

Dicite Pontifices, in ſacris quid facit aurum?
Say Biſhops, of what avail is glitter to ſacred ſubjects?

In my opinion indeed, he, who in a theological conteſt ſhould pleaſe himſelf with the idea of diſplaying rhetorical flouriſhes, would derive no other advantage therefrom, but that his head, adorned with magnificent verboſe garlands and pellets, would fall a richer victim to the criticiſms of the learned.

But whatever ſhall be the deciſion of the ſerious and judicious, with reſpect to this *Treatiſe*, if I ſhall any how ſtir up an emulation in others, on whom the grace of God may have beſtowed more excellent gifts, to bring forward to public utility their pure, ſolid, and learned labours, and ſhall excite them from their *light*, to confer light on the ſplendour of this *Univerſity*, I ſhall be abundantly gratified. Farewell, *pious reader*, and think not lightly of him, who hath uſed his moſt zealous endeavours to ſerve thy intereſt in the cauſe of the Goſpel.

JOHN OWEN.

A

DISSERTATION

ON

DIVINE JUSTICE.

CHAP. I.

*The introduction—The design of the work—Atheists—The prolepsis * of Divine Justice general—The divisions of Justice, according to Aristotle—The sentiments of the Schoolmen respecting these — Another division — Justice considered absolutely—then in various respects.*

IN this Treatise, we are to discourse of God and of his *justice*, the most illustrious of all the divine perfections; but especially of his † *vindicatory justice*; of the certainty of which, I

* This word commonly means a *previous and concise view of a subject, or, an anticipation of objections.* In this treatise it means, a natural or innate conception of *Divine Justice.*

† *The word in the original means either to claim and assert a right, or to punish the violation of it: by vindicatory justice then, we are to understand that perfection of the Deity,* which disposes him to vindicate his right by punishing its violators. It ought never to be translated *vindictive*, or understood as meaning revengeful.

moſt firmly believe, that all mankind will, one time or other, be made fully ſenſible, either by faith in it here, as revealed in the word; or by feeling its *effects*, to their extreme miſery, in the world hereafter. But as the human mind is blind to divine light, and as both our underſtandings and tongues are inadequate to conceive of God aright, and to declare him, (hence, that common and juſt obſervation, that it is an arduous thing to ſpeak of God aright) that we may handle ſo important a ſubject with that reverence and perſpicuity wherewith it becomes it to be treated, we muſt chiefly depend on his aid, *who was made the* * *righteouſneſs of God for us, God himſelf bleſſed for ever.* But whatever I have written, and whatever I have aſſerted, *on this ſubject*, whether I have written and aſſerted it with modeſty, ſobriety, judgment, and humility, muſt be left to the deciſion of ſuch as are competent judges.

We think proper to divide this *Diſſertation* into *Two Parts*. In the FIRST PART, which contains *the body of our opinion*, after having premiſed ſome general deſcriptions of Divine Juſtice, I maintain *ſin-puniſhing juſtice to be natural, and in its exerciſe neceſſary to God.* The truth of this aſſertion forms a very diſtin-

* *Or juſtice.*

guiſhed

guiſhed part of *natural theology*. The *defence* of it, to the beſt of my abilities, both againſt *Socinians*, who bitterly oppoſe it, as well as againſt *certain of our* OWN COUNTRYMEN, who, in defiance of all truth, under a ſpecious pretext, ſupport the ſame pernicious ſcheme with them, ſhall be the ſubject of the LATTER PART.

SECT. I. In almoſt all ages, there have exiſted *ſome*, who have denied the *being* of a God, although but very few, and theſe the moſt abandoned. And as mankind, for the moſt part, have ſubmitted to the evidence of *a divine exiſtence*; ſo there never has exiſted one, who has ever preferred an indictment of injuſtice againſt God, or who hath not declared him to be infinitely juſt. The deſpairing complaints of ſome *in deep calamities*; the unhallowed expoſtulations of others *at the point of death*, do not beſpeak the real ſentiments of the man, but the miſery of his ſituation. As for inſtance, that expoſtulation of JOB x. 3. *Is it good unto thee that thou ſhouldeſt oppreſs?* And among the *Gentiles*, that of BRUTUS, "*O wretched virtue! how mere a nothing art thou, but a name.*" And that furious exclamation of TITUS, when dying, related by *Suetonius*, "who, *pulling aſide his curtains, and looking up to the heavens, complained, that his life was taken from him, undeſervedly, and unjuſtly.*" Of the ſame kind

was that late dreadful epiphonema * of a *despairing Italian*, related by *Mersennus*, who, speaking of GOD and the Devil, in dread contempt of Divine Justice, exclaimed, *Let the strongest take me.*

SECT. II But as " *the judgments of God are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out,*" those who have refused to submit to his *absolute dominion, and supreme jurisdiction,* (some monstrous human characters) have been hardy enough to assert that there is *no God*, rather than venture to call him *unjust*. Hence that common couplet.

Marmoreo tumulo Licinus jacet, at Cato parvo,
Pompeius nullo, credimus esse deos?

Licinus lies buried in a marble tomb: Cato in a mean one;
Pompey has none: can we believe that there are gods?

And hence Ulysses is introduced by Euripides, expressing his horror of the gormandizing of the man-devouring Cyclops, in these verses.†

O, Jupiter, behold such violations of hospitality; for if thou regardest them not,
Thou art in vain accounted Jupiter: for thou canst be no god.

Beyond any doubt, the *audacity* of these abandoned triflers, who would wish to seem to

* A sudden unconnected exclamation.
† Eurip. in Cyclop. v. 350.

act

act the mad part with a ſhew of reaſon, is more akin to *the madneſs of Atheiſm*, than to the *folly* of aſcribing to the god whom they worſhip and acknowledge, ſuch attributes as would not only be unworthy, but diſgraceful to him. Protagoras, therefore, not comprehending the *juſtice* of God, in reſpect of his *government*, hath written, "*With regard to the gods, I do not know whether they exiſt, or do not exiſt.*" Yet, even among the Gentiles themſelves, and thoſe who were deſtitute of the true knowledge of the true God, (for they, in ſome ſenſe, were *without God in the world*) writers have not been wanting *, who have endeavoured, by ſerious and forcible arguments, to unravel the difficulty "*reſpecting the contrary lots of good and bad men, in this life.*" Our firſt idea, therefore, of *the Divine Being*, and the natural conceptions of all men, demand and enforce the neceſſity of *juſtice* being aſcribed to God. To be eloquent then in ſo eaſy a cauſe, or to triumph with arguments on a matter ſo univerſally acknowledged, we have neither leiſure nor inclination. What, and of what kind the peculiar quality and nature of *ſin-puniſhing juſtice* is, ſhall now be briefly explained. And that we may do this with the greater perſpicuity and force of evidence, a few obſervations ſeem neceſſary to be pre-

* The moſt diſtinguiſhed were Seneca and Plutarch.

miſed concerning *juſtice in general*, and its more commonly received diviſions.

Sect. III. The *Philoſopher*, *Ariſtotle*, long ago, as is well known, hath divided juſtice into *univerſal* and *particular*. Concerning the former, he ſays, that he might *compare it* to the celebrated ſaying, "*In juſtice every virtue is ſummarily comprehended.*" And he affirms, that it in no wiſe differs from *virtue in general*, unleſs in reſpect of its *relation* to *another* being.

But, he ſays, that *particular juſtice* is a *ſynonimous* part thereof, which he again diſtinguiſhes into *diſtributive* and * *commutative*. The *Schoolmen* too agreeing with him, which is rather ſurpriſing, divide the Divine Juſtice into *univerſal* and *particular*. For that *excellence*, *ſay they*, is *ſpoken* of God and man by way of *analogy* †: Nor is it like that bird mentioned by Homer, which goes by a double name; by one among mortals, by another among the immortals;

The gods call it Chalcis, but men, Cumindis. Hom.

But *is underſtood* as exiſting in God *principally*, as in the firſt ‡ *analogiſed being*. Nor do *later*

* That which relates to fair exchange.

† Analogy means a reſemblance between things with regard to ſome qualities or circumſtances, properties or effects, though not in all.

‡ That is, the firſt being whoſe perfections have been explained by analogy: or, by tracing a reſemblance between theſe perfections and ſomething like them in our ſelve

later divines diſſent from them: nay, all of them, who have made the divine attributes the ſubject of their contemplations, have, by their unanimous voice, approved of this diſtinction, and given their ſuffrages in its favour.

SECT. IV. But further they aſſert, that *particular juſtice*, in reſpect of its exerciſe, conſiſts either *in what is ſaid*, or, *in what is done*. That which is diſplayed *in things ſaid*, in commands, is *equity*; in declarations, *truth*; both which the Holy Scriptures * do ſometimes point out under the title of Divine Juſtice. But the juſtice which reſpects *things done*, is either that of *government*, or *juriſdiction* or *judgment*: and this again they affirm to be either *remunerative*, or *corrective*; but that corrective is either *caſtigatory*, or *vindicatory*. With the laſt member of this laſt diſtinction, I begin this work: and yet, indeed, although the moſt learned of our divines, in later ages, have aſſented to this diſtribution of Divine Juſtice into theſe various ſignifications, it ſeems proper to me to proceed in a manner *ſomewhat* different, and more ſuited to our purpoſe.

SECT. V. I ſay then, that the juſtice of God may be conſidered in a two-fold manner.

ſelves, in kind or ſort, though differing infinitely with reſpect to manner and degree.

* Rom. i. 14. iii. 21.—Ezra ix. 15.—Neh. ix. 8, &c. &c.

1. *Abſolutely*, and in itſelf.
2. In reſpect of its *egreſs* and *exerciſe*.

Firſt. The juſtice of God, *abſolutely* conſidered, is the univerſal *rectitude* and *perfection* of the divine nature: for ſuch is the divine nature antecedent to all acts of his will, and ſuppoſitions of objects towards which it might operate. This excellence is *moſt univerſal*; nor from its own nature, as an excellence, can it belong* to any other being.

Secondly. It is to be viewed with reſpect to its *egreſs* and *exerciſe*. And thus, in the order of nature, it is conſidered as *conſequent*, or at leaſt as *concomitant* to ſome acts of the divine will, aſſigning or appointing to it a proper object. Hence that rectitude, which in itſelf is an *abſolute property* of the divine nature, is conſidered as a *relative* and hypothetical † attribute, and has a certain habitude to its proper objects.

That is to ſay, this rectitude, or *univerſal juſtice*, has certain egreſſes towards *objects out of itſelf*, in conſequence of the divine will, and in a manner agreeable to the *rule* of his ſupreme right and wiſdom, namely, when ſome object of juſtice is ſuppoſed and appointed; (which object muſt neceſſarily depend on the mere good pleaſure of God, becauſe it was poſſible it might never have exiſted at all;

* Or, have a reſpect to any other Being. † *Conditional.*

God

God notwithſtanding continuing juſt and righteous to all eternity) and theſe *egreſſes* are *two-fold*.

Sect. VI. *Firſt*. They are *abſolute* and perfectly free, viz. in *words*.

Secondly. They are *neceſſary*, viz. in *actions*. For the juſtice of God is neither altogether one of that kind of perfections, *which create and conſtitute an object to themſelves*, as *power* and *wiſdom* do; nor of that kind which not only require an object for their exerciſe, but one peculiarly affected and circumſtanced, as *mercy*, *patience* and *forbearance* do; but may be conſidered in both points of view, as ſhall be more fully demonſtrated hereafter.

Sect. VII. For, *firſt*, it has *abſolute egreſſes in words*; (conſtituting, and as it were creating an object to itſelf) as for inſtance, *in words* of *legiſlation*, and is then called *equity*; or *in words* of *declaration* and *narration*, and is then called *truth*. Both theſe * I ſuppoſe for the preſent, to take place abſolutely and freely. Whether God hath *neceſſarily* preſcribed a law to his rational creatures, at leaſt one accompanied with threats and promiſes, is another conſideration.

Secondly. There are *reſpective* egreſſes of this *juſtice* in *deeds*, and according to the diſtinc-

* Viz. The egreſſes in words of legiſlation; and in words of declaration and narration.

tions above mentioned; that is to say, it is exercised either in the *government* of all things, according to what is due to them by the counsel and will of God; or, in *judgments rewarding*, or *punishing*, according to the *rule* of his *right* and *wisdom*, which also is the rule of *equity* in *legislation*, and of *truth* in the *declarations* annexed. In respect of these*, I call the egresses of the Divine Justice *necessary*, and such that they could not possibly be otherwise, which, by divine help, I shall prove hereafter. And this is the same as saying, that *vindicatory justice* is so natural to God, that sin being supposed, he cannot, according to the rule of his *right*, *wisdom*, and *truth*, but punish it. But antecedent to this whole exercise of the *Divine Justice*, I suppose *a natural right*, which indispensably requires the dependance and moral subjection of the rational creature, in God, all the egresses of whose justice, *in words*, contain an arrest of judgment till further trial, in respect of the object.

Sect. VIII. It now then appears, that all these distinctions of *Divine Justice*, respect it not as considered in itself, but its *egresses* and exercise only; to make which clear, was the reason that I departed from the beaten

* Viz. the egresses in the government of things according to what is due to them, by the counsel of his will; or, in judgments rewarding or punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom.

track.

track. Nay, perhaps, it would be a difficult matter to assign any virtue to God, but *in the general*, and not as having any specific ratio * of any virtue; but that which answers to the ratio of any *particular virtue* in God, consists in the exercise of the same. For instance, *mercy* is properly attributed to God, so far as it denotes the highest perfection in the will of God; the *particular* ratio or quality of which, viz. *a disposition of assisting the miserable, with a compassion of their misery*, is found not altogether as to some, as to others, altogether and only in the exercise of the above-mentioned perfection †; but it is called a proper attribute of God, because, by means of it, some operation is performed agreeable to the nature of God, which, in respect of his other attributes, his will would not produce. This kind, therefore, of the divine attributes, because they have proper and formal objects, thence only derive their formal and specific ratios. But all these observations upon justice must be briefly examined and explained, that we may arrive at the point intended.

* That is, any distinguishing sort or quality.

† In the general sparing mercy of God, the particular quality of mercy, viz. "a disposition of assisting the miserable with a compassion of their misery," is not wholly found, because there are many of mankind towards whom this disposition of assisting is never effectually exerted; but in the pardoning mercy of God to his people, it is fully and gloriously displayed.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The univerſal juſtice of God—The idle fancies of the Schoolmen—The arguments of Durandus againſt commutative juſtice—Suarez's cenſure of the ſcholaſtic reaſonings—His opinion of Divine Juſtice—The examination of it—A deſcription of univerſal juſtice from the ſacred writings—A diviſion of it in reſpect of its egreſs—Rectitude of government in God—what, and of what kind—Definitions of the philoſophers and lawyers—Diviſions of the juſtice of government—A caution reſpecting theſe—Vindicatory juſtice—The opinions of the partiſans—An explication of the true opinion—Who the adverſaries are—The ſtate of the controverſy further conſidered.

SECT. I. WE are firſt then briefly to treat *of the univerſal juſtice of God*; or of his juſtice conſidered in itſelf, and abſolutely, which *contains in it all the divine excellencies*. The Schoolmen, treading in the ſteps of the Philoſophers, who have acknowledged no kind of juſtice which has not naturally ſome reſpect to *another object*, are for the moſt part ſilent concerning this juſtice. And

And once, *by the way* to take notice of theſe, on this as almoſt on every other ſubject, they are ſtrangely divided. Duns Scotus, Durandus, and Poludamus, deny *that there is commutative juſtice in God.**

For the maſter of the ſentences himſelf calls God an *impartial and juſt diſtributor*, but ſays not a word of *commutation*. Thomas Aquinas †, and Cajetan, do the ſame; though the latter ſays, "that ſome *degree* of *commutative juſtice* is diſcernible." So alſo Ferorarienſis, on the ſame place: and Scotus, in the third book of his treatiſe, *of Nature and Grace*, chap. vii. Durandus, in particular, contends, with many arguments, that this kind of juſtice ought not to be aſſigned to God. *Firſt*, becauſe that this juſtice obſerves an equality between the thing given and received, which cannot be the caſe between us and God. And, *ſecondly*, becauſe that we cannot be of any ſervice to him, (which he proves from Romans xi. 35. Job xxii. 3. and xxxv. 7. Luke xvii. 10.) whereby he can be bound to make an equality with us by virtue *of commutation*. And, *thirdly*, becauſe that we cannot make an equal return to God for benefits received. And, finally, that as there is no proper *commutative juſtice* between a father and his

* Palud. on the *Sent. book* 4. *diſtinct.* 46.

† Thomas firſt page of queſt. 21. and Cajetan 2. 2. qu. 61. A. 4.

children,

children, according to Ariſtotle's * opinion, much leſs can it ſubſiſt between God and us.

Sect. II. But the ſame Durandus likewiſe denies to God diſtributive juſtice †, becauſe *he is not indebted to any one:* he, however, acknowledges ſome mode of diſtributive juſtice; and Peſantius ‡ follows his opinion.

But Gabriel, *on the ſame* § *diſtinction*, aſſerts, commutative juſtice to be inherent in God; for there is a certain equality, as he ſays, between God and man, from *the acceptation of God the receiver.* Proudly enough ſaid indeed! But what ſhall we ſay of theſe triflers? They reſemble thoſe advocates in Terence, whoſe opinion, after Demipho, embarraſſed by the cheats of Phormio the ſycophant, had aſked, he exclaims, " *Well done, Gentlemen, I am now in greater uncertainty than before.*" So intricate were their anſwers, and reſembling the practices of the Andabatæ ‖.

Sect. III. Hence Suarez himſelf, after he had reviewed the opinions of the Schoolmen concerning the juſtice of God, bids adieu to them all, declaring, " *That the expreſſions of Scripture had greater weight with him than their philoſophic human arguments.* But with much labour and prolixity, he inſiſts that both *diſ-*

* Eth. b. 8. c. 8. † On diſt. 46.
‡ In. 2. 2. Thomas. § A work to which he alludes.
‖ A kind of Fencers who fought on horſeback hoodwinked.

tributive

tributive and commutative juſtice are to be aſcribed to God, that ſo he might pave the way for that rotten fiction concerning the merits of *Roman Catholics* with God; a doctrine which, were even all his ſuppoſitions granted, appears not to follow, much leſs to be confirmed*. This opinion of Suarez, concerning *vindicatory juſtice*, as it is deſervedly famous in ſcholaſtic theology, we think proper to lay before you in few words.

SECT. IV. In his diſcourſes, *concerning the juſtice of God* †, he contends that the *affection* ‡ of puniſhing, which he calls "*a perfection elicitive*§ *of the act of puniſhing*," is properly and formally inherent in God; and it is ſo, becauſe it hath a proper object, viz. to puniſh the guilt of ſin which is honourable; nor does it include any imperfection, and therefore that ſome formal and proper divine attribute ought to correſpond to that effect.

SECT. V. He further maintains, that this affection of *puniſhing* is neither *commutative* nor *diſtributive juſtice*. His concluſions here I do not oppoſe, though I cannot approve of many of his reaſonings and arguments. In fine, he contends, that *vindicatory juſtice* in God is the ſame with *univerſal*, or *legal*, or *providential*

* Suarez's Lectures "of the Juſtice of God."
† Sect. 5. ‡ Or quality.
§ That is, inducing to, or drawing forth the act of puniſhing.

juſtice,

juſtice, which we call the juſtice of *government*. But he makes a diſhonourable and baſe concluſion, from a diſtinction about the perſons puniſhed, viz. into ſuch as are *merely paſſive ſufferers*, and ſuch as *ſpontaneouſly ſubmit themſelves to puniſhment*, that they may ſatisfy the *punitory juſtice* of God: *reaſoning* in ſuch a manner, that after he has forced the whole doctrine concerning the *commutative* and *diſtributive* juſtice of God, to become ſubſervient to that ſacrilegious and proud error, concerning the merits of man with God, and even of one from the ſupererogation of another; he ſtrenuouſly endeavours to eſtabliſh a conſiſtency between this doctrine of vindicatory juſtice, and a fiction, not leſs impious and diſgraceful to the blood of Chriſt, *which cleanſeth us from all ſin*, about penal ſatisfactions to be performed by ſuch ways and means as God hath never preſcribed, or even thought of.

Deſinit in piſcem mulier formoſa ſuperne. HOR.

SECT. VI. Diſmiſſing theſe bunglers, (who know not the righteouſneſs of God) then, from our diſſertation, let us attend to the more ſure word of prophecy. That word every where aſſerts God to be *juſt*, and poſſeſſed of ſuch juſtice as denotes the *univerſal rectitude*, and perfection of his divine nature. His eſſence is moſt wiſe, moſt perfect, moſt excellent, moſt merciful, moſt bleſſed: that, in fine, is the juſtice of God, according to the Scriptures, viz. conſidered abſolutely, and in itſelf: nor would

would the Holy Scriptures have us to understand any thing else by *Divine Justice, than the power and readiness of God to do all things rightly and becomingly, according to the rule of his wisdom, goodness, truth, mercy, and clemency.* Hence the above-mentioned Sophists agree, that justice, taken precisely, and in itself, and abstracting it from all human imperfections, simply means perfection without intrinsic imperfection: for it is not a virtue that rules the *passions*, but directs their *operations.*

Sect. VII. Hence it presides, as it were, in all the divine decrees, actions, works and words, of whatsoever kind they be: there is no *egress* of the divine will; no *work* or exercise of providence, though immediately and distinctly breathing *clemency, mercy, anger, truth*, or *wisdom*, but in respect thereof, God is eminently said *to be just*, and *to execute justice.* Hence, Isa. li. 6. He is said to be *just, and bringing salvation.* Rom. iii. 25, 26. *Just in pardoning sin.* Psalm cxliii. 11. *Just in avenging and punishing sin.* Rom. iii. 5, 6. *Just in all the exercises of his supreme right and dominion* Job xxxiv. 12, 13, 14. Rom. ix. 8, 14, 15. He is just, *in sparing according to his mercy.* Just *in punishing according* to his *anger and wrath.* In a word, whatsoever by reason of his *right*, he doeth or worketh according *to the counsel of his will*, whatever proceeds from his *faithfulness, mercy, grace, love, clemency, anger*, and even from

from his *fury*, is said to be done *by*, *through*, and *because of his justice*, as the perfection inducing to, or, the cause effecting and procuring such operations. It is evident then, that justice, universally taken, denotes the highest rectitude of the divine nature, and a power and promptitude of doing all things, in a manner becoming and agreeable to his *wisdom*, *goodness*, and *right*.

Sect. VIII. The more solemn egresses of this justice, to which all particular acts may be easily reduced, have been already pointed out: but *equity* in *legislation*, *fidelity* and *truth* in *declarations*, and the promises annexed to them, in which God is often said to be just, and to execute justice, I think may be passed over, as being too remote from our purpose. But as it appears that some light may be thrown on this subject, which we are now treating of, from the consideration of the *relation* of *rectitude* and *divine wisdom*, that is, of universal justice to *government* and *judgment*, we must say a few words on that head.

Sect. IX. But rectitude of *government*, to which that justice *analogically* corresponds, is that which Philosophers and Civilians unanimously agree to be the highest excellence, though they have variously described it. Aristotle calls it "*a habit by which men are capable of doing just things, and by which they both will and*

and do just things *;" attributing to it *aptitude, will,* and *action.* Cicero † calls it " *an affection of the mind, giving to every one his due*; understanding by *affection* not any passion of the mind, but a *habit.* The Civilians understand by it, " *a constant and perpetual will, assigning to every one his due.*" The propriety of their definition, we leave to themselves. That constant and perpetual will of theirs, is the same as the habit of the Philosophers, which, whether it be the proper genus ‡ of this virtue, let *Logicians* determine. Again, as they constantly attribute three acts to *right,* which is the object of justice, viz. *to live honestly, to hurt nobody,* and *to give every one his due*; how comes it to pass that they define justice by one act, when doubtless it respects all right: therefore it is, they say, that " to give *every one his due,* is not of the same extent in the definition of justice, and in the description of the acts of *right.*

Sect. X. But let them both unite in their sentiments as they please, neither the *habit* or *affection* of the Philosophers, nor *the living honestly,* and *hurting nobody,* of the Civilians, can be assigned to God. For in ascribing the perfection of excellencies to him, we exclude the ratio of *habit* or *quality,* properly so called,

* Ethics, Book 5. chap. 1. † De Finibus.
‡ Or class.

and

and every material and imperfect mode of operation. He must be a mortal man, and subject to a law to whom these things apply.

Sect. XI. Moreover those, (I speak of our own countrymen) who divide this justice of *government* into *commutative* and *distributive*, rob God entirely of the *commutative*, which consists in a mutual giving and receiving. *For who first hath given any thing to him?* Who made *thee to differ from another? He giveth no account of his matters.* But *distributive*, which belongs to him as the Supreme Governor of all things, who renders to every one his due, is proper to himself alone. This we have above asserted to be the justice of *government*, or judgment. Of this justice of *government*, frequent mention is made in the sacred writings. *It is that perfection of the Divine Being, whereby he directs all his actions in governing and administring created things, according to the rule of his rectitude and wisdom.* But this excellence, or habitude for action in no wise differs *from universal justice*, unless in respect of its relation to another being. But what is a *law* to us in the administration of things, in God is his *right*, in conjunction with his most wise and just will. For God, as it is said, is a law unto himself. To this justice, are these passages to be referred, Zeph. iii. 5. 2 Chron. xii. 6. Psalm vii. 9. Jer. xii. 1, 2. Tim. iv. 8. with

with almoſt innumerable others. But in all the effects and egreſſes of this juſtice, God is juſtified, not from the reaſon of things, but from his dominion and ſupreme right. Thus, Job xiv. 14. and xxxiii. 12, 13. and xxxiv. 12, 13, 14. And this is the firſt egreſs of the divine rectitude in *works*.

Sect. XII. The other egreſs of this juſtice is in judgment, the laſt member of the diviſions of which above-mentioned, viz. that by which God puniſhes the crimes of rational beings, to whom a law hath been given, according to the rule of his right, is the *vindicatory* juſtice of which we are treating.

Sect. XIII. Here again, reader, I would wiſh to put you in mind, that I by no means aſſert many ſpecies of *univerſal juſtice*, or ſo to ſpeak, particular or *ſpecial juſtices*, as diſtinct perfections in God, which others ſeem to do; but one only, viz. *the univerſal and eſſential rectitude* of the divine nature, and therefore I maintain that this very *vindicatory juſtice itſelf* is the rectitude and perfection of the Deity variouſly exerciſed.

Sect. XIV. Some of the ſchoolmen, however, agree with me in opinion; for Cajetan* upon Thomas grants, that *vindicatory juſtice*, in a public perſon, differs nothing from legal and univerſal juſtice. Although he maintains that there is a *peculiar ſpecies of juſtice* in a pri-

* Queſt. ii. 2.

vate

vate perſon; a poſition which, I confeſs, I do not underſtand, ſince puniſhment, conſidered as puniſhment, is not the right of a private perſon. God certainly does not puniſh us, as being injured, but as a Ruler and Judge. But again, concerning this juſtice, another queſtion ariſes, "*whether it be natural to God*, or, an *eſſential attribute of the divine nature*; that is to ſay, ſuch, that the exiſtence of ſin being admitted, God muſt neceſſarily exerciſe it, becauſe it ſuppoſes in him a conſtant and immutable will to puniſh ſin: ſo that while he acts conſiſtent with his nature, he cannot do otherwiſe than puniſh and avenge it? Or, whether it be a free act of the divine will, which he may exerciſe at pleaſure? On this point Theologians are divided. We ſhall conſider what has been determined on the matter, by the moſt notorious enemies of divine truth, and eſpecially by thoſe of our own times.

1ſt. Then, they own, "*That ſuch a kind of juſtice is applicable to God, which, were he always inclined to exerciſe, he might, conſiſtent with right, deſtroy all ſinners, without waiting for their repentance, and ſo let no ſin paſs unpuniſhed.*"

2dly. "*That he will not pardon any ſins, but thoſe of the penitent.*"

Nor do they deny, ſo far as I know,

3dly. "*That God hath determined the puniſhment*

niſhment of ſin, by the rule of his right and wiſdom."

But they deny,

1ſt. That perfection by which God puniſhes ſins, either to be his juſtice, or to be ſo called in Scripture; but, only *anger*, *fury*, or *fierce indignation*, expreſſions, denoting in the cleareſt manner, the freedom of the divine will *in the act of puniſhing*. Although ſome of Socinus's followers, among whom is Crellius, have declared openly againſt him on this point.

Again, they deny,

2dly. That there is any ſuch attribute in God as requires a ſatisfaction for ſins, which he is willing to forgive; but maintain, that he is entirely free "*to yield up his claim of right*," as they phraſe it, at pleaſure; that therefore *Divine Juſtice* ought, by no means, to be reckoned among the cauſes of Chriſt's death; nay more, ſay they, *ſuch a kind of juſtice* may be found *in the epiſtles* of Iſcariot to the Phariſees, (they are the words of Gitichius) but is not to be found in the *Holy Scriptures*.

Sect. XV. Such are the opinions of thoſe concerning whom we are diſputing at this preſent day, whether they be heretics; certainly they are not Chriſtians. Between their ſentiments and ours on this point, there is the wideſt difference: for we affirm, "*the juſtice by which God puniſhes ſin, to be the very eſſential rectitude of Deity itſelf, exerciſed in the puniſhment*

ment of ſins, according to the rule of his wiſdom, and which is in itſelf no more free, than the divine eſſence.

Sect. XVI. This *kind of* juſtice Socinus oppoſes with all his might, in almoſt all his writings, but eſpecially in his *Theological Lectures of the Saviour*, Book I. chapter i. &c. Moſcorovius alſo on the Racovian Catechiſm, chap. viii. queſt. 19. Oſtorodius, a moſt abſurd heretic, in his Inſtitutions, chap. xxxi. and in his Diſputations to Tradelius. Volkelius, *of the true religion*, Book V. chap. xxi. Alſo Crellius, the moſt acute and learned of all the adverſaries, in that book which he wiſhed to have prefixed to the Diſſertations of Volkelius, chap. xxviii. and in his Vindications againſt Grotius, chap. i. In a little work alſo, entitled, " Of the Cauſes of the Death of Chriſt," chap. xvi. He purſued the ſame object in almoſt all his other writings, both *polemical* and *dogmatical*, and likewiſe in his commentaries; a very artful man, and one that employed very great diligence and learning in the worſt of cauſes. Michael Gitichius has the ſame thing in view, in his writings againſt Paræus, and in his diſpute with Ludovicus Lucius, in defence of his firſt argument, a moſt trifling ſophiſt, a mere copieſt of Socinus, and a ſervile follower of his maſter. Of mightier powers too riſe up againſt us, Valentinus Smalcius againſt Francheus,

cheus; and, who is ſaid to be ſtill alive, the learned Jonas Schlictingius. All theſe, with the reſt of that herd, place all their hopes of overturning the doctrine of the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, in oppoſing this juſtice.

Sect. XVIII. But theſe are not the only adverſaries we have to do with: there are others, pious, worthy and very learned divines, who, reſpecting the point of Chriſt's ſatisfaction, are moſt ſtrictly orthodox; and who, though they cannot find in their hearts directly to deny that ſuch an attribute or power is eſſential to God: yet maintain all its egreſſes, and its whole exerciſe, reſpecting ſin, to be ſo free and dependent on the mere free motion and good pleaſure of the Divine will, that ſhould not that oppoſe, *God might, by his nod, by his word, without any trouble*, by other modes and ways, beſides the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, (if only it ſeemed proper to his wiſdom) take away, pardon, and make an end of ſin, without inflicting any penalty for the tranſgreſſion of his law. And this, it is ſaid, was the opinion of Auguſtine. By which (I will ſay) raſh and daring aſſertion, (be it ſpoken without offence, for they are truly great men) by their nod and breath they ſuſpend and diſperſe the very ſtrongeſt arguments, by which the adverſaries feel themſelves moſt hardly puſhed, and by which the belief of Chriſt's ſatisfaction is ſtrongly ſupported; and

deliver up our moſt holy cauſe, I had almoſt ſaid, defenceleſs, to be the ſport of the Philiſtines. Nay, not very long ago, it has been diſcovered and lamented by the orthodox, that very conſiderable aſſiſtance has been imprudently given by a learned countryman of our own, to theſe *Aliens, who defy the armies of the living God.* " *For, if we could but get rid of this juſtice, even if we had no other proof,*" ſays Socinus, " *that human fiction of Chriſt's ſatisfaction would be thoroughly expoſed, and would vaniſh.*" Soc. *of the Saviour.* Book III. Chap. 1. &c.

Sect. XIX. Of our own countrymen, the only one I know is Rutherford, a Scotch divine, who roundly and boldly aſſerts, " *Punitive juſtice to be a free act of the Divine will:*" nor is he content with the bare aſſertion, but ſupported chiefly by his arguments, to whom the Schoolmen are ſo much indebted, he defends the *fallacy*, againſt both *Cameron* and *Voetius*, *theſe two thunderbolts of Theological war*; though, in my opinion, neither with a force of argument nor felicity of iſſue equal to his opponents. But both the one and the others grant, " *that God hath decreed to let no ſin paſs unpuniſhed without a ſatisfaction: but that decree being ſuppoſed, with a law given, and a ſanction of the ſame by threatenings, that a ſatisfaction was neceſſary:*" but, that punitive juſtice *neceſſarily* requires the puniſhment of all ſins, according to the rule of God's right and

and wiſdom, this is what they deny, and endeavour to overturn.

SECT. XX. But to me, theſe arguments are altogether aſtoniſhing; viz. *that ſin-puniſhing juſtice ſhould be natural to God*, and *yet that God, ſin being ſuppoſed to exiſt*, MAY EITHER EXERCISE IT, OR NOT EXERCISE IT. They may alſo ſay, and with as much propriety, *that truth is natural to God*; but upon a ſuppoſition that he were to converſe with man, HE MIGHT EITHER USE IT, OR NOT: or, that omnipotence is natural to God; but upon a ſuppoſition that he were inclined to do any work *without* himſelf, that *it were free to him to act* OMNIPOTENTLY, OR NOT: or, finally, *that ſin-puniſhing juſtice* is among the *primary cauſes of the death of Chriſt*, and that Chriſt *was ſet forth as a propitiation, to declare his righteouſneſs*, and yet that, *that juſtice required not the puniſhment of ſin*. For if it ſhould require it, how is it poſſible that it ſhould not *neceſſarily* require it, ſince God would be *unjuſt*, if he ſhould not inflict puniſhment? Or further, *they might as well aſſert*, that God willed that *juſtice* ſhould be *ſatisfied* by ſo many and ſuch great ſufferings of his ſon Chriſt, when *that juſtice required no ſuch thing:* nay more, that ſetting aſide the free act of the Divine will, SIN AND NO SIN are the ſame with God, and that *man's mortality* hath not followed, chiefly as *the conſequence of ſin*, but of *the will of God*.

Theſe, and ſuch like difficulties, I leave to the authors of this opinion *(for they are very learned men)* to unravel. As to myſelf, they fill me with confuſion and aſtoniſhment.

Sect. XXI. But this I cannot forbear to mention, that theſe very divines, who oppoſe our opinion, when hard puſhed by their adverſaries, perpetually have recourſe in their diſputations to this juſtice, as to their *ſacred anchor*; and aſſert, that without a ſatisfaction, God could not pardon ſin, *conſiſtent with his nature, juſtice, and truth.* But as theſe are very great abſurdities, it would have ſeemed ſtrange to me, that any men of judgment and orthodoxy ſhould have been ſo entangled in ſome of theſe *ſophiſms*, as to renounce the truth on their account, *unleſs I had happened at one time myſelf to fall into the ſame ſnare*; which, to the praiſe and glory of that truth, of which I am now a ſervant, I freely confeſs *to have been my caſe.*

But to avoid miſtakes, as much as poſſible, in diſcuſſing the nature of this juſtice, we will make the following obſervations.

Sect. XXII. 1ſt. There are ſome attributes of Deity which, in order to their exerciſe, require no determined object *antecedent* to their egreſs: of this kind are *wiſdom* and *power.* Theſe attributes, at leaſt, as to their firſt exerciſe, muſt be entirely free, and dependent on the mere good pleaſure of God only; ſo that

that *antecedent* to their acting, the Divine will is so indifferent as to every exercise of them, on objects *without* himself, that he might even will the opposite. But if we suppose that God wills to do any work *without* himself, he must act *omnipotently* and *wisely*.

There are again, some attributes, which can, in no wise, have an egress, or be exercised without an object predetermined, and, as it were, by some circumstances prepared for them: among these is *punitive justice*; for the exercise of which there would be no ground, but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being, and its having sinned; but these being supposed, *this justice must necessarily* act according to *its own rule*.

Sect. XXIII. 2d. But that *rule* is not any free act of the Divine will, but a *supreme, intrinsic, natural right of Deity*, conjoined with *wisdom*, to which the entire exercise of this justice ought to be reduced. These men, entirely trifle then, who, devising certain *absurd* conclusions of their own, annex them to a supposition of the necessity of punitive justice as to its exercise: as for instance, *that God ought to punish sin to the full extent of his power, and that he ought to punish every sin with eternal punishment, and that therefore he must preserve every creature that sins to eternity*, and *that he cannot do otherwise*, I say they trifle; for God does not punish to the *utmost extent of his power*, but, *so far as is just*; and all modes and de-

grees of punishment are determined by the standard of the *Divine right and wisdom.*

Whether that necessarily requires that every sin should be punished with eternal punishment, let those inquire, who choose.—*Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.*

Sect. XXIV. 3d. But the existence of a rational creature, and the moral dependence which it has, and must have upon God, being supposed, the first egress of this justice is in the constitution of a *penal law*; not as a law which, as was before observed, originates from the justice of government, but as a penal law.

For if such a law were not made *necessarily*, it might be possible that God should lose his *natural right* and dominion over his creatures, and thus he would not be God; or, *that right being established*, that the creature might not be subject to him, which implies a contradiction, not less, than if you were to say, that *Abraham is the father of Isaac*, but that, *Isaac is not the son of Abraham.* For, in case of a failure in point of obedience, (a circumstance which might happen, and really hath happened) that dependence could be continued in no way, but through means of a vicarious punishment: and there must have been a penal law constituted, necessarily requiring that punishment. Hence arises a *secondary* right of punishing, which extends to every amplification of that penal

penal law, in whatever manner made. But it has a ſecond egreſs in the infliction of puniſhment.

Sect. XXV. 4th. And here it is to be remarked, that *this juſtice* neceſſarily reſpects *puniſhment in general*, as including in it the nature of puniſhment, and ordaining ſuch a vindication of the Divine honour, as God can acquieſce in: not the *time*, or *degrees*, or ſuch like circumſtances of puniſhment. Yea, not this, or that ſpecies of puniſhment; for it reſpects only the preſervation of God's natural right, and the vindication of his glory; both which may be done by *puniſhment in general*, however circumſtanced. A diſpenſation, therefore, with puniſhment (eſpecially temporary puniſhment) by a delay of time, an increaſe or diminution of the degree, by no means prejudiceth the neceſſity of the exerciſe of this juſtice, which only intends an infliction of puniſhment in general.

Sect. XXVI. 5th. But again, though we determine "*the egreſſes of this juſtice to be neceſſary*," we do not deny that God exerciſes it *freely:* for that neceſſity doth not exclude a *concomitant liberty*, but only an *antecedent indifference*. This only we deny, viz. that, ſuppoſing a ſinful creature, the will of God can be indifferent (by virtue of the punitive juſtice inherent in it) to inflict, or not inflict puniſhment upon that creature, or to the volition of

puniſhment, or its oppoſite. The whole of Scripture, indeed, loudly teſtifies againſt any ſuch *indifference*; nor is it conſiſtent with God's ſupreme right over his creatures: neither do they who eſpouſe a different ſide, contend with a ſingle word brought from the Scriptures. But that God puniſhes ſins with a *concomitant liberty*, becauſe he is of all agents the moſt free, we have not a doubt. Thus his intellectual will is *carried* towards happineſs *by an eſſential inclination* antecedent to liberty, and notwithſtanding it wills happineſs *with a concomitant liberty:* for to act freely is the very nature of the will; yea, it muſt neceſſarily act freely.

Sect. XXVII. Let our adverſaries therefore *dream* as they pleaſe, that we determine God to be an *abſolutely neceſſary agent*, when he is a *moſt free one*; and that his will is ſo circumſcribed by ſome kind of juſtice, *which we maintain*, that he cannot will thoſe things which, ſetting the conſideration of that *juſtice* aſide, would be free to him. For, we acknowledge the Deity to be both a *neceſſary* and *free agent: neceſſary* in reſpect of all his actions, *internally*, or in reſpect of the perſons *in the Godhead towards one another:* the Father neceſſarily begets the Son and loves himſelf: as to theſe and ſuch like actions, he is of all neceſſary agents the moſt neceſſary. But in reſpect of the acts of the Divine will, which have

have their operations and effects upon external objects, he is an agent absolutely free, being one, *who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.* But of these acts there are two kinds; for some are *absolute*, and *admit* no respect to any antecedent condition.

Of this kind is his *purpose of creating the world*, and in it rational creatures, properly adapted to know and obey the Creator, Benefactor, and Lord of all. In works of this kind, God hath exercised the greatest liberty: his infinitely wise and infinitely free will is the fountain and origin of all things. Neither is there in God any kind of justice, or any other essential attribute, which could prescribe any limits or *measure* to the Divine will. But this decree *of creating* being supposed, the Divine will undergoes a double *necessity* (so to speak) both in respect of the *event*, and in respect of its *manner* of acting. For in respect of the *event*, it is necessary, from the *immutability of God*, that the world should be created: and in respect of the *manner of doing it*, that it should be done *omnipotently*, because God is essentially *omnipotent*; and it being once supposed that he wills to do any work *without* himself, he *must* do it omnipotently. Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, in the creation of the world, God was entirely a free agent: he exercised will and understanding in acting, although the

choice of acting or not acting, and of acting in one particular way or another, is taken away by his *immutability* and *omnipotence*.

SECT. XXVIII. There is *another kind* of the acts of the Divine will, which could have no possible existence but upon a *condition supposed*.

This kind contains the egresses and exercise of those attributes which could not be exercised but upon a supposition of other antecedent acts; of which we have treated before. Of this kind, are all the acts of the Divine will, in which Justice, Mercy, &c. exert their *energy*. But these attributes of the Divine nature are, either for the purpose of preserving or continuing to God what belongs to him of right, supposing that state of things which he hath freely appointed; or for bestowing on his creatures some further good. Of the former kind is *vindicatory justice*, which, as it cannot be exercised but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being, and of its sin; so, these being supposed, the *supreme right* and *dominion* of the Deity could not be preserved entire, unless it were exercised. Of the latter kind is *sparing mercy*, by which God bestows an undeserved good on miserable creatures. For setting aside the consideration of their misery, this attribute cannot be exercised; but that being supposed, if he be inclined to bestow any undeserved

ſerved good on creatures wretched through their own tranſgreſſion, he may exerciſe this mercy, if he will. But again, in the exerciſe of *that juſtice*, although if it were not to be exerciſed, according to our former hypotheſis, God would ceaſe from his right and dominion, and ſo would not be God, ſtill he is a free, and not an abſolutely neceſſary agent: for, he acts from will and underſtanding, and not from an impetus of nature only, as fire burns: and he freely willed that ſtate and condition of things, which being ſuppoſed, that juſtice muſt neceſſarily be exerciſed. Therefore, in the exerciſe of it, he is not leſs free than in ſpeaking; for, ſuppoſing, as I ſaid before, that his will were to ſpeak any thing, it is neceſſary that he ſpeak the truth. Theſe loud outcries, therefore, which the adverſaries ſo unſeaſonably make againſt our opinion, as if it determined God to be an *abſolutely neceſſary agent* in his operations *ad extra*, entirely vaniſh and come to nought. But we will treat more fully of theſe things, when we come to anſwer objections.

Sect. XXIX. Finally let it be obſerved, that the nature of *mercy* and *juſtice* are different in reſpect of their exerciſe: for, between the *act* of *mercy* and its *object*, no natural obligation intervenes; for God is not bound to any one, to exerciſe any act of mercy, neither is he bound to *reward obedience*: for this is a debt

debt due from his natural right, and from the moral dependence of the rational creature, and indiſpenſably thence ariſing. But between the *act* of *juſtice* and its object, a natural obligation intervenes, ariſing from the indiſpenſable ſubordination of the creature to God, which ſuppoſing diſobedience or ſin, could not otherwiſe be ſecured than by puniſhment. Nor is the liberty of the Divine will diminiſhed in any reſpect more by the *neceſſary* egreſſes of Divine Juſtice, than by the exerciſe of other attributes: for theſe *neceſſary egreſſes* are the conſequence, not of an abſolute, but of a *conditional* neceſſity; viz. a rational creature and its ſin being ſuppoſed, and both exiſting freely in reſpect of God: but the neceſſary ſuppoſitions being made, the exerciſe of other perfections is alſo neceſſary; for it being ſuppoſed, that God were diſpoſed to ſpeak with man, he muſt neceſſarily ſpeak according to truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

A series of arguments in support of vindicatory justice—First from the Scriptures—Three divisions of the passages of Scripture—The first, contains those which respect the purity and holiness of God—The second, those which respect God as the Judge—What it is to judge with justice—The third, those which respect the Divine supreme right.

A second argument is taken from the general consent of mankind—A three-fold testimony of that consent—The first, from the Scriptures—some testimonies of the Heathens—The second, from the power of conscience—Testimonies concerning that power—The mark set upon Cain—The expression of the Emperor Adrian, when at the point of death—The consternation of mankind at prodigies—The horror of the wicked, whom even fictions terrify:—two conclusions.

The third testimony, from the confession of all nations—A vindication of the argument against Rutherford—The regard paid to sacrifices among the Nations—Different kinds of the same—Propitiatory sacrifices—Some instances of them.

SECT. I. THESE preliminaries being thus laid down to facilitate our entrance on the subject, I proceed to demonstrate

ſtrate, by a variety of arguments, both againſt *enemies*, and againſt *friends* from whom I diſſent, that this *punitive juſtice* is *natural* to God, and *neceſſary* as to its egreſſes reſpecting ſin. But becauſe, ſince the entrance of ſin into the world, God hath either continued, or increaſed the knowledge of himſelf, or accommodated it to our capacities by four ways, namely, by the *written word, by a rational conſcience, by his works of providence*; and laſtly, *by the perſon of Jeſus Chriſt his only-begotten Son*, and by the myſtery of godlineſs manifeſted in him; we will ſhew, that by each of theſe modes of communication he hath revealed and made known to us this his juſtice. Our firſt argument then is taken from the *teſtimony* of the *ſacred writings*, which in almoſt numberleſs places aſcribe this *vindicatory* juſtice to God.

Sect. II. The paſſages of Holy Scripture which aſcribe *this juſtice* to God, may be claſſed under *three diviſions*. The *firſt* contains thoſe which certify, "*that the purity and holineſs of God*," hoſtily oppoſe and deteſt ſin. Whether *holineſs* or *purity* be an attribute natural to God, and immutably *reſiding* in him, has not yet been called in queſtion by our adverſaries. They have not yet arrived at ſuch a pitch of madneſs. But *this* is that *univerſal perfection of God*, which, when he exerciſes in puniſhing the tranſgreſſions of his crea-

creatures, is called *vindicatory juſtice*. For whatever there be in God perpetually inherent, whatever *excellence* there be *eſſential* to his nature, which occaſions his diſpleaſure with ſin, and which *neceſſarily occaſions this diſpleaſure*, this is *that juſtice* of which we are ſpeaking.

SECT. III. But here firſt occurs to us that celebrated paſſage of the prophet Habakkuk, chap. i. verſe 15. "*Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canſt not look on iniquity.*" The Prophet here aſcribes to God the greateſt deteſtation, and ſuch an immortal hatred of ſin, that he cannot look upon it; but, with a wrathful averſion of his countenance abominates and dooms it to puniſhment. But perhaps God thus hates ſin, becauſe *he wills it*; and by an act of his will, entirely free, though the ſtate of things might be changed, without any injury to him, or diminution of his eſſential glory. But the Holy Spirit gives us a reaſon very different from this, viz. "*The purity of God's eyes: thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil.*" But there is no one who can doubt that the Prophet here intended the holineſs of God: the incomprehenſible, infinite, and moſt perfect *holineſs* or *purity* of God, is the cauſe why he hates and deteſts all ſin; and, that *juſtice* and *holineſs* are the ſame as to the common and general notion of them, we have ſhewn before.

SECT.

SECT. IV. Of the same import is the admonition of Joshua in his address to the people of Israel, chap. xxiv. 19. "*Ye cannot serve the Lord*; (that is, he will not accept of a false and hypocritical worship from you) *for he is an holy God: he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins.*" God then will not forgive transgressions, that is, he will most certainly punish them, because he is *most holy*. But this holiness is the universal perfection of God, which, when exercised in punishing the sins of the creatures, is called *vindicatory justice*; that is, in relation to its exercise and effects; for in reality the *holiness and justice* of God are the same; neither of which, considered in itself and absolutely, differs from the divine nature; whence they are frequently used the one for the other.

SECT. V. Moreover, it is manifest, that God meant this holiness in that promulgation of his glorious name, or of the essential properties of his Divine nature, made face to face, to Moses, in Exodus xxxiv. 5, 7. which name he had also before declared, chap. xxiii. 7. That, *non-absolution* or *punishment* denotes an external effect of the Divine will, is granted: But when God proclaims this to be his name, "*The Lord, The Lord God, &c. that will by no mans clear the guilty*," he manifestly leads us to the contemplation of that excellence essentially inherent in his nature, which

which induces him to such an act: but that, by whatever name it be distinguished in condescension to our capacities, is *the justice* that we mean.

Sect. VI. That eulogium of Divine Justice by the Psalmist, Psal. v. 54, 6. favours this opinion. "*For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness: neither shall evil dwell with thee: the foolish shall not stand in thy sight: thou hatest all the workers of iniquity: thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man.*" But those who deny this hatred of sin and sinners, and the disposition to punish them, to be *perpetually, immutably, and habitually* inherent in God, I am afraid have never strictly weighed in their thoughts the Divine purity and holiness.

Sect. VII. To the *second class* may be referred those passages of Scripture which ascribe to God the *office of a Judge*, and which affirm that he judges, and will judge, all things with justice. The first which occurs is that celebrated expression of Abraham, Gen. xviii. 25. *Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* These are not the words of one who doubts, but of one enforcing a truth acknowledged and confessed among all; a truth upon which the intercession of this faithful friend of God, for the pious and just inhabitants of Sodom is founded; for Abraham here ascribes to God the

the power and office of a *juſt Judge*; in conſequence of which character, he muſt neceſſarily exerciſe judgment according to the different merits of mankind. This, the words in the preceding clauſe of the verſe, accompanied with a vehement rejection and deteſtation of every ſuſpicion that might ariſe to the contrary, ſufficiently demonſtrate, "*that be far from thee to do*, viz. *to ſlay the righteous with the wicked.* God then is a Judge and a juſt one: and it is impoſſible for him not to exerciſe right or *judgment.* But that *juſtice* wherewith he is now endowed, and by which he exerciſeth right, is not a free act of his will (for who would entertain ſuch contemptible thoughts even of an earthly judge) but a habit or excellence at all times inherent in his nature.

SECT. VIII. But this *ſupreme excellence and general idea* which Abraham made mention of and enforced, the Apoſtle again afterwards ſupports and recommends, Rom. iii. 5, 6. "*Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid, for then how ſhall God judge the world?* Unleſs he were *juſt*, how ſhall he judge the world? Therefore this moſt righteous of all judges, exerciſeth juſtice in judging the world, "*becauſe he is juſt.*"

SECT. IX. For why ſhould God ſo often be ſaid to judge the world *juſtly and in juſtice*, unleſs his juſtice were that perfection, whence this

this righteous and juſt judgment flows and is derived, Acts xvii. 31. " *he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteouſneſs, by that man whom he hath ordained :*— and in Rom. ii. 5. The day of the laſt judgment is called, " *the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.*"

Sect. X. But again, on this very account the *juſtice* of God is celebrated, and he himſelf, in an eſpecial manner, is ſaid to be *juſt*, becauſe he inflicts puniſhment, and *exerciſes his judgments* according to the demerits of ſinners. Rev. xvi. 5, 6. " *Thou art righteous, O Lord, which art, and waſt, and ſhalt be, becauſe thou haſt judged thus ; for they have ſhed the blood of Saints and Prophets, and thou haſt given them blood to drink : for they are worthy.*"

But all *retaliation* for a crime proceeds from *vindicatory juſtice* ; but that God exerciſes that juſtice, and is thence denominated juſt, is evident. The Holy Spirit eſtabliſhes this truth in the plaineſt words, Pſal. ix. 4, 5. where he glorioufly vindicates this juſtice of God,— " *Thou haſt maintained my right and my cauſe,* ſays the Pſalmiſt, *thou ſatteſt on the throne judging right. Thou haſt rebuked the heathen, thou haſt deſtroyed the wicked, thou haſt put out their name for ever and ever.* God exerciſeth juſtice and determines cauſes, as he *ſits upon his throne,* that is, as being endowed with ſupreme

judi-

judiciary power, and that, as he is a *Judge of righteouſneſs, or moſt righteous Judge.* Pſal. cxix. 137. *Righteous art thou, O Lord, and upright are thy judgments.*

Sect. XI. It now remains, that we take a view of one or two of thoſe paſſages of Scripture which, in conſideration of this Divine Juſtice, aſſert the infliction of puniſhment for ſin in itſelf, and as far as relates to the thing itſelf to be juſt. To this purpoſe is that of the Apoſtle to the Rom. chap. i. 34. "*Who knowing the judgment*, or juſtice, *of God, that they which commit ſuch things are worthy of death.*" Whatever, or of what kind ſoever that juſtice or right of God may be, of which the Apoſtle is ſpeaking, it ſeems evident that the three following properties belong to it.

1ſt. That it is univerſally acknowledged, nay, it is not unknown, even to the moſt abandoned of mankind, and to thoſe ſchools of every kind of wickedneſs which the Apoſtle is there deſcribing. Whence they derive this knowledge of the Divine law and juſtice, ſhall be made appear hereafter.

2d. That it is the *cauſe, ſource* and *rule* of all puniſhments, to be inflicted. For this is the *right* of God, "*that thoſe who commit ſin are worthy of death.*" From this *right* of God it follows, "*that the wages of every ſin is death.*

3d. That

3d. That it is *natural* and *essential* to God. For although in respect of its *exercise*, it may have a handle, or occasion, from some things external to the Deity, and in respect of its effects may have a *meritorious* cause, yet in respect of its *source* and *root*, it respects himself, as its subject, if God be absolutely perfect: if belonging to any other being, it cannot agree to him.

You will say that this *right* of God is free: but I deny, that any *right* of God, which respects his creatures, can, as a habit inherent in his nature, be free, though in the exercise of every right, God be absolutely free; neither can any free act of the Divine will towards creatures be called any *right* of Deity, it is only the *exercise* of some *right*. But an act is distinguished from its habit or root.

Sect. XII. And now it appears evident, that this *right* is not that *supreme right* or *absolute dominion* of God, which, under the primary notion of a *Creator*, must be necessarily ascribed to him; for it belongs not to the *supreme Lord*, as such to inflict punishment, but as *Ruler* or *Judge*.

The supreme dominion and right of God over his creatures, no doubt, so far as it supposes *dependence* and *obedience*, necessarily requires that a *vicarious punishment* should be appointed, in case of transgression or disobedience; but the very *appointment* of punishment,

ment, as well as the infliction of it, flows from his right as the *Governor*; which right, conſidered with *reſpect to tranſgreſſions*, is nothing elſe than *vindicatory juſtice*. The Apoſtle therefore ſignifies that, that is, the *juſtice* always reſident in God as a *Legiſlator*, *Ruler*, and *Judge* of all things, which by common preſumption, even the moſt abandoned of mankind acknowledge.

SECT. XIII. To theſe may be added two other paſſages which occur in the writings of the ſame Apoſtle, 2 Theſſ. i. 6. "*Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompence tribulation to them that trouble you*;" *a recompence of tribulation* is a real peculiar act of *vindicatory juſtice*; but that belongs to God as he is *juſt*. Thence the puniſhment of ſin is called in Heb. ii. 2. "*A juſt recompence of reward*," and by Jude v. 7. "*the vengeance*, or juſtice, *of eternal fire*." Becauſe, viz. it follows from *that juſtice* of God, that ſuch crimes are juſtly recompenſed by ſuch a puniſhment.

SECT. XIV. But we will not be further troubleſome in reciting particular proofs; from thoſe already mentioned, and from others equally ſtrong, we thus briefly argue; that to that being, whoſe property it is "*to render unto every one according to his works, not to clear the guilty, to condemn ſinners worthy of death, and to inflict the ſame upon them, to hate ſin, and who will in no wiſe let ſin paſs unpuniſhed, and*

and all this, becauſe he is juſt, and becauſe his juſtice ſo requires," ſin-puniſhing juſtice, naturally belongs, and that he cannot act contrary to that juſtice.

But the paſſages of Scripture juſt now mentioned, with many others, aſſert that all theſe properties above recounted, belong to and are proper to God, *becauſe he is juſt:* therefore, *this juſtice belongs to God, and is natural to him.*

Sect. XV. It *matters not* what we affirm of vindicatory juſtice; *whether that it be meant* of God eſſentially, and not only *denominatively,* that it has an abſolute name (for it is called *holineſs* and *purity*) that we have it expreſſed both in the *abſtract* and *concrete*; for what is more than that, it is affirmed expreſsly, directly, and particularly, oftimes in the paſſages above mentioned, that it requires the puniſhment of ſinners, that it implies a conſtant and immutable will of puniſhing every ſin according to the rule of Divine *wiſdom* and *right:* impudent to a high degree indeed then muſt Socinus have been, who hath maintained that, that perfection of Deity by which he puniſheth ſin, is not called *juſtice,* but always *anger* or *fury.* Anger indeed and fury, analogically and effectively, belong to juſtice.

So much for our *firſt argument.*

Sect. XVI. The *univerſal conſent of mankind* furniſhes us with a *ſecond*; from which we may reaſon in this manner;—*what common opinions*

opinions and the innate conceptions of all assign to God, that is natural to God. But this corrective justice is so assigned to God; therefore this justice is natural to God.

The major proposition is evident; for what is not natural to God, neither exists in him by any *mode of habit, or mode of affection,* but is only a free act of the Divine will; and the knowledge of that can by no means be naturally implanted in creatures: for whence should there be an *universal previous conception* of an act which might either take place, or never take place. No such thing was at the first engraven on the hearts of men, and the fabric of the world teaches us no such thing.

But the *minor proposition* is established by a three-fold proof. 1st. By the testimony of the Scripture. 2d. By the testimony of every sinner's conscience. 3d. And by that of the *public* consent of all nations.

Sect. XVII. The Holy Scriptures testify that such an *innate conception* is implanted by God in the minds of men. Thus the Apostle to the Rom. chap. i. 32. *who knowing the judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death.* He is here speaking of those nations that were the most forsaken by God, and *delivered over to a reprobate mind:* yet even to these he ascribes some remaining knowledge of this immutable right of God, which renders it neces-

neceſſary, that every tranſgreſſion ſhould receive its *juſt recompence of reward*, and that ſinners ſhould be deſerving of *death* in ſuch a manner, that it would be unworthy of God not to inflict it; that is to ſay, although the *operations of this obſerving and acknowledging principle* ſhould often become very languid, and be even almoſt entirely overwhelmed by abounding wickedneſs; for *what they know naturally as brute beaſts, in thoſe things they corrupt themſelves*, yet, that mankind muſt ceaſe to exiſt before they can altogether loſe this innate ſenſe of Divine *right* and *judgment*. Hence the Barbarians conclude againſt Paul, then a priſoner, and in bonds, ſeeing the viper hanging on one of his hands, that " *No doubt he was a murderer, whom, though he had eſcaped the ſea, yet vengeance ſuffered not to live.* Here they argue, from the effect to the cauſe, which in matters relating to moral, good or evil, they could not, unleſs convinced in their conſciences, that there is an inviolable connection between ſin and puniſhment, which they here aſcribe to *juſtice*.

Evidences of God's Justice, from Pagan writers.

Sect. XVIII. Juſtice among them, according to their *fabulous* Theology, which was particularly favoured by the bulk of the people, was the daughter of *Jupiter*, whom he ſet over the affairs of mortals, *to avenge the*

 injuries

injuries which they ſhould do to one another, and to inflict condign puniſhment on all thoſe who ſhould impiouſly offend againſt the gods.

Hence, Heſiod ſpeaking of Jupiter, ſays,

He married a ſecond wife, the fair Themis, who brought forth the Hours,
And Eunomia, and Juſtice, &c.
Who ſhould watch o'er the actions of mortal men.

HESIOD IN THEOG.

Again, the ſame Author ſays,

Juſtice is a Virgin, deſcended from Jupiter,
Chaſte, and honour'd by the heavenly deities;
And when any one hath injur'd her,
Indirectly committing the injury, &c.

HESIOD IN OPER.

Alſo, Orpheus in the Hymns,

I ſing the eye of juſtice, who looketh behind her, and is fair,
Who likewiſe ſits upon the ſacred throne of ſovereign Jupiter,
As the avenger of the unjuſt.

Hence, theſe common ſayings,

God hath a juſt eye;
God hath found the tranſgreſſor.

In all which, and in numberleſs other ſuch paſſages, *the wiſeſt men in thoſe times of ignorance*, have announced their ſenſe of this *Vindicatory Juſtice.*

And

And among the Latins, the following paſſages prove their ſenſe of the ſame

Aſpiciunt oculis, &c.

The gods above behold the affairs of mortals with impartial eyes.

Raro antecedentem, &c.

Seldom hath Puniſhment, through lameneſs of foot, left off purſuit of the wicked man, though he hath had the ſtart of her. HORACE.

Alſo, that celebrated reſponſe of the Delphic Oracle, recorded by Ælian:

But Divine Juſtice traces out the ſources of crimes,
Nor can it be avoided even by the deſcendants of Jupiter;
But it hangs over the heads of the wicked themſelves, and over the heads of their
Children; and one diſaſter to their race is followed by another.

All which aſſert this *Vindicatory Juſtice.*

SECT. XIX. This then, as Plutarch ſays, is the *antient faith* of mankind; or in the words of Ariſtotle, "opinion concerning God," which Dion Pruſæenſis calls "*a very ſtrong and eternal perſuaſion, from time immemorial received, and ſtill remaining among all nations.*"

SECT. XX. Secondly, The conſciences of all mankind concur to corrobate this truth; but the cauſe which has *numberleſs witneſſes* to ſupport it, cannot fail. Hence, not only the flight, hiding places, and fig-leaf aprons of our Primogenitor, but every word of dire

meaning and evil omen, as terror, horror, tremor, and whatever elſe harraſſes guilty mortals, have derived their origin. Conſcious to themſelves of their wickedneſs, and convinced of the Divine dominion over them, this idea, above all, dwells in their minds, that he with whom they have to do, is ſupremely juſt, and the avenger of all ſin. From this conſideration, even the people of God have been induced to believe, that death muſt inevitably be their portion, ſhould they be but for once ſiſted in his preſence. Not that the maſs of the body is to us an obſcure and dark priſon, (as the Platoniſt's dream) whence, when we obtain a view of Divine things, being formerly enveloped by that maſs, it is immediately ſuggeſted to the mind, that the bond of union between mind and body muſt be inſtantly diſſolved.

Sect. XXI. It muſt indeed be acknowledged, that through ſin we have been tranſformed into worms, moles, bats, and owls; but the cauſe of this general fear and diſmay, is not to be derived from this ſource.

The *juſtice* and *purity* of God, on account of which he can bear nothing *impure* or filthy to come into his preſence, occurs to ſinners minds: wherefore, they think of nothing elſe, but of a preſent God, of puniſhment prepared, and of deſerved penalties to be immediately inflicted. The thought of the Deity

burſting

bursting in upon the mind, immediately every sinner stands confessed a debtor, a guilty and self-condemned criminal. *Fetters, prisons, rods, axes,* and *fire,* without delay, and without end, rise to his view. Whence, some have judged the mark set upon Cain to have been some horrible tremor, by which, being continually shaken and agitated, he was known to all. Hence too these following verses:

Whither flyest thou Enceladus? Whatever coasts thou shalt arrive on,
Thou wilt always be under the eye of Jupiter.

And these,

As every one's conscience is, so in his heart he conceives hope or fear, according to his actions.

——— *This is the first* punishment, that even in his own judgment, no guilty person is acquitted.*

——— *You may think that we have passed over those whom a guilty conscience holds abashed, and lashes with its inexorable scourge; the mind, the executioner shaking the secret lash.*

See Voss. on Idol. Book I. Chap. II.

'Tis the saying of a certain Author, that *punishment* is *coeval* with *injustice*; and, that *the horror of natural conscience is not terminated by the limits of human life.*

Sunt aliquid manes: lethum non omnia finit,
Lucida que evictos effugit Umbra Rogos.

* Or, Chief.

The ſoul is ſomething, death ends not all,
And the light ſpirit eſcapes the vanquiſhed funeral pile.

SECT. XXII. Hence the famous verſes of *Adrian*, the Roman Emperor, ſpoken on his death-bed:

Animula vagula, blandula,
Hoſpes comeſque corporis,
Quæ nunc abibis in loca?
Pallidula, rigida, nudula,
Nec (ut ſoles) dabis joca.

"Alas, my ſoul, thou pleaſing companion "of this body, thou fleeting thing, that art "now deſerting it! Whither art thou flying? "To what unknown ſcene? All trembling, "fearful, and penſive! What now is become "of thy former wit and humour? Thou ſhalt "jeſt and be gay no more."

TRANSLATED THUS BY POPE.

"Ah fleeting ſpirit! wandering fire,
"That long haſt warm'd my tender breaſt,
"Muſt thou no more this frame inſpire?
"No more a pleaſing chearful gueſt?

"Whither, ah whither art thou flying!
"To what dark undiſcover'd ſhore?
"Thou ſeem'ſt all trembling, ſhiv'ring, dying,
"And wit and humour are no more!"

"That which is truly evil," ſays Tertullian, "not even thoſe who are under its influence, "dare defend as good. All evil fills nature "with fear, or ſhame. Evil doers are glad

"to

" to lie concealed; they avoid making their " appearance; they tremble when appre- " hended." Hence the Heathens have repreſented *Jove* himſelf, when conſcious of any crime, as not free from fear. We find Mercury thus ſpeaking of him in Plautus:

Etenim ille, &c.

" Even that Jupiter, by whoſe order I come hither,
" Dreads evil no leſs than any of us;
" Being himſelf deſcended from a human father and " mother,
" There is no reaſon to wonder, that he ſhould fear for " himſelf."

Sect. XXIII. Hence too, mankind have a *dread awe* of every thing in nature that is *grand, unuſual,* and *ſtrange*; as thunders, lightenings, or eclipſes of the heavenly bodies; and tremble at every prodigy, ſpectre, or comet; nay, even at the hob-goblins of the night, exclaiming, like the woman of Sarepta, upon the death of her ſon, " *What have I to do with thee? Art thou come to me to put me in remembrance of my iniquities?* Hence, even the moſt abandoned of men, when vengeance for their ſins hangs over their heads, have confeſſed their ſins, and acknowledged the Divine Juſtice.

It is related by Suetonius, that *Nero*, that diſgrace of human nature, juſt before his death, exclaimed, " My wife, my mother,

and my father, are forcing me to my* end." Moſt deſervedly celebrated too is that expreſſion of Mauricius the Capadocian, when ſlain by Phocas, "Juſt art thou, O Lord, and thy judgments are righteous."

SECT. XXV. But moreover, while guilty man dreads the conſequences of evil, which he knows he has really committed, he torments and vexes himſelf even with fictitious fears and bugbears: hence theſe verſes of Horace;

Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, ſagas,
Nocturnos Lemures, portenta que Theſſala finxit.

Ideas for the moſt part ridiculous: but as the old proverb ſays, *'Tis but reaſonable that they ſhould wear the fetters which themſelves have forged.* Hence the guilty trembling mob is impoſed upon, and cheated by impoſtors: by vagrant fortune-tellers and aſtrologers. If any illiterate juggler ſhall have foretold a year of darkneſs, alluding, viz. to the night-ſeaſon of the year, the conſternation is as great, *as if Hannibal were at the gates of the city.* The ſtings of conſcience vex and goad them, and

* His mother, Agrippa, had poiſoned her laſt huſband, the Emperor Claudius, to make way for his ſucceſſion; and Nero rewarded her, by cauſing her to be murdered. He likewiſe cauſed his wife, Octavia, and his tutor, Seneca, to loſe their lives; and was, in every reſpect, perhaps one of the greateſt monſters of wickedneſs that ever diſgraced human nature.

their

their minds have ſuch preſentiments of Divine Juſtice, that they look upon every new prodigy as final, or portentous of the final conſummation. I paſs over obſerving, at preſent, that, if once a conviction of the guilt of any ſin be carried home to the mind, this ſolemn tribunal cannot thoroughly be diſlodged from any man's boſom, either by diſmal ſolitude, or by frequent company; by affluence of delicacies, or by habits of wickedneſs and impiety; nor, in fine, by any endeavours after the practice of innocence. The Apoſtle in his Epiſtle to the Romans, chap. ii. enters more fully into this ſubject. Two things, then, are to be concluded from what has been ſaid that mankind are guilty, and that they acknowledge.

Sect. XXVI. 1ſt. *That God hates ſin, as contrary to himſelf, and that therefore 'tis impoſſible for a ſinner, with ſafety, to appear before him.* But *if God hate ſin*, he does it either from his *nature*, or becauſe he ſo *wills it:* but it cannot be becauſe he *wills it*, for in that caſe he might *not will it:* a ſuppoſition moſt abſurd. And indeed, that aſſertion of Socinus, is every way barbarous, abominable, and moſt unworthy of God, wherein he ſays, "*I maintain that our damnation derives its origin, not from any juſtice of God, but from the free will of God.*" Socinus "of the Saviour." chap. viii. p. 3. But if

God hate ſin *by nature*, then *by nature* he is juſt, and vindicatory juſtice is natural to him.

SECT. XXVII. 2d. *That our ſins are debts, and therefore we ſhun the ſight of our creditor.* But I mean ſuch a *debt*, as with relation to God's ſupreme dominion, implies in it a perpetual right of puniſhment; and ſuch is the ſecond proof of the minor propoſition of the ſecond argument. The third remains.

SECT. XXVIII. The public conſent of all nations furniſhes the *third* proof of this truth. There are writers indeed who have affirmed, a thing by no means credible, that ſome nations have been ſo given *up to a reprobate mind*, that they acknowledge no Deity. Socinus hath written, that a certain Dominican Friar, a worthy honeſt man, had related this much to himſelf of the Braſilians, and other natives of America. But who can aſſure us that this Friar has not falſified, according to the uſual cuſtom of travellers, or that Socinus himſelf has not invented this ſtory, (for he had a genius fertile in falſehoods) to anſwer his own ends; but let this matter reſt on the credit of Socinus, who was but little better than an infidel. But nobody, even by report, hath heard that there exiſt any who have acknowledged the being of a God, and who have not, at the ſame time, declared him to be juſt, to be diſpleaſed with ſinners and ſin, and that it is the duty of mankind to propitiate him, if they would enjoy his favour.

SECT.

SECT. XXIX. But a reſpectable writer objects, viz. *Rutherford on Providence*, chap. xxii. p. 355. *That this argument, that, that which men know of God by the natural power of conſcience, muſt be naturally inherent in God, is of no weight*; *for*, ſays he, *by the natural power of conſcience, men know that God does many good things freely, without himſelf*; as for inſtance, *that he has created the world*; *that the ſun riſes and gives light*; *and yet in theſe operations God does not act from any neceſſity of nature.*

SECT. XXX. But this learned man blunders miſerably here, (as often elſewhere) in his apprehenſion of the deſign and meaning of his opponents; for they do not uſe this argument to prove that the *egreſſes* of Divine Juſtice are *neceſſary*, but that *juſtice* itſelf is *neceſſary* to God, which Socinians deny. What is his anſwer to theſe arguments? *Mankind acknowledge many things*, ſays he, *which God does freely.* To be ſure they do, when he exhibits them before their eyes: but what follows from that? ſo too they acknowledge that God puniſhes ſin, when he puniſhes it. But becauſe all mankind, from the works of God, and from the natural power of conſcience, acknowledge God to be good and bountiful, we may, without heſitation, conclude goodneſs and bounty to be eſſential attributes of God; ſo likewiſe, becauſe from the natural power of conſcience, and the conſideration of God's works of Providence,

vidence, they conclude and agree *that God is juſt:* we contend, that *juſtice* is natural to God.

Sect. XXXI. But as mankind have teſtified this conſent by other methods, ſo they have eſpecially done it by *ſacrifices:* concerning which, Pliny ſays, "That all the world have agreed in them, although enemies or ſtrangers to one another." But ſince theſe are plainly of *a divine origin,* and inſtituted to prefigure (ſo to ſpeak) the true atonement by the blood of Chriſt, in which he hath been the Lamb ſlain from the foundation of the world; that is, from the promiſe made of the ſeed of the woman, and from the ſacrifice of Abel which followed, the uſe of them deſcended to all the poſterity of Adam; therefore, though afterwards the whole plan and purpoſe of the inſtitution was loſt, among by far the greateſt part of mankind, and even the true God himſelf, to whom alone they were due, was unknown; and though no traces of the thing ſignified, namely, the promiſed ſeed remained, yet ſtill the thing itſelf, and the general notion of appeaſing the Deity by ſacrifices hath ſurvived all the darkneſs, impieties, dreadful wickedneſs, puniſhments, migrations of nations, downfalls, and deſtructions of cities, ſtates, and people, in which the world for theſe many ages hath been involved. For a conſciouſneſs of ſin, and a ſenſe of divine and aveng-

avenging juſtice, have taken deeper root in the heart of man, than that they can by any means be eradicated.

SECT. XXXII. There were four kinds of ſacrifices among the Gentiles. *Firſt*, the *propitiatory* or *peace-making* ſacrifices; for by thoſe, they thought they could render the gods propitious, or *appeaſe them*; or avert the anger of the gods, and *obtain peace* with them: hence theſe verſes on that undertaking of the Greeks in the exordium of Homer.

But let ſome Prophet, or ſome ſacred ſage,
Explore the cauſe of great Apollo's rage:
Or learn the waſteful vengeance to remove
By myſtic dreams; for dreams deſcend from Jove.
If broken vows this heavy curſe have laid,
Let altars ſmoke, and Hecatombs be paid:
So heaven atoned ſhall dying Greece reſtore,
And Phœbus dart his burning ſhafts no more.
POPE'S HOMER.

They were deſirous of *appeaſing* Apollo by ſacrifices, who had inflicted on them a lamentable mortality. To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of Virgil,

The Prophet * firſt with ſacrifice adores
The greater gods; their pardon then implores, &c.
DRYDEN'S VIRG.

Hence too that lamentation of the perſon in the *Penalus* of *Plautus*, who could not make ſatisfaction to his gods.

* Viz. Helenus *Æneid*, Book III.

" Unhappy

" Unhappy man that I am," says he, " to-
" day I have sacrificed six lambs to my much-
" incensed gods, and yet I have not been
" able to render Venus propitious to me: and
" as I could not appease her, I came instantly
" off."

Sect. XXXIII. And Suetonius, speaking of Otho, says, *he endeavours, by all kinds of piaculary sacrifices, to propitiate the manes of Galba, by whom he had seen himself thrust down and expelled.* And the same author affirms of Nero, *That he had been instructed that Kings were wont to expiate the heavenly prodigies by the slaughter of some illustrious victim, and to turn them from themselves upon the heads of their nobles.* Though this perhaps rather belongs to the second kind. But innumerable expressions to this purpose are extant both among the Greek and Latin authors.

Sect. XXXIV. The second kind were the *expiatory* or *purifying* sacrifices, by which sins were said to be *atoned, expiated*, and *cleansed*, and sinners *purified, purged*, and made *desirous of peace*, and the anger of the gods *turned aside and averted.* It would be tedious, and perhaps superfluous, to produce examples: the learned can easily trace them in great abundance. The other kinds were the *Eucharistical* and *Prophetical*, which have no relation to our present purpose.

Sect.

SECT. XXXV. In this way of appeasing the Deity, mankind, I say, formerly agreed: whence 'tis evident, that an *innate conception* of this *sin-avenging justice* is natural to all; and, therefore, that, that justice is to be reckoned among the essential attributes of the Divine nature, concerning which only, and not concerning the free acts of his will, *mankind universally agree.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The origin of human ſacrifices—Their uſe among the Jews, Aſſyrians, Germans, Goths, the inhabitants of Marſeilles, the Normans, the Francs, the Tyrians, the Egyptians, and the antient Gauls — Teſtimonies of Cicero and Cæſar, that they were uſed among the Britons and Romans by the Druids—A fiction of Appio concerning the worſhip in the Temple of Jeruſalem—The names of ſome perſons ſacrificed—The uſe of human ſacrifices among the Gentiles, proved from Clemens of Alexandria, Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſia, Porphyry, Philo, Euſebius, Tertullian, Euripides—Inſtances of human ſacrifices in the Sacred Scriptures—The remarkable obedience of Abraham—What the neighbouring nations might have gathered from that event—Why human ſacrifices were not inſtituted by God—The ſtory of Iphigenia—The hiſtory of Jephtha—Whether he put his daughter to death—The cauſe of the difficulty—The impious ſacrifice of King Moab—The abominable ſuperſtition of the Rugiani—The craftineſs of the Devil—Vindications of the argument—The ſame concluded.

SECT. I. BUT it is ſtrange to think what a ſtir was made, by the antient enemy of mankind, to prevent any ray of light reſpecting

pecting the true *ſacrifice*, that was to be made in the fulneſs of time, from being communicated to the minds of men through means of this *univerſal ceremony and cuſtom of ſacrificing*. Hence, he influenced the moſt of the nations to the heinous, horrible, and deteſtable crime of offering human ſacrifices, in order to *make atonement for themſelves, and render God propitious* by ſuch an abominable wickedneſs.

Sect. II. But as it ſeems probable, that ſome light may be borrowed from the conſideration of theſe *ſacrifices*, in which, mankind, from the *preſumption* of a future judgment, have ſo cloſely agreed, perhaps the *learned reader* will think it not foreign to our purpoſe to dwell a little on the ſubject, and to reckon up ſome examples. This *abomination*, prohibited by God, under the penalty of a total extermination, was divers times committed by the Jews, running headlong into forbidden wickedneſs, while urged on by the ſtings of conſcience to this infernal remedy. They offered their children as burnt-ſacrifices to *Moloch*, that is, to the *Saturn* of the *Tyrians*; not to the planet of that name; not to the Father of the *Cretan Jupiter*; but to the *Saturn* of the *Tyrians*, that is, to *Baal*, or to the Sun; and not by making them to paſs between two fires *for purification*, as ſome think, but by burning them in the manner of a whole burnt-offering. Pſal. cvi. 36, 37, 38. "And they ſerved

"their

" their idols which were a ſnare unto them :
" yea, they ſacrificed their ſons and their
" daughters unto Devils, and ſhed innocent
" blood, even the blood of their ſons and of
" their daughters, whom they ſacrificed unto
" the idols of Canaan, and the land was pol-
" luted with blood." Almoſt the whole world, *during the times of that ignorance which God winked at, paid court to the Devil.* Since then, it is abundantly evident, from theſe ſacrifices, by what a ſenſe of *vindicatory juſtice*, horror of puniſhment, and conſciouſneſs of ſin, mankind are conſtrained : we muſt enlarge a little on the conſideration of them.

Sect. III. Tacitus ſpeaking of the Germans, ſays, " Of the gods, they chiefly
" worſhip Mercury, to whom, on certain
" days, they hold it as an article of religion
" and piety to ſacrifice human victims : Mars,
" they have always been accuſtomed to ap-
" peaſe by a moſt cruel worſhip; for his vic-
" times were the deaths of the captives." Jornandes affirms the ſame of the Goths. And thus *Lucan* writes in his ſiege of *Marſeilles* ;

" ———Here the ſacred rites of the gods
" are barbarous in their manner; altars are
" built for deadly ceremonies, and every tree
" is purified by human blood."

And the ſame author, in the ſixth book, from his Precepts of Magic, has theſe verſes.

Vulnere

Vulnere ſi ventris, &c.

" If contrary to nature, the child be extracted through " a wound in the belly, to be ſerved up on the hot al- " tars.

Virgil bears witneſs that ſuch ſacrifices were offered to *Phœbus* or the *Sun*.

ÆNEID X.

" Next Lycas fell; who not like others born,
" Was from his wretched mother rip'd and torn:
" Sacred, O Phœbus! from his birth to thee——

DRYDEN'S VIRGIL.

But *Acoſta* aſſerts, that infants are ſacrificed, even at this very time, to the *Sun*, in *Cuſcum*, the capital of Peru.

And thus the Scriptures teſtify, 2 Kings, xvii. 29, 30, 31.

Howbeit, every nation made gods of their own, and put them in the houſes of the high places, which the Samaritans had made, every nation in the cities wherein they dwelt, and the men of Babylon made Succoth-benoth, and the men of Cuth made Nergal, and the men of Hamath made Aſhima; and the Avites made Nibhaz and Tartak, and the Sepharvites burnt their children in fire to Adrammelech and Anammelech the gods of Sepharvaim.

SECT. IV. Ditmarus, in his firſt book, teſtifies, " that the Normans and Danes ſa- " crificed yearly, in the month of January, " to their gods, ninety-nine human crea- " tures,

" tures, as many horſes, beſides dogs and " cocks." But what Procopius, on the Gothic war writes, is truly aſtoniſhing, viz. " that the Francs made uſe of human victims in his time, even though they then worſhiped Chriſt. Alas! for ſuch a kind of Chriſtianity. The practices of the Tyrians,* Carthaginians, and Egyptians, in this reſpect, are known to every one." And Theodoret ſays, " that in Rhodes, ſome perſon was ſacrificed " to Saturn, on the ſixteenth of the calends of " November, which, after having been for a " long time obſerved, became a cuſtom. And " they uſed to reſerve one of thoſe who had " been capitally condemned till the feaſt of " Saturn."

Sect. V. Porphyry, " on Abſtinence from " Animals," relates the cuſtoms of the Phœnicians concerning this matter. " The Phœ- " nicians," ſays he, " in great diſaſters, either " by wars, or commotions, or peſtilence, uſed " to ſacrifice one of their deareſt friends, or " relations, to Saturn, devoted to this fate by " the common ſuffrages." They were called Phœnicians, from the word φοῖνιξ, which ſignifies a *red* colour; φοινιξ, according to Euſtathius, is from φονος, which ſignifies *blood*; thence the colour called φοινίκεος, or the purple

* Concerning the Tyrians, ſee Curtius, book fourth, and concerning the Carthaginians, ſee Diodorus, book twentieth.

colour.

colour. Hence, the learned conjecture, that the Phœnicians were the deſcendants of *Eſau* or *Edom*, whoſe name alſo ſignifies *red*, and from whom alſo the *Red ſea* was named. *Edom*, then φοινιξ and ἐρυθραῖος, mean the ſame, viz. *red*. Why may we not then conjecture, that the *Phœnicians* or *Idumæans*, were firſt led to this cuſtom, from ſome corrupt tradition concerning the ſacrificing of *Iſaac*, the father of *Eſau*, the leader and head of their nation. This, at leaſt, makes for the conjecture, that while other nations ſacrificed enemies or ſtrangers, *Porphyry* bears witneſs that they ſacrificed *one of their deareſt friends or relations*. But *Iſaac* was not to *Abraham one of the deareſt*, but the *only dear one*. From ſuch corrupt traditions as theſe, it is not to be wondered, that the conſciences of men, ſtruck with a fear of puniſhment, ſhould have been encouraged to perſevere in ſo cruel and ſuperſtitious a worſhip.

Sect. VI. Concerning the antient Gauls, we have the moſt creditable evidences, Cicero, and Julius Cæſar; the former of whom charges them with *the practice of offering human ſacrifices*, as a horrid crime, and certain evidence of their contempt of Deity. The other, however, commends them on this very account, on the ſcore of a more ſevere religion. "If at any time induced by fear, they think "it neceſſary that the gods ſhould be ap-

"peaſed,

" peaſed, they defile their altars and temples " with human victims; as if they could not " practice religion, without firſt violating it " by their wickedneſs. For who does not " know, that even at this day, they retain " that ſavage and barbarous cuſtom of ſacri- " ficing human beings? thinking that the " immortal gods can be appeaſed by the " blood and wickedneſs of man." *Cicero pro Fonteio.* But Cæſar, the conquèror of the Gauls, gives us a very different account of theſe kind of ſacrifices; " this nation, ſays " he, of all the Gauls, is the moſt devoted to " religious obſervances; and for that reaſon, " thoſe who labour under any grievous " diſtemper, or who are converſant in dan- " gers and battles, either ſacrifice human " victims, or vow that they will ſacrifice " them, and they employ the Druids as the " conductors of ſuch ſacrifices: for they have " an opinion that, unleſs a human life be given " for a human life, the heavenly Deities " cannot be appeaſed." Theſe laſt words ſeem to me to acknowledge a perſuaſion that muſt have ariſen from ſome antient tradition, about the ſubſtitution of the ſon of man, in the ſtead of ſinners, *as a propitiation for ſin.*

SECT. VII. No doubt can be entertained concerning the inhabitants of *Britain*, but that they were guilty of the ſame practices; for from them came the *Druids*, the firſt promoters of

of that superstition, not only in the *Gauls*, but even in *Italy*, and in the city of *Rome* itself. "The doctrine of the Druids," says Cæsar, "is thought to have been found in Britain, and "brought thence into Gaul: and now such as "are desirous to examine more particularly "into that matter, generally go thither for "the sake of information." Book vi. of the wars in Gaul. But Tacitus informs us with what kind of sacrifices they performed their divine services there, in the fourteenth book of his annals. "When the island of "Anglesea was conquered by Paulinus, a "guard (says he) was placed over the van-"quished, and the groves devoted to cruel "superstitions were hewn down; (the "same was done by Cæsar in the siege of "Marseilles; *Lucan*, book third) for it was "an article of their religion to sacrifice their "captives on the altars, and to consult their "gods by human entrails."

Hence that verse in Horace.

Visam Britannos hospitibus feros.

"I will visit the Britons cruel to strangers."

Sect. VIII. At which remote place*, the Britons used to sacrifice their guests for victims; yea, even in Rome itself, as Plutarch, in his life of Marcellus testifies, they buried, by order of the high priests, *a man and woman*

* Viz. Anglesea.

of

of Gaul, and a man and woman of Greece, alive in the cattle market, to avert ſome calamity by ſuch a fatal ſacrifice. Whether this was done yearly, as ſome think, I am rather inclined to doubt.

Sect. IX. Of the ſame kind was the religion of the *Decii*, devoting themſelves for the ſafety of the city. Hence a ſuſpicion aroſe, and was every where rumoured among the Gentiles concerning the ſacred rites of the Jews, with which they were unacquainted, viz. " that they were wont to be ſolemnized with human ſacrifices. For although after the deſtruction of the Temple, it was manifeſt that they worſhipped the *God of heaven* only, yet ſo long as they celebrated *the ſecret myſteries* appointed them by God, *Joſephus againſt Appio* bears witneſs, that they laboured under the infamy of that horrible crime, viz. of ſacrificing human victims, *among thoſe who were unacquainted with the Jewiſh polity*: where he alſo recites, from the ſame Appio, a moſt ridiculous fiction about a young Greek captive, being delivered by Antiochus, when he impiouſly ſpoiled the Temple, after having been fed there on a ſumptuous diet for the ſpace of a year, that he might make the fatter a victim.

Sect. X. A cuſtom that prevailed with ſome, not unlike this untruth about the young Greek kept in the Temple, ſeems to have given

given rise to it. For thus *Diodorus*, in Book V. writes of the *Druids*, " They fix up their ma-
" lefactors upon poles, after having kept them
" five years, (it seems they fattened much
" slower than at Jerusalem) and sacrifice
" them to their gods; and with other first
" fruits of the year, offer them on large fu-
" neral piles." Theodoret also mentions something of that kind concerning the Rhodians, in the first book *of the Greek Affections:* the words have been mentioned before.

But that young Greek, *destined for sacrifice*, in Appio, *has no name*; that is, there never was any such person.

" But, friend, discover faithful what I crave,
" Artful concealment ill becomes the brave;
" Say what thy birth, and what the name you bore,
" Imposed by parents in the natal hour."

* *Pope's Homer's Odyssey*, Book VIII.

Sec. XI. But after having prepared the plot, he ought not to have shunned the task of giving names to the actors. We have the name of a *Persian* sacrificed even among the *Thracians*, in Herodotus, Book IX. " The
" Thracians of Apsinthium (says he) having
" seized Oiobazus flying into Thrace, sacri-
" ficed him after their custom to Pleistorus,
" the god of the country."

* The words in the original apply much better to our Author's meaning. *See them,* Odyss. Lib. VIII. v. 550.

SECT. XII. There is ſtill remaining, if I rightly remember, the name of a Spaniſh ſoldier, a captive with other of his companions among the Mexicans, well known inhabitants of America, who being ſacrificed on a very high altar to the gods of the country, when his heart was pulled out, if we can credit Peter Martyr, author of the Hiſtory of the Weſt Indies, tumbling down upon the ſand, exclaimed, "*O, companions, they have murdered me.*" Clemens of Alexandria makes mention of *Theopompus*, a king of the Lacedemonians being ſacrificed by *Ariſtomenes the Meſſenian*. His words, which elegantly ſet forth this cuſtom of all the nations, we ſhall beg leave to trouble the reader with: "But now, "when they had invaded all ſtates and nations "as plagues, (he is ſpeaking of Dæmons) "they demanded cruel ſacrifices; and one "Ariſtomenes, a Meſſenian, ſlew three hun- "dred in honour of Ithometan Jupiter, "thinking that he ſacrificed ſo many Heca- "tombs in due form, and of ſuch a kind. "Among theſe, too, was Theopompus, king "of the Lacedemonians, an illuſtrious vic- "tim. But the inhabitants of Mount Tau- "rus, who dwell about the Tauric Cherſo- "neſe, inſtantly ſacrifice whatever ſhip- "wrecked ſtrangers they find upon their "coaſts to Diana of Taurus." "Thence, "*ye unhoſpitable ſhores*, Euripides again and

"again

" again bewails in his ſcenes theſe your ſacri-
" fices."

Clemens's Exhortations to the Greeks.

SECT. XIII. But what he ſays concerning *Euripides*, has a reference to the ſtory of Iphigenia among the inhabitants of Taurus: *where, however, the Poet ſignifies that ſhe deteſted ſuch kinds of ſacrifices; for he introduces Iphigenia, then Prieſteſs of Diana, thus bewailing her lot:

" They have appointed me Prieſteſs in
" theſe temples, where Diana, the goddeſs of
" the feſtival, is delighted with ſuch laws;
" whoſe name alone is honourable: but I ſay
" no more, dreading the goddeſs. For I ſa-
" crifice, (and it long hath been a cuſtom of
" the State) every Grecian that arrives in
" this country." *Eur. Iph. in Tauris.*

Thus far Clemens, who alſo demonſtrates the ſame thing of the *Theſſalians*, *Lycians*, *Leſbians*, *Phocenſians*, and *Romans*, from *Monimus*, *Antoclides*, *Pythocles*, and *Demaratus*. That deed too of Agamemnon, alluded to by Virgil, furniſhes another proof.

Sanguine placaſtis ventos, et virgine cæſa, &c.

" O, Grecians, when the Trojan ſhores you ſought,
" Your paſſage with a virgin's blood was bought."

DRYDEN'S VIRG.

SECT. XIV. Tertullian alſo bears witneſs to this wickedneſs:—" In Africa they openly

* In the play of Euripides, called *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

" ſacrificed infants to Saturn, even down to " the time of the Proconſulate of Tiberius; " and what is ſurpriſing, even in that moſt re- " ligious city of the pious deſcendants of " Æneas, there is a certain Jupiter, whom, " at his games, they drench with human " blood."

'Tis notoriouſly known, that *in the ſanguinary games* of the Romans, they made atonement to the gods with human blood, namely, that of captives. But *Euſebius* * *Pamphilus* enters the moſt fully of any into this matter: for he ſhews from *Porphyry*, *Philo*, *Clemens*, *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſia*, and *Diodorus Siculus*, that this ceremony of *offering human ſacrifices* was practiſed all over the world. Porphyry, indeed, ſhews, at large, who inſtituted this kind of worſhip in different places, and who put an end to it. Another very ingenious Poet brings an accuſation of extreme folly and madneſs, againſt this rite, in theſe verſes. 'Tis a Plebeian addreſſing Agamemnon:

Tu quum pro vitula, ſtatuis dulcem Aulide natam,
Anté aras, ſpargiſque mola caput, Improbe, Salſa,
Rectum animi ſervas?

When your own child you to the altar led,
And pour'd the ſalted meal upon her head;
When you beheld the lovely victim ſlain,
Unnatural Father! were you ſound of brain?

* Biſhop of Cæſarea, in Paleſtine, a very learned Prelate, and one of the greateſt writers of his time.

Agamem-

Agamemnon is introduced thus apologiſing for himſelf, on account of the utility and neceſſity of the ſacrifice.

Verum ego, ut hærentes adverſo littore naves
Eriperem, prudens placavi ſanguine Divos.

But I, while adverſe winds tempeſtuous roar,
To looſe our fated navy from the ſhore,
Wiſely with blood the powers divine adore.
FRANCIS HORACE.

The Plebeian again charges him with madneſs:

Nempe tuo, furioſe?

What! your own blood, you madman?

But *Philo*, in his firſt book, relates that one *Saturn* (there were many illuſtrious perſons of that name, as well as of the name of *Hercules*) when the enemies of his country were oppreſſing it, ſacrificed at the altars *his own daughter*, named *Leudem*, which among them, *viz.* the *Tyrians*, means *only begotten*.

I have little or no doubt but that this *Saturn* was *Jephthah* the *Iſraelite*; that their *Hercules* was *Joſhua*, the celebrated *Voſſius* has clearly proved. *Book* I. *of Idol.*

SECT. XVI. But as we have made mention of *Jephthah*, it will not be foreign to our purpoſe, briefly to treat of theſe three famous examples of *human ſacrifices* recorded in the ſacred writings. The firſt is contained in that celebrated hiſtory concerning the *trial* of *Abraham:* an undertaking ſo wonderful and aſtoniſhing, that no age hath ever produced, or will produce its like. It even exceeds every

thing *that fabulous Greece hath presumed in story.* A most indulgent and affectionate father, weighed down with age,* is ordered to offer his only son, the pillar of his house and family, *the trust of Heaven,* a son solemnly promised him by God, *the foundation of the future church,* in whom, according to the oracles of God, *all the nations of the earth were to be blessed*; this most innocent, and most obedient son, he is ordered to offer as a *burnt-offering:* a dreadful kind of sacrifice indeed! which required, that the victim should be first *slain,* afterwards *cut in pieces,* and lastly *burnt* by the hand of a father! What though the purpose was not accomplished, God having graciously so ordained it; this obedience of the holy man is, *notwithstanding,* to be had in *everlasting* remembrance! And forasmuch as he begun the task with a sincere heart and unfeigned faith, the Holy Spirit bears testimony to him, as if he had *really* offered his son. Heb. xi. 17. *By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac; and he that had received the promises, offered up his only begotten.* The fame of this transaction, no doubt, was spread, in antient times, over

* Abraham is now said to have been a hundred and thirty-three years of age: for some are of opinion that Isaac, at the time he was to have been sacrificed, was thirty-three years old: Josephus says, twenty-five. The Jews in *Seder Olam,* thirty-six. Nor is it any objection that he is called *Naar,* for so Benjamin, the father of many children is called, Gen. xliii.

many

many of the Eaſtern nations. But that thoſe, who were altogether ignorant of the communion and friendſhip which Abraham cultivated with *the Lord*, and yet were convinced in their conſciences, that a more noble ſacrifice than all cattle, and a more precious victim was neceſſary to be offered to God, (for if this perſuaſion had not been deeply impreſſed on their minds, the *Devil* could not have induced them to that *dreadful worſhip)* aſſumed the courage of practiſing the ſame thing, from that event, there is not any room to doubt. And further, if any report were ſpread abroad concerning the Divine command and oracle which Abraham received, the eyes of all would be turned upon him as the *wiſeſt* and *holieſt* of men, and they would be led (perhaps) to conclude falſely that God might be propitiated by ſuch kind of victims. For they did not *this*, from any *rivalſhip of Abraham*, whom they reſpected as a wiſe and juſt man; but being deceived by that action of his, and endeavouring, at an expiation of their own crimes, they did the ſame thing that he did, but with a very different end: for the *offering up* of Iſaac was a type of the ſacrifice of Jesus Christ.

Sect. XVI. But from that right and dominion, which God naturally hath over all the creatures, or from that ſuperior excellence and eminence, wherewith he is endowed and conſtituted, he might, without any degree or

ſuſpicion of injuſtice or cruelty, exact victims as a tribute from man; but he hath declared his will to the contrary, Exod. xxxiv. 19, 20. *But the firſtlings of an aſs thou ſhalt redeem with a lamb: and the firſt-born of thy ſons thou ſhalt redeem.* Partly, leſt human blood, of which he has the higheſt care, ſhould become of little account; but eſpecially, becauſe all mankind in general being polluted with iniquities, a type of his immaculate ſon could not be taken from among them.

SECT. XVII. But this hiſtory, the falſifying poets of the Greeks have corrupted, by that *fable* of theirs, concerning the ſacrifice of Iphigenia, begun by her father Agamemnon, but who was liberated by the ſubſtitution of a doe*: hence, in Euripides, theſe words are falſely applied to the virgin, deſtined to be ſacrificed, which, (the proper changes being made) might with more propriety be ſpoken of *Iſaac*, when acting in obedience to the command of God, and of his father.

——ὦ πάτερ πάρειμί σοι, &c. &c.

" O, Father, I am here preſent, and I " cheerfully deliver up my body, for my

* Agamemnon, as the ſtory runs, had killed one of Diana's ſtags; and the goddeſs would be appeaſed on no other terms than by the ſacrifice of his daughter: but after ſhe was laid on the pile, Diana, pitying the virgin, put a doe in her room, and made Iphigenia her Prieſteſs.

" country

" country, and for all Greece, to be ſacrificed " at the altar of the goddeſs, by thoſe who " now conduct me thither, if the oracle ſo " require."

Euripid. Iphigenia in Aulis, near the end.

'Tis worth while to notice, by the way, the uſe of the word ὑπερ; the virgin to be ſacrificed, declared, that ſhe was willing to appeaſe the anger of the gods, and ſuffer puniſhment *in behalf of*, or, *inſtead of* her country and all Greece: and but a little before ſhe is introduced, exulting in theſe words,

Ελισσετ' αμφι ναον, &c.

" Invoke to her temple, to her altar, " Diana, queen Diana, the bleſſed Diana: " for if it ſhall be neceſſary, by my blood and " ſacrifice I will obliterate the oracle."

Sect. XVIII. Juſtly celebrated too, in the ſecond place, is the hiſtory of *Jephthah*'s ſacrificing his only daughter, related by the Holy Spirit in theſe words, Judges xi. 30, 31, *And Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord, and ſaid, If thou ſhalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into mine hands; then it ſhall be, that whatſoever cometh forth of the doors of my houſe to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, ſhall ſurely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering.* But when he returned, " his daughter came out to meet him; and at the end of two months, he did

with her according to his vow." If any paſſage ever puzzled both Jewiſh and Chriſtian interpreters, antient and modern, as well as all your *diſputants upon*, and *patchers up* of common-place difficulties, this one has. For on the one hand, here it is ſuppoſed, that *all offering* of human ſacrifices is deteſted and abhorred by God; and to aſcribe ſuch a thing to a man of piety, and one celebrated by the Holy Spirit *for his faith*, many will not venture. But again, on the other hand, the words of the hiſtory, the circumſtances, the grief and lamentation of the father ſeem hardly capable of admitting any other meaning.—But to me theſe things are *ambiguous*.*

Sect. XIX. Firſt, It is evident, that a *groſs ignorance of the law*, either in making the vow, or in executing it, is by no means to be aſcribed to Jephthah, who was, though a military man, a man of piety, a fearer of God, and well acquainted with the ſacred writings. Now then, if he ſimply made a vow; that a compenſation and redemption, according to *the valuation of the prieſts*, ought to have been made, could not have eſcaped him; and therefore there was no reaſon why he ſhould ſo much bewail the event of a vow, by which he had engaged himſelf to the Lord, and to

* That is, the expreſſions relating to this ſubject are capable of more meanings than one; and to aſcertain the right one, is attended with difficulties.

which

which he was *bound:* for he might both keep his *faith*, and free his *daughter*, according to the words of the law, Levit. xxvii. 21, 31.

Or if we ſhould conjecture, that he was ſo groſsly miſtaken, and entirely unacquainted with Divine matters, was there no Prieſt or Scribe among all the people, who, during that time which he granted to his daughter, at her own requeſt, to bewail her virginity, could inſtruct this illuſtrious leader, who had lately merited ſo highly of the commonwealth, in the *meaning of the law*, ſo that he ſhould neither vex himſelf, render his family extinct, nor worſhip God, to no purpoſe, by a vain ſuperſtition? I have no doubt then, but that Jephthah performed his duty in executing his vow, according to the precept of the law, however much he might have erred in his original conception of it.

Sect. XX. Nor is it leſs doubtful, in the ſecond place, that Jephthah did not offer his daughter as a *burnt-offering*, as the words of the vow imply, according to the ceremony and inſtitution of that kind of ſacrifice: for as theſe ſacrifices could be performed by the Prieſt only, by *killing* the victim, *cutting* it in pieces, and *conſuming it by fire* upon the altar; offices, in which no Prieſt would have miniſtered or aſſiſted: ſo alſo, ſuch kind of ſacrifices are enumerated among "the abominations to "the Lord which he hateth." Deut. xii. 31.

Thou

Thou ſhalt not do ſo unto the Lord thy God: for every abomination to the Lord which he hateth, have they done unto their Gods: for even their ſons and their daughters have they burnt in the fire to their gods.

SECT. XXI. Nor does it ſeem probable that Jephthah had dedicated his daughter to God, that ſhe ſhould perpetually remain a virgin: for neither hath God inſtituted any ſuch kind of worſhip; nor could the *forced virginity* of the daughter by any means ever be reckoned to the account of the father, as any valuable conſideration, *in place of a victim.*

SECT. XXII. As then there were two kinds *of things devoted* to God: the *firſt* of which, was of the claſs of thoſe, which, as God did not order that they ſhould be offered in ſacrifice, it was made a ſtatute, that they ſhould be valued by the Prieſt, at a fair valuation, and be redeemed, and ſo return again to common uſe. The law of theſe is delivered, Levit. xxvii. 1, 2, &c. *And the Lord ſpake unto Moſes, ſaying, Speak unto the children of Iſrael, and ſay unto them, when a man ſhall make a ſingular vow, the perſons ſhall be for the Lord, by thy eſtimation. And thy eſtimation ſhall be, of the male from twenty years old, even unto ſixty years old, even thy eſtimation ſhall be fifty ſhekels of ſilver, after the ſhekel of the ſanctuary. And if it be a female, then thy eſtimation ſhall be thirty ſhekels,* &c. And verſe 8, *But if he be poorer than thy eſtimation,*

mation, then he ſhall preſent himſelf before the Prieſt, and the Prieſt ſhall value him: according to his ability that vowed ſhall the Prieſt value him.

But the ſecond kind of theſe were called *Chærem,* * concerning which it was not a ſimple vow, of which there was no redemption or eſtimation to be made by the Prieſt: the law reſpecting theſe is given in the 28th and 29th verſes of the ſame chapter. *Notwithſtanding, no devoted thing that a man ſhall devote unto the Lord, of all that he hath, both of man and beaſt, and of the field of his poſſeſſion ſhall be ſold or redeemed: every devoted thing is moſt holy unto the Lord. None devoted, which ſhall be devoted of men, ſhall be redeemed; but ſhall ſurely be put to death.*

The queſtion to which of theſe two kinds the vow of Jephthah belonged, creates, if I miſtake not, the whole difficulty of the paſſage.

Sect. XXIII. That it belonged not to the firſt is as clear as the day; becauſe if we ſuppoſe that it did, he might eaſily have extricated himſelf and family from all grief on that account *by paying the eſtimation made by the Prieſt.* It was then a *Chærem* which, by his vow, Jephthah had vowed to the Lord, by no means *to be redeemed,* but accounted "moſt holy un-

* A thing or perſon ſo devoted as not to be redeemed.

to

to the Lord:" as in verſes, 27, 28, before mentioned.

SECT. XXIV. But it is doubted, whether a rational creature could be made a *Chærem:* but in fact there can hardly remain any room for doubt: to the perſon who conſiders the text itſelf, it will eaſily appear: the words are "every devoted thing is moſt holy unto the Lord: none devoted, which ſhall be devoted of men, ſhall be redeemed, but ſhall ſurely be put to death." It is evident from the foregoing verſe, that the words "*of men*", point not at *the efficient cauſe*, but *the matter** of the vow; where, the ſame words, *in the original*, cannot be otherwiſe rendered than by *of* or *touching man*, or by *out of* or *from among mankind or men*, or *of the claſs of men*. And all thoſe writers interpret the words in this ſenſe, (and there are not a few of them both among Jews and Chriſtians) who are of opinion, that the paſſage ought to be explained as relating to the enemies of God devoted to univerſal ſlaughter and deſtruction.

As Jephthah then had devoted his daughter as a *Chærem*, it ſeems hardly to admit of a doubt that the cauſe of his conſternation and ſorrow at meeting her was, becauſe, that ac-

* That is, point not at the perſons vowing, but at the object of their vow, or at the thing vowed or devoted by them.

cording

cording to the law he had ſlain her, having devoted her to God in ſuch a manner as not to be redeemed.

Sect. XXV. It would be foreign to our purpoſe to agitate this queſtion any further. We ſhall only ſay then, that after having maturely weighed all the circumſtances of the text, and of the thing itſelf, according to the meaſure of our abilities, we have gone into the opinion of thoſe who maintain, that Jephthah gave up his daughter to death, ſhe being devoted to God in ſuch a manner, as according to the law not to be redeemed, that ſupreme Being, who has the abſolute right and power of life and death, ſo requiring* it. The Theologians of both nations,† who eſpouſe this ſide of the queſtion, are both numerous and renowned. *Peter Martyr* teſtifies that almoſt all the more antient *Rabbins* agreed in this opinion. *Joſephus* in his Antiquities follows them, although he hath not determined Jephthah to be free of blame. Of the fathers, it is ſufficient, for the matter is not to be determined by votes, that *Hieron* in

* The author here uſes the words, "at leaſt interpretatively, before "ſo requiring it:" meaning thereby, as I underſtand him, that the juſt and proper interpretation of the paſſage wherein this hiſtory is recorded, and of the others quoted, relating to vows, had clearly determined him to adopt this opinion.

† That is, both of the Jewiſh and Chriſtian perſuaſion.

his

his epiſtle to *Julian*; *Ambroſe* on *Virginity*, book the 3d; *Auguſtine* on the book of Judges; and of thoſe in later times, *Peter Martyr* in his commentary on the 11th of Judges; and Ludovicus Capellus, in that excellent treatiſe of his *concerning Jephthah's Vow*, have either approved, or at leaſt have not diſſented from this opinion. What Epiphanius* relates concerning the deification of Jephthah's daughter, favours this opinion: "In Sebaſte, (ſays he) which was "formerly called Samaria, having deified the "daughter of Jephthah, they yearly celebrate "a ſolemn feſtival in honour of her." Yea more, the moſt learned agree that the fame of this tranſaction was ſo ſpread among the Gentile nations, that thence *Homer*, *Euripides*, and others, ſeized the occaſion of raiſing that fable about Agamemnon's ſacrificing his daughter; and that there never was any other *Iphigenia* than *Jephthegenia*, nor *Iphianaſſa* † than Ιφθιανασσα,‡ or Jephtheanaſſa.

Sect. XXVI. But this was a kind of human ſacrifice, by which, as God intended to ſhadow forth the true ſacrifice of his ſon;

* Patriarch of Conſtantinople in the year 520.

† Iphianaſſa, as ſtory ſays, was daughter of Proetus, king of the Argives, who preferring herſelf in beauty to Juno, was ſtruck with ſuch a madneſs as to believe herſelf to be a cow: but was afterwards cured by Melampus, a famous phyſician, to whom ſhe was given in marriage.

‡ Or, than the daughter of Jephthah: for Iphigenia, ſee note on page 80.

ſo,

ſo, the enemy of the human race aping the almighty, and taking advantage of, and inſulting the blindneſs of mankind, and the horror of their troubled conſciences ariſing from a ſenſe of the guilt of ſin, influenced and compelled them to the performance of ceremonies of a ſimilar kind.

Sect. XXVII. There is no need that we ſhould dwell on the third inſtance of this kind of ſacrifices that occurs in the ſacred writings; viz. that of the king of Moab, during the ſiege of his city, offering up either his own ſon, or the king of Edom's, upon the wall, as he was a Heathen and a worſhipper of Saturn, according to the cuſtom of the Phœnicians. Deſpairing of his ſiutation, when it ſeemed to him that the city could no longer be defended; and when he had no hope of breaking through, or of eſcaping, he offered his own ſon, in my opinion, (for the king of Edom had no firſt-born to ſucceed him in the government, being himſelf only a deputy king) as a ſacrifice to the gods of his country, to procure a deliverance. The three kings then departed from the city which they were beſieging, God ſo directing it, either having entered into an agreement to that purpoſe, or becauſe of the war not being ſucceſſfully ended, (for the conjectures on this point are by no means ſatisfactory) ſome indignation having broke out among the troops of

of the Iſraelites, who alſo themſelves were Idolaters.* See 2 Kings, chap. iii. verſe 26, 27.

SECT. XXVIII. We ſhall conclude this train of teſtimonies with that noted account of the *Rugiani*, certain inhabitants of an iſland of Sclavonia, related by *Albertus Crantzius*, from which we may learn the dreadful judgment of God againſt a late *ſuperſtition* of Chriſtians.

* Dr. Gill agrees with our author, that the king of Moab ſacrificed his own ſon; and thinks that he might be induced to offer him thus publicly on the wall, that it might be ſeen by the camp of Iſrael, and move their compaſſion; but rather that he did it as a religious action to appeaſe the Deity by a human ſacrifice; and that it was offered either to the true God, in imitation of Abraham, or to his idol Chemoſh, the ſun. It was uſual with the Heathens, particularly the Phœnicians, when in calamity and diſtreſs, to offer up what was moſt dear and valuable to them, ſee page 69. Dr. Gill ſeems of opinion that the cauſe why the three kings broke up the ſiege was, that after this barbarous and ſhocking ſacrifice, the Moabites became quite deſperate, and that the kings, ſeeing them reſolved to ſell their lives ſo dear, and to hold out to the laſt man, thought fit to raiſe the ſiege. A very natural explication of theſe words, "and there was great indignation againſt Iſrael," if the indignation be underſtood as applicable only to the Moabites: but the concluding ſentence of our author on this ſubject ſeems to imply it to be his opinion, that there were alſo diſſentions and indignation in the allied army; perhaps, between the Edomites, the idolatrous Iſraelites, and the worſhippers of the true God, ariſing from the horrid ſpectacle they had witneſſed. This is only ventured as a conjecture, that may better account for the ſudden departure of the kings.

"Some

" Some preachers of the Goſpel of Chriſt, " who and what they were the hiſtorian ſhews, " converted the whole iſland of the Rugiani " to the faith: then they built an oratory in " honour of our Lord and Saviour Jeſus " Chriſt, and in memory of St. Vitus, Patron " of Corveia. But after, by divine permiſſi- " on, matters were changed, and the Rugi- " ani fell off from the faith, having inſtantly " expelled the Prieſts and Chriſtians, they " converted their religion into ſuperſtition;* " for they worſhip St. Vitus, whom we ac- " knowledge as a martyr and ſervant of " Chriſt, as God; nor is there any barbarous " people under heaven, that more dread " Chriſtians and Prieſts: whence alſo, in pe- " culiar honour of St. Vitus, they have " been accuſtomed to ſacrifice, yearly, " any Chriſtian that may accidentally " fall into their hands." A more horrible iſſue of Chriſtianity ſinking into ſuperſtition, would, perhaps, be difficult to be found. But we are now tired of dwelling on ſuch horrid rites and abominable ſacrifices. Foraſmuch then as we ourſelves are the offspring of thoſe who were wholly polluted with ſuch ſacrifices, and by nature not better or wiſer than they; but only, through the rich, free and unſpeak-

* Their religion, at beſt, had been contaminated with the ſuperſtitions of the church of Rome.

able

able mercy of God, have been tranſlated from the power of darkneſs, and the kingdom of Satan, into his marvellous light, it is moſt evident, that by every tie we are bound to offer and devote ourſelves wholly to Chriſt our deliverer, and moſt glorious Saviour, "who "hath loved us; and who gave himſelf for "us, that he might redeem us from all ini-"quity, and purify to himſelf a peculiar "people, zealous of good works."*

SECT. XXIX. Thus the prophecies concerning the oblation of Chriſt being but badly underſtood, mankind were ſeduced, through the inſtigation of the Devil, to pollute themſelves with theſe inhuman and accurſed ſacrifices. Perhaps too, that moſt artful ſeducer had it in view, by ſuch ſacrifices, to prejudice the more acute and intelligent part of mankind againſt that *life-giving ſacrifice*, that was to be deſtructive of his kingdom: for, ſuch now held theſe atrocious ſacrifices and deteſtable rites in abhorrence. However, to keep the minds of men in ſuſpence, and in ſubjection to himſelf, he did not fail from another quarter, by words, *obliquely*, to ſpread abroad and ſend forth ambiguous oracles, as if ſuch rites and ſacrifices were of no avail for the expiation of ſins: thence theſe verſes in Cato's Diſtichs;

* 1 Epiſtle to Titus, chap. i. verſe 14.

Cum

Cum ſis ipſe nocens moritur cur victima pro te?
Stultitia eſt morte alterius ſperare ſalutem.

" Since it is thyſelf that art guilty, why need any " victim die for thee? 'Tis madneſs to expect ſalvation " from the death of another."

I have no doubt but that this laſt verſe is a diabolical oracle.

SECT. XXX. By ſuch deceitful practices the old ſerpent, inflamed with envy, and being himſelf for ever loſt, becauſe he could not eradicate every ſenſe of avenging juſtice, (which is as a curb to reſtrain the fury of the wicked) from the minds of men, wiſhed to lead them into mazes, that he might ſtill keep them the ſlaves of ſin, and ſubject to his own dominion.

SECT. XXXI. There have been, and ſtill are, ſome of mankind, I confeſs it, who, from indulging their vices, are *feared in their conſciences*, and whoſe minds are become callous by the practice of iniquity; who, flattering themſelves to their own deſtruction, have falſely conceived, either that God does not trouble himſelf about ſuch things, or that he can be eaſily appeaſed, and without any trouble. Hence that profane wretch, introduced by *Eraſmus*, after having ſettled matters with the *Dominican commiſſaries*, to a jolly companion of his own, when he aſked him, " whether " God would ratify the bargain?" anſwers, " I fear rather leſt the Devil ſhould not ratify " it,

" it, for God by nature is eaſy to be appeaſed." It is from the ſame idea, that many of the barbarous natives of America idly fancying that there are two Gods, one *good*, and another *evil*, ſay, that there is no need to offer ſacrifices to the good one, becauſe being naturally good, he is not diſpoſed to hurt or injure any one: but they uſe all poſſible care, both by words and actions, and every kind of horrible ſacrifice, to pleaſe the *evil* one. Likewiſe thoſe, who are called by Merſennus deiſts, exclaim, " that the bigots, or ſu-" perſtitiouſly religious, who believe in infer-" nal puniſhments, are worſe than Atheiſts " who deny that there is a God." So too, ſome new *maſters* among our own countrymen talk of nothing, in their diſcourſes, but of the goodneſs of God: his *ſupreme right*, *dominion*, *and vindicatory juſtice*, are of no account with them: but he himſelf knows how to preſerve his glory and his truth pure and entire, in ſpite of the abilities, and without regard to the delicacy of theſe faſhionable and dainty gentlemen.

SECT. XXXII. But Rutherford, *on Providence*, anſwers, that " the Gentiles formerly borrowed their *purgations* and *luſtrations** from

* That is, their acts or ceremonies of cleanſing or purifying themſelves from guilt by ſacrifice or otherwiſe; the latter word more particularly means the operation of cleanſing by water.

the

the Jews, and not from the light of nature;" but he must be a mere novice in the knowledge of these matters, into whose mind even the slightest thought of that kind could enter. For I believe there is no one who doubts the custom and ceremony of sacrificing among the Gentile nations to be much more ancient than the Mosaic institutions. Nor can any one imagine, that this universal custom among all nations, tribes and people, civilized and barbarous, unknown to one another, differently situated and scattered all over the world, could have first arisen and proceeded from the institutions of the Jews.

SECT. XXXIII. "But, says he, the "light is dark, that a sinful creature could "dream of being able to perform a satisfaction, and make propitiatory expiations to "an infinite God incensed, and such too as "would be satisfactory for sin:" yea, I say, that a sinful creature could perform this is false, and a presumption only arising from that darkness which we are in by nature: but notwithstanding it is true, that God must be appeased by a propitiatory sacrifice, if we would that our sins should be forgiven us; and this much he hath pointed out to all mankind by that light of nature, obscure indeed, but not dark. Nor is it necessary, in order to prove this, that we should have recourse to the fabulous antiquities of the Egyptians, the

very

very modeſt writer of which, Manetho, the High Prieſt of Heliopolis, who lived in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and took his hiſtory from the *Seriadic Hieroglyphical* * obeliſks, writes, that the Egyptian empire had endured to the time of Alexander the Great, through 31 dynaſties,† containing a period of five thouſand three hundred and fifty-three years: this is the ſum of the years according to that writer, as *Scaliger* collects it, to which *Voſſius* has added two years. But other *Egyptians* have been, by no means, ſatisfied with this period of time. "For, from Iſiris and "Iſis, to the reign of Alexander, who built a "city of his own name in Egypt, they reckon "more than ten thouſand years; and as ſome "write little leſs than thirteen thouſand "years," ſays *Diodorus*; during which period of time, they ſay that the ſun had four times changed his courſe, for that he had twice riſen in the weſt, and ſet in the eaſt: which things, though they may ſeem the

* Hieroglyphics are emblems or pictures that were uſed in the firſt method of writing; but after characters were introduced, they became generally unintelligible, and contributed much to promote idolatry. They were uſed by the Egyptian prieſts to conceal the myſteries of their religion from the vulgar, and were thence called hieroglyphics, i. e. ſacred engravings or carvings. They were originally engraven or carved on walls and obeliſks.

† A dynaſty, in hiſtory, means a ſucceſſion of kings in the ſame line.

dreams

dreams of madmen, ſtrictly and properly underſtood; yet ſome very learned men entertain a hope, by means of the diſtinction of the years which the Egyptians uſed, and the deſcription of their feſtivals, of reconciling them with the truth of the Holy Scriptures.

Sect. XXXIV. But paſſing over theſe things, it can hardly be doubted, that *Jupiter Ammon*, among the Egyptians, was no other than *Cham* the ſon of *Noah*, and *Bacchus Noah* himſelf; and that *Vulcan*, among other nations, was *Tubal Cain*; to all whom, and to others, ſacrifices were offered before the birth of *Moſes*. What too do they ſay to this? that *Job*, among the Gentiles, offered burnt-offerings before the inſtitution of the *Moſaic* ceremonies: ſee chap. i. 5. xlii. 8. And Jethro, the prieſt of Midian, offered a burnt-offering and ſacrifices to God, even in the very camp of the Iſraelites in the wilderneſs, Exodus viii. Either then the ſacrifice of *Cain* and *Abel*, or that of *Adam himſelf and Eve*, conſiſting of thoſe beaſts, of whoſe ſkins coats were made to them by God,* and by whoſe blood the covenant was ratified, which could not have been made with them after their fall without ſhedding of blood, gave the firſt occaſion to mankind of diſcharging that perſuaſion, con-

* Gen. iii. 21. Unto Adam alſo, and to his wife, did the Lord God make coats of ſkins and cloathed them.

cerning the neceſſity of appeaſing the offended Deity, which hath ariſen from the light of nature, through this channel of ſacrificing. Yea, it is evident that this innate notion concerning vindicatory juſtice, and the obſervation of its exerciſe and egreſs have given riſe to all divine worſhip. Hence that expreſſion, *primus in orbe Deos fecit timor: fear firſt created gods.* And hence theſe verſes in *Virgil*, ſpoken by king *Evander*.

——*Non hæc ſolennia nobis, &c.*

Theſe rites, theſe altars, and this feaſt, O King!
From no *vain* fears, or ſuperſtition ſpring;
Or blind devotion, or from blinder chance;
Or heady zeal, or brutal ignorance:
But ſav'd from danger, with a grateful ſenſe,
The labours of a god we recompence.

But I do not mention theſe things, as if it were my opinion that ſacrifices are preſcribed by the law of nature:* but, from the agreement of mankind in the ceremony of ſacrificing, I maintain, that they have poſſeſſed a

* The moſt of the Romiſh clergy, ſays our author, maintain this opinion, that ſo they may pave the way for eſtabliſhing the blaſphemous ſacrifice of the maſs. Thus Leſs: "on Juſtice and Right:" Suarez, book 2. however, is of a different opinion; "for, (ſays he) there is no natural precept, from which it can be ſufficiently gathered that a determination to any particular mode of that worſhip is at all neceſſary to good morals." In page 3, of his Theol. on queſt. 8. diſtinct 71. ſect. 8.

conſtant

conſtant ſenſe of ſin and vindicatory juſtice, diſcovering to them more and more of this rite, from its firſt commencement, by means of tradition.

Sect. XXXV. But to return from this digreſſion: it appears, that ſuch a preſumption of corrective juſtice is implanted in all by nature, that it cannot by any means be eradicated; but ſince theſe univerſal conceptions by no means relate to what may belong, or not belong to God at his free pleaſure, it follows that ſin-avenging juſtice is natural to God: the point that was to be proved.

Sect. XXXVI. I ſhall only add, in one word, that an argument from the conſent of all, is by conſent of all allowed to be very ſtrong. For thus, ſays the Philoſopher, "what is admitted by all, we alſo admit; "but he who would deſtroy ſuch faith can "himſelf advance nothing more credible."

Aristotle, Nicom. 3d.

And Heſiod ſays,

"That ſentiment cannot be altogether "groundleſs, which many people agree "in publiſhing." And "when we diſcourſe "of the eternity of the ſoul, (ſays Seneca) the "conſent of mankind is conſidered as a "weighty argument; I content myſelf with "this public perſuaſion."

Seneca. Ep. 117.

And again, Ariſtotle ſays,

" It is a very ſtrong proof, if all ſhall agree " in what we ſhall ſay." And that obſervation of another author concurs, " the things that " are commonly agreed on are worthy of cre- " dit." And here endeth the ſecond argument.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

THE THIRD ARGUMENT—*This Divine attribute demonſtrated in the works of Providence—That paſſage of the Apoſtle to the Romans, chap.* i. 18. *conſidered—Anger—what it is—The definitions of the Philoſophers—The opinion of Lactantius concerning the anger of God—Anger often aſcribed to God in the Holy Scriptures—In what ſenſe this is done—The Divine anger denotes,* 1*ſt. The effect of anger—*2*dly. The will of puniſhing—What that will is in God—Why the juſtice of God is expreſſed by anger—The manifeſtation of the Divine anger—what it is—How it is revealed from Heaven—The ſum of the argument—*THE FOURTH ARGUMENT—*Vindicatory Juſtice revealed in the croſs of Chriſt—The attributes of God—How diſplayed in Chriſt—Heads of other arguments—The concluſion.*

IT remains then, that we ſhould now conſider, in the third place, what teſtimony God has given, and is ſtill giving to this eſſential attribute of his in the *works* of Providence. This Paul takes notice of, Rom. i. 18. *For the wrath of God* (ſays he) *is revealed from Heaven againſt all ungodlineſs and unrighteouſneſs of men, who hold the truth in unrighteouſneſs,*

Sect. II. The Philoſopher, Ariſtotle, ſays, that anger is, " A deſire of puniſhing on ac-" count of an apparent neglect."* A definition, perhaps, not altogether accurate. Seneca ſays, that Ariſtotle's definition of anger, that it is " A deſire of requiting pain," differs but little from his own, viz. " That anger is a " deſire of inflicting puniſhment." Book I. *of Anger*, chap. iii. where he diſcuſſes it with great elegance, according to the maxims of the Stoics. But Ariſtotle reckons ἀοργησιαν† among vices, or extremes, in the 7th chap. of the 2d book of his *Ethics to Nicomedes*. But Phavorinus ſays, that " Anger is a deſire to " puniſh the perſon appearing to have injured " you, contrary to what is fit and proper." But in whatever manner it be defined, it is beyond a doubt that it cannot, properly ſpeaking, belong to God. Lactantius Firmianus, therefore, is laſhed by the learned, who, in his Book " *of the Anger of God*," chap. iv. in refuting the Stoics, who contend, that Anger ought not in any manner whatever to be aſcribed to God, has ventured to aſcribe to the Deity *commotions and affections of mind*, but ſuch as are *juſt and good*. Suarez, however, excuſes him, in his diſputation " *of the Divine Juſtice*," Sect. V. and contends, that the

* Book VIII. chap. 5. of his Topics.
† A deprivation of Iraſcibility.

nature

nature of Anger is very ſpecially preſerved in the diſpoſition of puniſhing offences.

Sect. III. But however this matter be, certain it is, that God aſſumes no affection of our nature ſo often to himſelf, in Scripture, as this: and that too, in words, which for the moſt part, in the Old Teſtament, denote the greateſt commotion of mind. Wrath, fury, the heat of great anger, indignation, hot anger, ſmoking anger, wrathful anger, anger appearing in the countenance, inflaming the noſtrils, rouſing the heart, flaming, and conſuming, are often aſſigned to him, and in words too, which, among the Hebrews, expreſs the parts of the body affected by ſuch commotions.*

In fine, there is no *perturbation* of the mind, no *commotion* of the ſpirits, no *change* of the bodily parts, by which either the *materiality*, or *formality* † (as they phraſe it) of anger is expreſſed, when we are moſt deeply affected thereby, which he has not aſſumed to himſelf.

Sect. IV. But ſince with God " There is

* Numb. xxv. 4. Deut. xiii. 17. Joſh. vii. 26. Pſalm lxxviii. 49. Iſaiah xiii. 9. Deut. xxix. 24. Judges ii. 14. Pſalm lxxiv. 1. and lxix. 24. Iſaiah xxx. 30. Lam. ii. 6. Ezek. v. 15. Iſaiah xxxiv. 2. 2 Chron. xxviii. 11. Ezra x. 14. Hab. iii. 8, 12.

† The materiality of anger is, what is eſſentially neceſſary to conſtitute anger; the formality means its external marks and characters.

no variableneſs, neither ſhadow of turning," beyond all doubt it will be worth while, ſtrictly to examine what he means by this deſcription of his moſt holy and unchangeable nature, ſo well accommodated to our weak capacities. Every material circumſtance, ſuch as, in us, is *the commotion of the blood, and gall about the heart*, and likewiſe thoſe troubleſome affections of *ſorrow* and *pain*, with which it is accompanied, being entirely excluded, we ſhall conſider, what this *anger of God* means.

Sect. V. *Firſt*, Then it is manifeſt, that by the *anger* of God, the *effects* of anger are denoted. *God is not unrighteous who taketh vengeance*, Rom. iii. 5. And it is ſaid, Epheſ. v. 6. *Becauſe of theſe things, the wrath of God cometh upon the children of diſobedience.* That is, God will moſt aſſuredly puniſh them. Hence the frequent mention of the *wrath to come*; that is, the laſt and everlaſting puniſhment. Thus, that great and terrible day, *in which God will judge the world by that man whom he hath ordained*, is called *the day of his wrath*, becauſe it is the day *of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God*, Rom. ii. 5. And he is ſaid to be ſlow to wrath, becauſe he oftentimes proceeds *ſlowly*, as it ſeems to us, to inflict puniſhment, or recompence evil. But, perhaps, this difficulty is better obviated by Peter, who removes every idea of *ſlowneſs* from God, but aſcribes

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to him *patience* and *long-suffering* in Christ towards the faithful; and of this dispensation, even the whole world, in a secondary sense, are made partakers. *The Lord is not slack*, says he, *concerning his promise*, (the promise, viz. of a future judgment) *as some men count slackness, but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance*, 2 Peter iii. 8, 9.

Sect. VI. Nay, the threatening of punishment is sometimes described by the words anger, fury, wrath, and fierce wrath. Thus, Jonah iii. 9. *Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not*; that is, whether he may not, *upon our humiliation and repentance*, avert from us the grievous punishment denounced by the Prophet.

Sect. VII. But, secondly, *it denotes a constant and immutable will in God of avenging and punishing, by a just punishment, every injury, transgression, and sin.* And hence that expression, Rom. ix. 22, *What if God willing to shew his anger*; that is, his *justice*, or *constant* will of punishing sinners: for when any external operations of the Deity are described by a word denoting a human affection that is wont to produce such effects, the Holy Scripture means to point out to us some perfection perpetually resident in God, whence these ope-

rations flow, and which is their proper and * next principle.

Sect. VIII. And what is that perfection but *this juſtice*, of which we are diſcourſing? For we muſt remove far from God every idea of *anger*, properly ſo called, which in reſpect of its cauſes and effects, and of its own nature, ſuppoſes even the greateſt *perturbation*, *change*, and *inquietude* of all the affections, in its ſubject; and yet we are under the neceſſity of aſcribing to him a nature adapted to effect thoſe operations, which are reckoned to belong to anger. But ſince the Scriptures teſtify, that God works theſe works, *as he is juſt*, and *becauſe he is juſt*, (and we have proved it above) it plainly appears that, that perfection of the Divine nature is nothing elſe but this *Vindicatory Juſtice*. Whence Thomas Aquinas aſſerts †, "That anger is not ſaid to be in God, "in alluſion to any paſſion of the mind, but "to the judgment or deciſions of his juſtice." Nay, that anger may not only be reduced to juſtice, but that the words themſelves are ſynonimous, and that they are taken ſo in Scripture, is certain. Pſalm vii. 6, 9. *Ariſe, O Lord, in thine anger, lift up thyſelf becauſe of the rage of mine enemies: and awake for me to the judgment*

* That is, the principle from which they immediately flow.

† Queſt. 47. Article 1.

that

that thou haſt commanded. O let the wickedneſs of the wicked come to an end; but eſtabliſh the juſt: for the righteous God trieth the heart and reins. To judge in anger, or with juſtice, are phraſes of the ſame import. Pſalm lvi. 7. *Shall they eſcape by iniquity? in thine anger caſt down the people, O God.* Or, in juſtice, caſt them down, becauſe of their iniquity. Thus, when he juſtly deſtroyed the people of Iſrael by the King of Babylon, he ſays, it came to paſs through his anger. 2 Kings xxiv. 20. *For through the anger of the Lord, it came to paſs in Jeruſalem and Judah, until he had caſt them out from his preſence, that Zedekiah rebelled againſt the King of Babylon.*

Sect. IX. But the Apoſtle ſays, that this *anger* or *punitory juſtice* is *revealed* from Heaven. The Apoſtle uſes the ſame word here, that is, tranſlated, *revealed*, in the preceding verſe, when ſpeaking of the manifeſtation *or revelation of the righteouſneſs of faith* in the Goſpel. Therefore, ſome have been of opinion, that the Apoſtle here aſſerts, that this very anger of God is again and again made known and manifeſt, or openly declared in the Goſpel againſt unbelievers. But to what purpoſe then is there any mention made of *Heaven*, whence that manifeſtation or revelation is ſaid to have been made. The Apoſtle, therefore, uſes the word in a different ſenſe in the 18th verſe from that which it is uſed in, in the preceding. There

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it means " a manifeſtation by the preaching of the word;" here it ſignifies a *declaration by examples*; and therefore a certain perſon hath, not improperly, tranſlated the word, *is laid open*, or *clearly appears*; that is, is proved by numberleſs inſtances. Moreover, this verſe is the principal of the arguments, by which the Apoſtle proves the neceſſity of *juſtification by faith in the remiſſion of ſins through the blood of Chriſt*; becauſe that all have ſinned, and thereby rendered God their open and avowed enemy.

Sect. X. The Apoſtle then affirms, that God hath taken care that his *anger againſt ſin*, or that *his juſtice* ſhould appear by innumerable examples of puniſhments inflicted, on mankind for their ſins, in his providential government of the world; and that it ſhould appear in ſo clear a manner, that there ſhould be no room left for conjectures about the matter. Not that puniſhment is always inflicted on the wicked and impious, while in this world, or at leaſt that it appears to be ſo, for very many of them enjoy all the pleaſures of a rich and flouriſhing outward eſtate; but beſides, that he exerciſes his anger on their conſciences, as we proved before; and that the external good things of fortune, as they call them, are only a *fattening* of them for the day of *ſlaughter*; even in this life, he oft-times, in the middle of their career, exerciſes his ſevere judgments againſt the public enemies of Heaven; the monſters

monſters of the earth, the architects of wickedneſs, ſunk in the mire and filth of their vices; and that too, even to the entire ruin and deſolation both of whole nations, and of particular individuals, whom, by a remarkable puniſhment, he thinks proper to make an example and ſpectacle of to the world, both to angels and to men.

Sect. XI. Therefore, although *God willing to ſhew his wrath, and to make his power known,* (not in that way only, viz. by exerciſing public puniſhments in this life, of which we are now ſpeaking) *endured with much long-ſuffering the veſſels of wrath, fitted to deſtruction:* and though he ſhould not inſtantly dart his lightenings againſt all, and every individual of the abandoned and prophane, yet mankind will eaſily diſcern * what the mind and thoughts of God are, what his right and pleaſure, and of what kind his anger and juſtice are with regard to every ſin whatever. Therefore the Apoſtle affirms, that the anger of God, of which he gives only ſome inſtances, is by theſe judgments openly declared againſt *all unrighteouſneſs* and *ungodlineſs of men* whatever; whether they fail in the worſhip and duty which they owe to God, or in the duties which it is in-

* Viz. from thoſe inſtances of puniſhment which he is pleaſed, in his wiſdom, ſometimes openly and awfully to inflict upon the wicked.

cumbent

cumbent on them to perform to one another. Moreover, that the *ſolemn revelation* of this Divine Juſtice conſiſts, not only in thoſe judgments which ſooner or later he hath exerciſed upon particular perſons, but alſo in the whole ſeries of his Divine diſpenſations towards men, in which, as he gives teſtimony both to his goodneſs and patience, inaſmuch as *he maketh his ſun to ſhine on the evil and the good, and ſendeth rain on the juſt and the unjuſt* *, *and leaves not himſelf without a witneſs, in that he doth good, and gives us rain from Heaven, and fruitful ſeaſons, filling our hearts with food and gladneſs*; ſo alſo he gives equally clear ſigns and teſtimonies of his anger, ſeverity, and indignation, or of his *punitory juſtice*. Hence, on account of the efficacy of the Divine anger, exerciſing its power and influence far and near, this viſible world, as if the very fuel of the curſe, is appointed as the *ſeat* and *abode* of all kinds of miſery, grief, lamentation, cares, wrath, vanity, and inquietude. Why need I mention tempeſts, thunders, lightenings, deluges, peſtilences, with many things more, by means of which, on account of the wickedneſs of man, univerſal nature is ſtruck with horror. All theſe, beyond a doubt, have a reſpect to the *revelation* of *God's anger*, or *juſtice* againſt the *unrighteouſneſs* and *ungodlineſs* of men.

* Matt. v. 46. and Acts xiv. 17.

SECT.

Sect. XII. Moreover, the Apoſtle teſtifies this *revelation* to be made *from Heaven*. Even the moſt abandoned cannot but obſerve puniſhments of various kinds making havock every where in the world, and innumerable evils brooding, as it were, over the very texture of the univerſe. But becauſe they wiſh for and deſire nothing more ardently, than either that there were no God, or that he paid no regard to human affairs, they either really aſcribe, or pretend to aſcribe all theſe things to *chance, fortune,* the *revolutions of the ſtars and their influence,* or finally, to natural cauſes. In order to free the minds of men from this pernicious deceit of Atheiſm, the Apoſtle affirms that all theſe things come to paſs *from Heaven*; that is, *under the direction of God,* or, by a Divine power and providence puniſhing the ſins and wickedneſs of men, and manifeſting the juſtice of God. Thus, *The Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimſtone and fire from the Lord out of Heaven,* Gen. xix. 24. Which cities, by that *puniſhment* inflicted on them *from Heaven,* he hath ſet up as an example, in every future age, to all thoſe who ſhould afterwards perſevere in the like impieties. To theſe conſiderations add, that the Apoſtle, from *this demonſtration of the Divine anger from Heaven againſt the ſins of men,* argues the neceſſity of appointing an atonement through the blood of Chriſt; verſes 23, 24, 25. which would by

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no means follow, but upon this ſuppoſition that, that anger of God was ſuch that it could not be averted without the intervention of an *atonement*.

SECT. XIII. But not to be tedious, 'tis evident that God, *by the works of his providence*, in the government of this world, gives a moſt copious teſtimony to his *Vindicatory Juſtice*, not inferior to that given to his goodneſs, or any other of his attributes; which teſtimony, concerning himſelf and his nature, he makes known, and openly exhibits to all by innumerable examples conſtantly provided, and appointed for that purpoſe. He then who ſhall deny this juſtice to be eſſential to God, may for the ſame reaſon reject his goodneſs and long-ſuffering patience.

SECT. XIV. The fourth argument ſhall be taken from the revelation of that *name*, glory and nature which God hath exhibited to us in and through Chriſt. John i. 18. *No man hath ſeen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the boſom of the Father, he hath declared him*—HIM who, though he be light itſelf, and dwelleth in light inacceſſible, yet in reſpect of us, who, without Chriſt, are naturally blinder than moles, is covered with darkneſs. In creation, in legiſlation, and in the works of Providence, God indeed hath plainly marked out and diſcovered to us certain traces of his power, wiſdom, goodneſs, juſtice,

juſtice, and long-ſufferance. But beſides, that there are ſome attributes of his nature, the knowlege of which could not reach the ears of ſinners but by Chriſt; ſuch as "his love to his peculiar people, his ſparing mercy, his free and ſaving grace:" and even, others which he hath made known to us in ſome meaſure, by the ways and means above-mentioned, we could have no clear or ſaving knowledge of, unleſs in and through this ſame Chriſt; "for in "him are hid all the treaſures of wiſdom and "knowledge:" in him, God hath fully and clearly exhibited himſelf to us to be loved, adored, and known; and that not only in regard of his heavenly doctrine, *in which he hath brought life and immortality to light through the Goſpel* *. God finiſhing the revelation of himſelf to mankind, by the miſſion and miniſtry of his Son; but alſo exhibiting both in the perſon of Chriſt, and in his mediatorial office, the brightneſs of his own glory, and the expreſs image of his perſon, he glorified his own name, and manifeſted his nature, to all thoſe at leaſt, "who being engrafted "into Chriſt, and baptiſed into his ſpirit," enjoy both the Father and the Son. But in the whole matter of ſalvation by the Mediator, God-man, there is no excellence of God, no eſſential property, no attribute of his nature, the glory of which is the chief end of all his

* 2 Tim. i. 10.

works,

works, that he hath more clearly and eminently displayed than this *Punitory Justice.*

SECT. XV. "It was for the display of his "justice, that he set forth Christ as a propi- "tiation through faith in his blood. He "spared him not, but laid the punishment of "us all upon him. It was for this that he "was pleased to bruise him, to put him to "grief, and to make his soul an offering for "sin."

SECT. XVI. The infinite wisdom of God, his inexpressible grace, free-love, boundless mercy, goodness, and benevolence to men, in the constitution of such a Mediator, viz. a *God-man*, are not more illustriously displayed, to the astonishment of men and angels, in bringing sinful man from death, condemnation, and a state of enmity, into a state of life, of salvation, of glory, and of union and communion with himself, than is this *Punitory Justice*, for the satisfaction, manifestation and glory of which, this whole scheme, pregnant with innumerable mysteries, was instituted. But that attribute, whose glory and manifestation God intended and accomplished both in the appointment of his only-begotten Son to the office of Mediator, and in his mission, must be natural to him. And there is no need of arguments to prove, that this was HIS *Vindicatory Justice.* Yea, supposing *this justice*,

tice, and all regard to it entirely ſet aſide, the glory of God's love in ſending his ſon, and delivering him up to the death for us all, which the Scriptures ſo much extol, is manifeſtly much obſcured, if it do not rather totally diſappear. For what kind of love can that be which God hath ſhewn in doing what there was no occaſion for him to do?

Sect. XVII. We will not at preſent enter fully into the conſideration of other arguments by which the knowledge of this truth is ſupported; among which that of the neceſſity of aſſigning to God, (obſerving a juſt analogy) whatever perfections or excellencies are found among the creatures, is not of the leaſt importance. Theſe we paſs; partly that we may not be tedious to the learned reader; partly, becauſe the truth flows in a channel, already ſufficiently repleniſhed with proofs. It would be eaſy, however, to ſhew that this juſtice denotes the higheſt perfection; and by no means includes any imperfection, on account of which it ſhould be excluded from the Divine nature: neither in the definition of it does one *iota* occur that *can* imply any imperfection; but all *perfection*, *ſimple* or *formal*, *ſimply* and *formally* is found in God. But when this *perfection* is employed in any *operation* reſpecting another being, and having for its object the common good, it neceſſarily acquires the nature of juſtice.

I ſhall

I ſhall not be farther troubleſome to my readers; if what has been already ſaid amount not to proof ſufficient, I know not what is ſufficient. I urge only one teſtimony more from Scripture and conclude.

It is found in Heb. x. 26. *For if we ſin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more ſacrifice for ſins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation.* But, perhaps God will pardon without any ſacrifice: the Apoſtle is of a contrary opinion; *where there is no ſacrifice for ſin,* he argues, that from the very nature of the thing, *there muſt be a looking for of judgment and fiery indignation*; the very point that was to be proved.

Sect. XVIII I could heartily wiſh that ſome ſinner, whoſe conſcience, the hand of the omnipotent God hath lately touched, *whoſe ſore ran in the night and ceaſed not,* and whoſe *ſoul refuſed to be comforted,* whoſe *grief is heavier than the ſand of the ſea,* in whom *the arrows of the Almighty ſtick faſt, the poiſon whereof drinketh up the ſpirit,** were to eſtimate and determine this difficult and doubtful diſpute. Let us, I ſay, have recourſe to a perſon, who being convinced, by the ſpirit, of his *debts* to God, is weighed down by their burden, while the ſharp arrows of Chriſt are piercing the

* Job vi. 2, 3, 4.

heart,

heart, Pſal. xlv. 5. and let us inform him, that God, *with the greateſt eaſe* by his nod, or by the light touch of his finger, ſo to ſpeak, can blot out, hide and forgive all his ſins. Will he reſt ſatisfied in ſuch a thought? Will he immediately ſubſcribe to it? Will he not rather exclaim, *I have heard many ſuch things, miſerable comforters are ye all?* nay, ye are preachers of lies, phyſicians of no value.* The terrors of the Lord which ſurround me, and beſet me day and night, you feel not; I have to do with the moſt juſt, the moſt holy, the ſupreme Judge of all, *who will do right, and will by no means clear the guilty.* Therefore *my days are conſumed like ſmoke, and my bones are burnt as an hearth: my heart is ſmitten and withered like graſs: ſo that I forget to eat my bread. By reaſon of the voice of my groaning, my bones cleave to my ſkin.*† *I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up; while I ſuffer thy terrors, I am diſtracted. Thy fierce wrath goeth over me, thy terrors have cut me off;* ‡ I wiſh I were hid in the grave, yea, even in *the pit,* unleſs the Judge himſelf, ſay to me, *Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ranſom* §. Indeed, when the recollection of that very melancholy period comes into mind, when firſt God was pleaſed by his ſpirit effectually to convince

* Job vi. 2. † Pſal. cii, 3, 4, 5.
‡ Pſal. lxxxviii. 15, 16. § Job xxxiii. 24.

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the heart of me, a poor ſinner of ſin, and when the whole of God's controverſy with me for ſin is again preſented to my view, I cannot ſufficiently wonder what thoughts could poſſeſs thoſe men, who have treated of the remiſſion of ſins, in ſo very ſlight, I had almoſt ſaid, contemptuous a manner. But theſe reflections are rather foreign to our preſent buſineſs.

CHAP. VI.

Another head of the FIRST PART *of the diſſertation —Arguments for the neceſſary egreſs of Vindicatory Juſtice from the ſuppoſition of ſin—The firſt argument—God's hatred of ſin—What—Whether God by nature hates ſin, or becauſe he wills ſo to do—Teſtimonies from Holy Scripture—Dr. Twiſs's anſwer—The ſum of it —The ſame obviated—The relation between obedience as to reward, and ſin as to puniſhment, not the ſame—Juſtice and mercy, in reſpect of their exerciſe, different—The ſecond argument—The deſcription of God in the Scriptures, in reſpect of ſin—In what ſenſe he is called a conſuming fire—Twiſs's anſwer refuted—The fallacies of the anſwer.*

SECT. I. WE have ſufficiently proved, if I be not miſtaken, that ſin-puniſhing juſtice is natural to God. The oppoſite arguments, more numerous than weighty, ſhall be conſidered hereafter. We are now to prove the ſecond part of the queſtion, viz. that the exiſtence and ſin of a rational creature being ſuppoſed, the exerciſe of this juſtice is neceſſary. And granting what follows from what we have already ſaid concerning

cerning the nature of juſtice, (eſpecially from the firſt argument) our proofs muſt neceſſarily be concluſive: the firſt is this.

Sect. II. He who cannot but hate all ſin, cannot but puniſh ſin; for to hate ſin is, as to the *affection*, to will to puniſh it; and as to the *effect*, the puniſhment itſelf. And to be unable, not to will the puniſhment of ſin, is the ſame with the neceſſity of puniſhing it: for he who cannot but will to puniſh ſin, cannot but puniſh it. *For our God is in the heavens, he hath done whatſoever he pleaſeth*, Pſal cxv. 3. Now, when we ſay that God neceſſarily puniſhes ſin, we mean, that on account of the rectitude and perfection of his nature he cannot poſſeſs an indifference of will to puniſh. For it being ſuppoſed that God hates ſin, he muſt hate it either by nature, or by choice; if it be by nature, then we have gained our point; if by choice, or becauſe he wills it, then it is poſſible for him not to hate it; nay, he may even juſtly will the contrary, or exerciſe a contrary act about the ſame object: for thoſe acts of the Divine will are moſt free, viz. which have their foundation in the will only: that is to ſay, that it is even poſſible for him *to love* ſin; for the Divine will is not ſo inclined to any object, but that if it ſhould be inclined to its contrary, that might, conſiſtent with juſtice, be done. This reaſoning Durandus agrees to, and this, Twiſs urges as an argument: the

the conclusion then must be, that God may love sin, considered as sin:

Credat Appelles.

The sons of circumcision may receive
The wond'rous tale, which I shall ne'er believe.
FRANCIS HORACE.

For, *God hates all workers of iniquity*, Psal. v. 5. *He calls it the abominable thing that he hateth*, Jer. xliv. 4. Besides these, other passages of Scripture testify that God hates sin, and that he cannot but hate it. *Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity*, Hab. i. 13. On account of the purity of God's eyes, that is of his holiness, an attribute which none hath ever ventured to deny, he *cannot look on iniquity*, that is, he *cannot but hate it. Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness*, says the Psalmist, Psal. v. 4, 5. that is, thou art a God who hatest all wickedness, for *evil shalt not dwell with thee, and the foolish shall not stand in thy sight, thou hatest all the workers of iniquity*. Is it a free act of the Divine will that he here describes, which might or might not be executed without any injury to the holiness, purity and justice of God? or, the Divine nature itself, as averse to, hating, and punishing every sin? Why shall not the foolish stand in God's sight? is it because he freely wills to punish them? or, because our God, to all the workers of iniquity is a consuming

fire? Not that the nature of God can wax hot at the ſight of ſin, in a natural manner, as fire doth after the combuſtible materials have been applied to it; but, that puniſhment as naturally follows ſin, as its conſequence, on account of the preſſing demand of juſtice, as fire conſumes the fuel that is applied to it.

Sect. III. But it is not without good reaſon that God, who is love, ſo often teſtifies in the Holy Scriptures his hatred and abomination of ſin, *the wicked, and him that loveth violence, his ſoul hateth*, Pſal. xi. 5. Speaking of ſinners, Levit. xxvi. 30. he ſays, *and my ſoul ſhall abhor you.* He calls ſin *that abominable thing*—there is nothing that God hates but ſin, and becauſe of ſin only, other things are liable to his hatred. In what ſenſe paſſions and affections are aſcribed to God, and what he would have us to underſtand by ſuch a deſcription of his nature and attributes, is known to every body. But of all the affections of human nature, hatred is the moſt reſtleſs and turbulent, and to the perſon who is under its influence, and who can neither diveſt himſelf of it, nor give a ſatisfactory vent to its motions, the moſt tormenting and vexatious. For as it takes its riſe from a diſagreement with and diſlike of its object, ſo that object is always viewed as repugnant and offenſive: no wonder then, that it ſhould rouſe the moſt vehement commotions

and

and bitterest sensations. But God, who enjoys eternal and infinite happiness and glory, as he is far removed from any such perturbations, and placed far beyond all variableness or shadow of change, would not assume this *affection* so often, for our instruction, unless he meant clearly to point out to us this supreme immutable and constant purpose of punishing sin, as that monster, whose property it is to be the object of God's hatred, (that is, of the hatred of infinite goodness) to be natural and essential to him.

Sect. IV. The learned Twiss answers, "I cannot agree, that God by nature equally "punishes and hates sin, unless you mean that "hatred in the Deity to respect his will as ap- "pointing a punishment for sin: in which "sense I acknowledge it to be true, that God "equally, from nature and necessity, punishes "and hates sin: but I deny it to be neces- "sary that he should either so hate sin, "or punish it; if hatred be understood "to mean God's displeasure, I maintain that "it is not equally natural to God to punish "sin, and to hate it; for we maintain it to be "necessary that every sin should displease "God; but it is not necessary that God should "punish every sin." The sum of the answer is this, God's hatred of sin is taken either for his will of punishing it, and so is not natural to God, or for his displeasure, on account of

ſin, and ſo is natural to him: but it does not thence follow, that God neceſſarily puniſhes every ſin, and that he can let no ſin paſs unpuniſhed.

But, *firſt*, this learned gentleman denies what has been proved; nor does he deign to advance a word to invalidate the proof: he denies that God naturally *hates* ſin, *hatred* being taken for the will of puniſhing; but this we have before demonſtrated both from Scripture and reaſon. It would be eaſy indeed to elude the force of any argument in this manner. Afterward he acknowledges, that every ſin muſt neceſſarily be diſpleaſing to God; this then depends not on the free-will of God, but on his nature; it belongs then immutably to God, and it is altogether impoſſible that it ſhould not diſpleaſe him. This then is ſuppoſed, that ſin is always diſpleaſing to God, but that God may or may not puniſh it, but pardon the ſin, and cheriſh the ſinner, though his ſin eternally diſpleaſe him; for that depends upon his nature, which is eternally immutable. Nor is it poſſible, that what hath been ſin, ſhould ever be any thing but ſin. From this natural diſpleaſure, then with ſin, we may with propriety argue to its neceſſary puniſhment; otherwiſe, what meaneth that deſpairing exclamation of alarmed hypocrites? *Who among us ſhall dwell with the devouring fire?*

fire? Who amongſt us ſhall dwell with everlaſting burnings *?

The learned Doctor retorts, "Obedience "muſt neceſſarily pleaſe God, but God is not "bound by his juſtice neceſſarily to reward "it." But the learned gentleman will hardly maintain, that the proportion between obedience as to reward, and diſobedience as to puniſhment, is the ſame; for God is bound to reward no man for obedience performed, for that is due to him by natural right. Luke xvii. 10. *So likewiſe ye, when ye ſhall have done all thoſe things which are commanded you, ſay, We are unprofitable ſervants: we have done that which was our duty to do.* Pſal. xvi. 2. *My goodneſs extendeth not unto thee.* But every man owes to God obedience, or is obnoxious to a vicarious puniſhment; nor can the moral dependance of a rational creature on its creator be otherwiſe preſerved. *The wages of ſin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life,* Rom. vi. 23.

Sect. V. Away then with all proud thoughts of equalling the proportion between obedience as to reward, and ſin as to puniſhment. *Who hath firſt given to him, and it ſhall be recompenſed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be glory for ever, Amen,* Rom. xi. 25, 26. *What haſt thou,*

* Iſaiah xxxiii. 14.

O man, that thou haſt not received? But if thou haſt received it, why doſt thou glory, as if thou hadſt not received it? 1 Cor. iv. 7. God requireth nothing of us but what he hath formerly given us, and therefore he has every right to require it, although he were to beſtow no rewards. What? Doth not God obſerve a juſt proportion in the infliction of puniſhments, ſo that the degrees of puniſhment, according to the rule of his juſtice ſhould not exceed the demerit of the tranſgreſſion? *Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* But beware, Dr. Twiſs, of aſſerting, "That "there is any proportion between the eternal "fruition of God, and the inexpreſſible par- "ticipation of his glory, in which he hath "been graciouſly pleaſed, that the reward of "our obedience ſhould conſiſt, and the "obedience of an inſignificant reptile, almoſt "leſs than nothing." Whatever dignity or happineſs we arrive at, we are ſtill God's creatures.

It is impoſſible, that he who is bleſſed for ever and ever, and is ſo infinitely happy in his own eſſential glory, that he ſtands in no need of us, or of our ſervices; and who, in requiring all that we are, and all that we can do, only requires his own, can, by the receipt of it, become bound in any debt or obligation. For God, I ſay, from the beginning, ſtood in no need of our praiſe; nor did he create us that he

he might have creatures to honour him, but that agreeable to his goodneſs he might conduct us to happineſs.

Sect. VI. But he again retorts, and maintains, "That God can puniſh where he does "not hate; and therefore he may hate and not "puniſh; for he puniſhed his moſt holy Son, "whom, God forbid, that we ſhould ſay he "ever hated." But beſides, that this mode of arguing, from oppoſites, hardly holds good in theology; though God hated not his Son when he puniſhed him, perſonally conſidered, he however hated the ſins, on account of which he puniſhed him, (and even himſelf ſubſtitutively conſidered with reſpect to the effect of ſin) no leſs than if they had been laid to any ſinner: yea, and from this argument it follows, that God cannot hate ſin, and *not* puniſh it; for when he laid ſins, which he hates, to the charge of his moſt holy Son, whom he loved with the higheſt love, yet he could not but puniſh him.

Sect. VII. The repreſentation or deſcription of God, and of the Divine nature, in reſpect of its habitude * to ſin, which the Scriptures furniſh us with, and the deſcription of ſin, with relation to God and his juſtice,

* Habitude means the ſtate of a perſon or thing, with relation to ſomething elſe: the habitude of the Divine nature with reſpect to ſin, is a diſpoſition to puniſh it.

ſupply us with a ſecond argument. They call God *a conſuming fire* *, *a God who will by no means clear the guilty* †.

They repreſent ſin *as that abominable thing which he hateth*, ‡ *which he will deſtroy, as the fire devoureth the ſtubble, and the flame conſumeth the chaff.* As then conſuming fire cannot but burn and conſume ſtubble, when applied to it, ſo neither can God do otherwiſe than puniſh ſin, *that abominable thing*, which is conſuming or deſtroying it, whenever preſented before him and his juſtice.

Sect. VIII. But the very learned Twiſs replies, " That God is a conſuming fire, but " an intelligent and rational one, not a natural " and inſenſible one; and this (ſays he) is " manifeſt from this, that this fire once burnt " ſomething not § conſumable, namely, his " own

* Rom. xii. 29. Deut. iv. 24. Iſaiah xiii. 13.

† Exod. xxxiv. 7. ‡ Jerem. xliv. 4. Iſa. v 24.

§ The word in the original is *combuſtibile*, meaning ſomething that is *ſuſceptible of*, and *conſumable by fire*. It muſt be evident to every one that the phraſe is uſed in alluſion to the metaphor, which repreſents God as a *conſuming fire*. The Son of God then was not, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, *conſumable, or ſuſceptible of this fire*; that is, he was by no means the object of the Divine anger, or puniſhment, conſidered as the Son of God, and without any relation to mankind; but on the contrary, was the beloved of his Father, with whom he was always well pleaſed: but he was liable to the effects of *this fire*, that is, of God's vindicatory juſtice, as our repreſentative and federal

" own Son, in whom there was no ſin; which " (ſays he) may ſerve as a proof, that this " fire may not burn what is conſumable, " when applied to it."

But, in my opinion, this very learned man was never more unhappy in extricating himſelf: for firſt he acknowleges God to be " *a conſuming fire*, though *a rational and intelligent one*, not a natural and inſenſible one; but the compariſon was made between the events of the operations, not the modes of operating. No body ever ſaid that God acts *without ſenſe*, or from *abſolute* neceſſity, and principles of nature, without any concomitant liberty; but although he acts by will and underſtanding, we have ſaid that his nature as neceſſarily requires him to puniſh any ſin committed, as natural and inſenſible fire burns the combuſtible matter that is applied to it. But the learned gentleman does not deny this, nay, he even confirms it, granting that, with reſpect to ſin, God *is a conſuming fire*, though only an intelligent and rational one.

SECT. IX. I am ſorry that this very learned Author ſhould have uſed the expreſſion, " *That this fire burnt ſomething not conſumable*, " when he puniſhed his moſt holy and well-be-

deral head. And every ſinner is *conſumable* by *this fire*, that is, is properly, and naturally the object of Divine wrath and puniſhment.

loved Son:" for God did not punish Christ as his most holy Son, but as our Mediator, and the Surety of the covenant, *whom he made sin for us, though he knew no sin*; surely, *he laid upon him our sins*, before *the chastisement of our peace* was upon him: but in this sense he was very susceptible of the effects of this fire, viz. when considered as bearing the guilt of all our sins, and therefore it was that *by fire the Lord did plead with him* *, therefore, what this very learned man asserts, in the third place, falls to the ground; for the conclusion from such a very false supposition must necessarily be false. We go on to the Third Argument.

* Isa. lxvi. 16.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The third argument—The non-punishment of sin is contrary to the glory of God's justice—Likewise of his holiness and dominion—A fourth argument—The necessity of a satisfaction being made by the death of Christ—No necessary cause, or cogent reason for the death of Christ, according to the adversaries—The objection refuted—The use of sacrifices—The end of the FIRST PART *of the dissertation.*

SECT. I. OUR third argument is this: "'Tis "absolutely necessary that God "should preserve his glory entire to all eter- "nity; but sin being supposed, without any "punishment due to it, he cannot preserve "his glory free from violation; therefore, 'tis "necessary that he should punish it." Concerning the *major** proposition, there is no dis-

*. Our author here speaks in the language and reasons in the manner of Logicians, the prevalent mode of reasoning at the time when he wrote: for the sake of those unacquainted with that art, it may not be improper to observe, that the above argument is what they call a *syllogism*; and that a syllogism consists of three propositions: the first is called the *major*, the second the *minor*, and the third the *conclusion*. In the above argument the *major* proposition is, "it is absolutely necessary that God should preserve his glory entire to all eternity." The *minor* is, "But sin being supposed, without any punishment due to it, he cannot preserve his glory free from violation." The *conclusion* is, "Therefore it is necessary that he should punish it." The minor is sometimes called the assumption, and sometimes the conclusion is so named. They are both included under this title by our author in the following sentence.

pute;

pute; for all acknowledge, not only that it is neceſſary to God, that he ſhould preſerve his glory, but that this is incumbent on him by *a neceſſity of nature*, for he cannot but love himſelf; *he is Jehovah, and will not give his glory to another* *. The truth of the *aſſumption* is no leſs clear, for the very nature of the thing itſelf proclaims, that the glory of juſtice, or of holineſs, and dominion, could not otherwiſe be preſerved and ſecured, than by the puniſhment of ſin.

SECT. II. For firſt, the glory of God is diſplayed in doing the things that are *juſt*; but in *omitting* theſe, it is impaired, not leſs than in doing *the things that are contrary. He that juſtifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the juſt, even they both are an abomination to the Lord* *. *Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* or, what is *juſt?* But *it is a righteous* or juſt *thing with God to recompenſe tribulation to the diſobedient* †, *and to puniſh thoſe, who, on account of ſin, are worthy of death.* Suppoſe then that God ſhould let the diſobedient, *whom it is a juſt thing* for him to puniſh, go unpuniſhed, and that thoſe who are worthy of death ſhould never be required to die, but that he ſhould clear the guilty and the wicked, although he hath declared them to be an abomination to him; where is the glory of his

* Iſa. xlii. 8.

* Prov. xvii. 15. † 2 Theſſ. i. 6. Rom. i. 32.

juſtice?

juſtice? That it is moſt evident, that God thus puniſhes, becauſe he *is juſt*, we have proved before. "Is God unrighteous or *unjuſt*, who taketh vengeance? God forbid; for then, how ſhall God judge the world?" "And he is righteous, or *juſt*, becauſe he hath given them blood to drink, who were worthy of it*;" "and would be ſo far *unjuſt*, were he not to inflict puniſhment on thoſe deſerving it."

Sect. III. Secondly, A proper regard is not ſhewn to Divine *holineſs*, nor is its glory manifeſted, unleſs the puniſhment due to ſin be inflicted. *Holineſs* is oppoſed to ſin, "for "God is of purer eyes than to behold evil, "and cannot look on † iniquity;" and is the cauſe why he cannot let ſin paſs unpuniſhed, "Ye cannot ſerve the Lord; for he is an *holy* "God: he will not forgive your tranſgreſ- "ſions, nor your ſins ‡," ſaid Joſhua to the Iſraelites. For why? Can any thing impure and polluted ſtand before his holy Majeſty? He himſelf declares the contrary, "That he is not a God that hath pleaſure in "wickedneſs; that, evil ſhall not dwell with "him; that the fooliſh ſhall not ſtand "in his ſight; that he hateth all the work- "ers of iniquity." And that, "there ſhall "in no wiſe enter into the New § Jeruſalem, "any thing that defileth, neither whatſoever

* Rom. iii. 5. Rev. xvi. 5, 6, 7. † Hab. i. 13,
‡ Joſh. xxiv. 9. § Pſal. v. 4, 5, 6. Rev. xxi. 27.

worketh

" worketh abomination, or maketh a lie *." Nor can JESUS CHRIST preſent his church to his Father, " till it be ſanctified and cleanſed, " with the waſhing of water by the word, and " made a glorious church, not having ſpot or " wrinkle, or any ſuch thing; but holy, and " without blemiſh." And we are injoined to be *holy*, becauſe *he* is *holy*. " But all things are " to be purged with blood, and without ſhed- " ding of blood, there is no remiſſion †."

SECT. IV. Thirdly, We have ſufficiently ſhewn above, that the *natural dominion* which God hath over rational creatures, and which, they by ſin renounce, could not otherwiſe be preſerved, or continued, than by means of a *vicarious puniſhment*. And now let impartial judges decide, whether it be *neceſſary* to God, " That he ſhould preſerve entire the glory of his *juſtice*, *holineſs*, and *ſupreme dominion*, or not?"

SECT. V. Fourthly, And which is a principal point to be conſidered on this ſubject, were the opinions of the adverſaries to be admitted, and were we to ſuppoſe that God *might will* the ſalvation of any ſinner, it will be difficult, if not impoſſible, to aſſign any ſufficient and *neceſſary* cauſe of the death of Chriſt. For, let us ſuppoſe that God hath impoſed on mankind a *law*, ratified by a threatening of eternal death; and that they, by a violation of that *law*, have deſerved the puniſhment threat-

* Eph. v. 26, 27. † Heb. ix. 22.

ened,

ened, and consequently are become liable to *eternal death*. Again, Let us suppose, that God in that threatening, did not *expressly* intend the death of the sinner; but afterwards declared *what, and of what kind* he willed that the guilt of sin should be, and what *punishment* he might justly inflict on the sinner, and what the sinner himself ought to expect, (all which things flow from the free determination of God) but that he might by his *nod*, *word*, *without any trouble*, though no *satisfaction* were either made, or received, without the least diminution of his glory, and without any affront or dishonour to any attribute, or any injury or disgrace to himself, consistent with *the preservation of his right*, *dominion*, and *justice*, *freely pardon* the sins of those whom he *might will* to save; what sufficient reason could be given, pray then, why he should lay those sins so *easily remissible* to the charge of his most holy Son, and on their account subject him to such dreadful sufferings?

Sect. VI. While *Socinians* do not acknowledge other ends of the whole of this dispensation and mystery, than those which they assign, they will be unable, to all eternity, to give any probable reason, why a most merciful and just God should expose a most innocent and holy man, who was his own Son, *by way of eminence*, and who was introduced by himself into the world in a *preternatural* manner, as they themselves acknowledge, to afflictions and

and ſufferings of every kind, while among the living he pointed out to them the way of life, and at laſt to a *cruel, ignominious, and accurſed death.*

SECT. VII. I very well know that I cannot pretend to be either ingenious or quick-ſighted; but reſpecting this matter, I am not aſhamed to confeſs my dulneſs to be ſuch, that I cannot ſee that God, conſiſtent with the preſervation of his right and glory entire, could, without the intervention of a ranſom, pardon ſins, as if juſtice did not require their puniſhment, or that Chriſt had died *in vain.* For why? "Hath not God ſet him forth to be a propitiation for the demonſtration, or declaration of "his ſin-puniſhing juſtice?" But how could that juſtice be demonſtrated by an action which it did not require? Or, if the action might be omitted without any diminution of it? If God would have been infinitely juſt to eternity, nor would have done any thing contrary and offenſive to juſtice, though he had never inflicted puniſhment upon any ſin? Could any ruler become highly famed and celebrated on account of his juſtice, by doing thoſe things, which, from the right of his dominion, he can do *without injuſtice,* but to the performance of which he is no way obligated by the *virtue of juſtice?* But if the adverſaries ſuppoſe, that, when God freely made a law for his rational creatures, he freely appointed a puniſhment for tranſgreſſion, freely ſubſtituted Chriſt

Chriſt in the room of tranſgreſſors: in fine, that God did all theſe things, and the like, *becauſe ſo it pleaſed him*, and that therefore we are to acquieſce in that moſt wiſe and free-will of his diſpoſing all things at his pleaſure; they ſhould not find me oppoſing them; unleſs God himſelf had taught us in his word, "that ſin is that abominable thing which his ſoul hateth," which is affrontive to him, which entirely caſteth off all regard to that glory, honour and reverence which are due to him; and that to the ſinner himſelf, it is ſomething evil and bitter, "for he ſhall eat of the fruit of his *doings*, and be filled with his own counſels;" and that God, with reſpect to ſinners, *is a conſuming fire*," an everlaſting burning, in which they ſhall dwell; that "he will by no means clear the guilty," that he judgeth thoſe who *are worthy of death*, and by his juſt judgment taketh vengeance on them; and that, therefore, "without the ſhedding of blood, there can be no remiſſion," and that without a victim for ſin, there remaineth to ſinners, "no-"thing but a fearful looking for of judgment "and fiery indignation, that ſhall conſume "the adverſaries;" and that he had appointed, from the beginning, his only begotten Son, for the *declaration* and ſatisfaction of his juſtice, and the recovery of his glory, to open the way to Heaven, otherwiſe ſhut, and to remain ſhut for ever; if I ſay God had not inſtructed us in *theſe and ſuch like truths* from his word,

I ſhould

I ſhould not oppoſe them: but theſe being clearly laid down *in the word*, we ſolemnly declare our belief, that no ſinner could obtain the remiſſion of his ſins, provided that we are diſpoſed to acknowledge God to be *juſt*, without * *a price of redemption.*

Sect. VIII. Perhaps, ſome one will ſay, it doth not follow from the death of Chriſt, that God neceſſarily puniſheth ſin, for Chriſt himſelf, in his agony, placeth *the paſſing away of the cup among things poſſible. All things*, (ſaith he) *Father, are poſſible with thee. Let this cup paſs from me.*

I anſwer; 'tis well known, that the word *impoſſibility* may be conſidered in a two-fold point of view: the firſt is in itſelf abſolute, which reſpects the abſolute power of God, antecedent to any free act of the Divine will; in this reſpect, it was not impoſſible that, that cup ſhould paſs from Chriſt. The ſecond is *conditional*, which reſpects the power of God, as *directed in a certain order*, that is, determined, and (if I might ſo phraſe it) circumſcribed by ſome act of the Divine will; and in this ſenſe it was impoſſible: that is to ſay, it being ſuppoſed, that God willed to pardon any ſins to ſinners, it could not be done without laying their puniſhment upon the Surety; but we do not purſue this argument further at preſent,

* Or ranſom.

becauſe

becauſe we intend to reſume it again in the conſideration of the doctrine of Chriſt's ſatisfaction.

Sect. IX. There are yet many arguments very proper for eſtabliſhing the truth on our ſide of the queſtion, which we chooſe not to enter on largely and on ſet purpoſe, leſt we ſhould be tireſome to the reader; perhaps, however, it will be judged worth while briefly to ſketch out ſome heads of them, and annex them to the former arguments concerning juſtice and the exerciſe thereof. The 1ſt. is to this purport.

Sect. X. A *ſecond* act preſuppoſes a firſt: and a conſtant manner of operating proves a habit. A ſign alſo expreſſes the thing ſignified. Becauſe God doeth good to all, we believe him to be good and endowed with ſupreme goodneſs. For how could he ſo conſtantly and uniformly do good, unleſs he himſelf were good? Yea, from *ſecond* acts the Holy Scriptures ſometimes teach the *firſt*; as for inſtance, that God is the *living God*, becauſe he giveth *life* to all; that he is *good*, becauſe he doeth good: why may we not alſo ſay, and that he is *juſt*, endowed with that juſtice of which we are treating, becauſe "God perverteth not "judgment; neither doth the Almighty pervert "juſtice;"* but "the Lord is righteous, and up-"right are his judgments," a conſtant then and

* Job. viii. 3. Pſal. cxix. 137.

uniform

uniform courſe of juſt operation in puniſhing ſins proves *punitory juſtice* to be eſſentially inherent in God. From his law, which is the ſign* of the Divine will, the ſame is evident. For the nature of *the thing ſignified* is, that it reſembles the ſign appointed for the purpoſe of expreſſing it. That the ſame thing may be ſaid of the *anger*, *fury* and *ſeverity* of God hath been ſhewn above. Rom. i. 8.

Sect. XI. A ſecond, It is not the part of a *juſt judge*, of his mere good pleaſure, to let the wicked paſs unpuniſhed: "he that juſtifieth "the wicked is an abomination to the Lord," and "woe to them that call evil good." But God is a juſt judge: but one, *who is not liable to render a reaſon*, you will ſay, and who is by no means *ſubject to a law*. But the nature of God is a law to itſelf: he cannot lie, becauſe he himſelf is *truth*; nor act unjuſtly, becauſe he is *juſt*. Such as God is by nature, ſuch is he in the acts of his will.

Sect. XII. A third, The argument, from the *immutable difference* of things in themſelves, is of very conſiderable weight. For that which is *ſin*, becauſe it deſtroys that ſubjection of the creature which is due to the Creator, cannot even, by the omnipotence of God, be made to be *not ſin*. *To hate* the ſupreme good implies a contradiction. But if from *the nature of the*

* That is, which ſheweth what the Divine will is.

thing

thing, ſin be ſin, in relation to the ſupreme perfection of God, from the nature of the thing too it is its own puniſhment. Yea, God hath ordered *children to obey their parents*, becauſe *this is right*.*

Sect. XIII. A fourth, The adverſaries acknowledge, " that God cannot ſave the impenitent and *obſtinately* wicked, without injury to the glory and holineſs and perfection of his nature:" why ſo? the juſtice of God, ſay they, will not ſuffer it: but *what kind of juſtice is that*, I aſk, which can regard certain *modes* and *relations* of tranſgreſſion or ſin, and will not regard the tranſgreſſion or ſin itſelf?

Sect. XIV. A fifth, God puniſhes ſin either becauſe he ſimply wills it, or becauſe it is *juſt* that ſin ſhould be puniſhed. If becauſe he ſimply wills it, then the will of God is the alone cauſe of the perdition of a ſinful creature. But he himſelf teſtifies to the contrary, viz. that man's ruin is of himſelf; " O Iſrael† " thou haſt deſtroyed thyſelf; but in me is thy " help." Again, juſtice does not require that the things which God doeth of his mere good pleaſure ſhould come to paſs, more, than that they ſhould not come to paſs. But if it be not more juſt that ſins ſhould be puniſhed, than that they ſhould not be puniſhed, it is certain that the non-puniſhment or free pardon of ſin

* In the original, juſt. † Hoſ. xiii. 9.

is

is more agreeable to the goodneſs, grace, love and compaſſion of God, than the infliction of puniſhment; how then comes it to paſs, that diſregarding theſe attributes, he ſhould freely will that which no eſſential property of his nature requires? If then ſin be ſin, becauſe *God wills it*; if the *tranſgreſſion* of the law deſerve puniſhment becauſe *God wills it*; and the puniſhment be at length inflicted becauſe God *wills it*; the order of things, or the condition which they are in by virtue of their reſpect and relation to the *dominion* and *perfection* of God, requiring no ſuch thing, why pray, ſhould we either hate or abhor ſin, when the *bare will* of God alone is to be conſidered, both in reſpect of the *decree* which ſuppoſes that there is nothing *in ſin*, and which implies no change of the ſtate of things, and alſo in reſpect of its execution? But if God puniſh ſin, becauſe, by virtue of his natural juſtice it is juſt that it ſhould be puniſhed, then it is unjuſt not to puniſh it. But is *God unjuſt? God forbid.*

Sect. XV. I am truly aſhamed of thoſe Divines, who have nothing more commonly in their mouths, both in their diſputations and diſcourſes to the people, than "that God might by other means have provided for the ſafety and honour of his juſtice, but that, that way by the blood of his ſon was more proper and becoming. So ſaid Auguſtine of old: but what then? Of that *abſolute* power, which they dream

dream of, by which he might, without any intervening ſacrifice, forgive ſins, not the leaſt ſyllable is mentioned in the whole ſacred writings: nor am I afraid to affirm that a more convenient device to weaken our faith, love and gratitude cannot be invented. Away then with ſuch ſpeculations which teach that the myſtery of the love of God the Father, of the blood of Jeſus Chriſt, of the grace of the Holy Spirit are either indifferent, or at leaſt were not neceſſary for procuring and beſtowing ſalvation and eternal glory on miſerable ſinners. But it is manifeſt, that by ſuch artifices Socinians endeavour to overthrow the whole healing and heavenly doctrine of the Goſpel: *my ſoul come not thou into their ſecret.* But, that God ſhould inſtitute ſo many expiatory typical ſacrifices, and attended with ſo great labour and coſt, with a ſanction of ſevere puniſhments upon delinquents, with this view only to *communicate inſtruction*, and to ſerve *to lead us* to Chriſt, though they could in no wiſe take away the guilt of ſin:* that he ſhould appoint his own ſon, not only to death, but to a bloody, ignominious, accurſed death, to be inflicted with ſuch ſhame and diſgrace as hath not been purged away through ſo many gene-

* Heb. x. 1. There the Apoſtle argues for the *neceſſity* of the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, which he could not, if the guilt of ſin could have been taken away by any other way whatever.

rations

rations that have paſſed ſince that death, even to the preſent time; that Jehovah himſelf ſhould have been pleaſed to bruiſe him, to put him to grief; that he made his own ſword to awake againſt him, and forſook him;* that God, I ſay, ſhould have done theſe and ſuch like things, without being induced to it by any neceſſary cauſe, let thoſe who can, comprehend and explain.

* See Iſa. liii. x.

END OF PART FIRST.

CHAP.

PART SECOND.

CHAP. VIII.

Objections of the adverſaries anſwered—The Racovian Catechiſm particularly conſidered—The force of the argument for the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, from punitory juſtice—The Catechiſts deny that juſtice to be inherent in God—And alſo ſparing mercy—Their firſt argument weighed and refuted—Juſtice and Mercy are not oppoſite—Two kinds of the Divine attributes—Their ſecond and third arguments, with the anſwers annexed.

SECT. I. IT is now time to meet the objections of the adverſaries, and ſo at length put an end to this diſpute, as far as regards the ſubject matter of it, already drawn out to ſuch a length, and yet farther to be continued. We muſt firſt then encounter the Socinians themſelves, on whoſe account we firſt engaged in this undertaking; and afterwards we ſhall compare notes with a few learned friends. But as * very lately the Racovian

* This Treatiſe was publiſhed in Latin, in the year 1653.

catechiſm of theſe heretics hath been repeatedly printed among us, we ſhall firſt conſider what is to be met with there in oppoſition to the truth which we aſſert.

Sect. II. The Socinians grant in that catechiſm of theirs, the argument for the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, drawn from the nature of this punitory juſtice "to be plauſible in appearance;" yea, they muſt neceſſarily acknowledge it to be ſuch as that they cannot even in appearance oppoſe it, without being guilty of the dreadful ſacrilege of robbing God of his eſſential attributes; and therefore they deny either *this juſtice* or *ſparing mercy* to be naturally inherent in God; and they endeavour to defend the robbery by a threefold argument. Their *firſt* is this: "as to mercy, that it is "not inherent in God in the manner that they "think,* is evident from this conſideration, "that if it were naturally inherent in God, "God would not wholly puniſh any ſin; as in "like manner, if that juſtice were naturally "inherent in God, as they think, God could "forgive no ſin: for God can never do any "thing againſt what is naturally inherent in "him. As for inſtance, as wiſdom is naturally inherent in God, God never doeth any

* Let the reader remember that the compilers of the Rocovian catechiſm are now ſpeaking, and that the words "they think" allude to the ſentiments of the orthodox.

"thing

" thing contrary to it, but whatſoever he do-
" eth, he doeth all things wiſely. But as it
" is manifeſt that God forgives and puniſhes
" ſins when he will, it appears, that ſuch a
" kind of mercy and juſtice as they think of,
" is not naturally inherent in God, but is the
" effect of his own will."

Sect. III. I anſwer, 1ſt. that we have laid it down as a fixed principle that mercy is eſſential to God, and that the nature of it in God is the ſame with juſtice we willingly grant. Rutherford alone hath aſſerted that mercy is eſſential to God, but that *this juſtice* is a free act of the Divine will. The falſity and folly of his aſſertion, let himſelf be anſwerable for; the thing ſpeaks for itſelf. To ſpeak the truth, juſtice is attributed to God *properly* and by way of *habit*, mercy only *analogically* and by way of *affection:* and in the firſt covenant God paved no way for the diſplay of his mercy, but proceeded in *that which led ſtraight* to the glory of his juſtice: nevertheleſs we maintain the one to be no leſs naturally inherent in God than the other. " But if it were naturally inherent in God, ſay the Catechiſts, God would not puniſh any ſin." Why, I ſay? mention ſome plea. " Becauſe, (ſay they) God cannot " do any thing contrary to what is naturally " inherent in him; but it is manifeſt that God " puniſhes ſin." But whoſe ſins doth God puniſh? The ſins of the impenitent, the unbe-

lieving, the rebellious, for whose offences the justice of God hath never been satisfied. But is not this contrary to mercy? Let every *just judge* then be called cruel; the *punishment* of sin then is contrary to mercy, either in respect of the *infliction of the punishment* itself, or because it supposes in God a *quality* opposite to mercy: the contrariety is not in respect of the infliction of punishment; for between an external act of Divine power and eternal attributes of Deity, no opposition can be supposed: nor can it be, because punishment supposes some quality in God opposite to *mercy*, for that which is opposite to *mercy* is *cruelty:* but God is free from every suspicion of cruelty, yet he punishes the sins of the impenitent, as the Socinians themselves acknowledge.

Sect. IV. But that punitory justice, say they, which you assign as the source of punishment, is opposite to mercy. How, I say, can that be? Punitory justice, essentially considered, is the very perfection and rectitude of God itself, essentially considered: and the essence of mercy, so to speak, is the same. But the essence of God, which is most simple, is not opposed to itself: moreover, both have their actual egresses by means of the acts of the Divine will, which is always one alone and self-consistent. Objectively considered, I acknowledge they have different, but not contrary effects: for to punish the impenitent guilty, for whom no satisfaction hath been made,

made, is not contrary to the pardoning of thoſe who believe and are penitent, through the blood of the Mediator, which was ſhed for the remiſſion of ſins. In one word, it is not neceſſary, that, though actions be contrary, the eſſential principles ſhould alſo be contrary.

Sect. V. But they again urge, "wiſdom "is naturally inherent in God, and he never "doeth any thing contrary to it; for whatſoever "he doeth, he doeth all things wiſely." We anſwer, "it hath been proved before that the puniſhment of ſin is not *contrary* to mercy. But they urge ſomething further, and inſinuate that God not only cannot act contrary to his wiſdom, but that in every work he exerciſeth it: whatſoever he doeth, ſay they, he doeth wiſely." But the nature of all the Divine attributes, in reſpect of their exerciſe, is not the ſame: for ſome create and conſtitute an object to themſelves, as *power* * and *wiſdom*, which God muſt neceſſarily exerciſe in all his works; ſome require an object conſtituted for their egreſs; and for theſe it is ſufficient, that no work be done that is oppoſite, or derogatory to their honour: of this kind are mercy and juſtice, as was ſaid before.

Thus far concerning mercy.

* See pages 28 and 29.

SECT. VI. The objections that they bring againſt juſtice are eaſily anſwered: "If juſtice be "naturally inherent in God, ſay they, then he "could let no ſin paſs unpuniſhed." We readily grant that God paſſes by no ſin unpuniſhed, nor can do it. He forgives our ſins, but he doth not abſolutely let them paſs unpuniſhed: every ſin hath its *juſt recompence of reward*, either in the *ſinner*, or the *ſurety*: but to pardon ſin for which *juſtice* hath been ſatisfied, is no wiſe contrary to juſtice: that the nature of *juſtice* and mercy, in reſpect of their relation to their object, is different, hath been ſhewn before.* Such is their *firſt* argument: the *ſecond* follows, which is this:

SECT. VII. "That juſtice which the adverſaries oppoſe to mercy, ſay they, whereby "God puniſheth ſins, the Sacred Scriptures no "where point out by the name of juſtice, but call "it the anger and fury of God." We anſwer, *in the firſt place*, that it is a very groſs miſtake, that we *oppoſe* juſtice to mercy. Theſe Catechiſts have need themſelves to be catechized.

In the *ſecond* place; let thoſe, who ſhall pleaſe to conſult the paſſages formerly mentioned and explained on this head, determine, whether the Sacred Scriptures call this juſtice by its own proper name or not?† In the *third*

* See pages 35 and 36.

† This point is treated, at great length, and clearly proved in the 3d chapter.

place;

place; *anger* or *fury* are, in reality, as to their effects, reducible to juſtice: hence that which is called *wrath* or *anger* in Rom. i. 18. in the thirty-firſt verſe is called *judgment*.* Such is their *ſecond*, and now follows the *third* argument.

Sect. VIII. "When God forgives ſins, "it is attributed in Scripture to his juſtice. "If we confeſs our ſins, he is faithful and juſt "to forgive us our ſins, and to cleanſe us "from all iniquity.† Being juſtified freely "by his grace through the redemption that "is in Jeſus Chriſt, whom God hath ſet forth "to be a propitiation through faith in his "blood, to declare his righteouſneſs for the "remiſſion of ſins that are paſt, through the "forbearance of God; to declare, I ſay, at "this time his righteouſneſs: that he might "be juſt, and the juſtifier of him that believeth "in Jeſus." We anſwer; that we have already ſhewn, at great length, that juſtice, univerſally taken, is the perfection and rectitude of God, and has various egreſſes both in *words* and in *deeds*, according to the conſtitution of the objects about which it may be employed:‡ hence effects diſtinct and in ſome meaſure different, are attributed to the ſame virtue. But

* The original word means a juſt ſentence, or righteous judgment.

†1 John i. 9. Rom. iii, 24, 25, 26.

‡ See pages 8, 9, 10.

the juſtice, on account of which, God is ſaid to forgive ſins, is the *juſtice of faithfulneſs*, which has the foundation of its exerciſe in this punitory juſtice, to which, when ſatisfied, God *who cannot lie*, promiſes the forgiveneſs of ſins through Jeſus Chriſt, which promiſe beyond all doubt he will perform, becauſe he is *faithful* and *juſt*. And thus vaniſhes in ſmoke all that theſe unhappy Catechiſts have ſcraped together againſt this Divine truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Crellius taken to task—His first mistake—God doth not punish sins as being endowed with supreme dominion---The first argument of Crellius—The answer—The translation of punishment upon Christ, in what view made by God—Whether the remission of sins, without a satisfaction made, could take place, without injury to him to whom punishment belongs—Whether every one can resign his right----Right twofold ---The right of debt, what: and what that of government---A natural and positive right---Positive right, what:—a description also of natural right—Concessions of Crellius.

SECT. I. CRELLIUS treats this subject at great length, and with his usual artifice and acuteness in his first book "of the true religion," prefixed to the works of Volkelius on the same subject.*

SECT. II. First then he asserts, "that God "hath a power of inflicting and of not inflicting punishment; but that it is by no means "repugnant to Divine justice, to pardon the sinner whom by his right he might punish."

* Chap. xxiii. Title, "Of the Power of God;" page 181, &c.

Sect. III. But here Crellius, which is a bad omen, as they ſay, ſtumbles in the very threſhold; ſuppoſing puniſhment to be competent to God, as he hath, or is endowed with an abſolute and ſupreme dominion over the creatures. God never puniſheth, or is ſaid to puniſh, as uſing that power: it is the part of a governor or judge to inflict puniſhment, and the Scriptures furniſh ſufficient evidence that both theſe relations belong to him in the infliction of puniſhment. " * There is one Law-" giver, who is able to ſave and to deſtroy. He " maintaineth right, and ſitteth on his throne " judging right. He is Judge of all the earth. " He is the ſupreme Judge. He hath pre-" pared his throne for judgment, and he " ſhall judge the world in righteouſneſs: he " ſhall miniſter judgment to the people in " righteouſneſs. He is Judge of the earth, " who will render a reward to the proud. He " is Jehovah our Judge, our Lawgiver, and " our King. And God the Judge of all." In all the acts of his abſolute dominion and ſupreme power, God is moſt free, and this the Apoſtle openly aſſerts with regard to his decrees making diſtinctions among mankind, in reſpect of their laſt end and the means thereto

* Jam. iv. 12. Pſal. ix. 4, 5. Gen. xviii. 25. Pſal. l. 6. Pſal. ix. 8, 9. Pſal. xciv. 2. Heb. xii. 23, &c.

con-

conducing, according to his mere good pleasure; see Rom. ix. Moreover, in some operations and dispensations of providence concerning mankind, both the godly and ungodly I acknowledge, that God frequently asserts the equity and rectitude of his government, from that supreme right which he possesseth, and may exercise.

" — Behold, * God is greater than man. " Why dost thou strive against him; for he " giveth not an account of any of his matters." " Yea, surely, God will not do wickedly, " neither will the Almighty pervert judg- " ment. Who hath given him a charge over " the earth? or who hath disposed the whole " world: if he set his heart upon man, if he " gather to himself his spirit and his breath; " all flesh shall perish together, and man shall " return again unto dust!"

But that God *punishes omissions*, and avenges transgressions, as the supreme † Lord of all, and

* Job xxxiii. 12, 13.

† As *supreme Lord* of the universe, he exerciseth an uncontrouled dominion, doing "*in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, whatsoever seemeth good unto him.*" But as the *Ruler* and *Judge* of the world, he distributeth impartial justice, "*giving to every one according to his works.*" The force of this argument then is this, that in viewing God, as punishing sin, we are not to consider him as a supreme Lord, who may exercise an absolute

and not as the *Ruler* of the univerſe and *judge* of the world, is an opinion ſupported by no probable reaſon, and by no teſtimony of Scripture. But let us hear what Crellius himſelf has to ſay; he thus proceeds.

SECT. IV. He injures none, "Whether he puniſh or do not puniſh; if ſo be that the queſtion "is only reſpecting his right: for the puniſhment is not *owing to* the offending perſon, but "he *owes it*; and he owes it to *him* upon whom "the whole injury will ultimately redound, "who in this matter is God; but if you conſider the matter in itſelf, every one has it in "his power to proſecute his right, and likewiſe "not to proſecute it, or to yield up of it as "much as he pleaſes: for this is the nature of "a proper and ſovereign right." *Anſ.* It is eaſy to be ſeen, that the former *fallacy* diffuſes its fibres through the whole of this reaſoning. For the *right*, a diſpenſation with which he maintains to be lawful, he affirms to be a *Sovereign right*, or the right of a *Lord and Maſter*; but this right is not the ſubject in queſtion. It is a *Ruler and Judge* to whom puniſhment belongs, and who repays it; I would not, indeed, deny that God's ſupreme and *ſovereign* right has a place in the matter of the ſatisfaction made by Chriſt in our ſtead: for although

abſolute and uncontrouled will; but as a righteous Judge, bound by a law to adminiſter juſtice, and by a law founded in his nature, *neceſſarily* requiring him ſo to do.

to

to inflict punishment be the office of a *Ruler* and *Judge*,* yet the very translation of guilt from us upon Christ, constituting him *sin* for us, is a most free act, and an act of supreme power; unless, perhaps, the acceptance of the promise made by the Surety, belong of right to him as *Ruler*, and there be no other act to be assigned to God.

Sect. V. But let us consider these arguments of Crellius severally. "He injures no "one, says he, whether he punish or not:" But an omission of the infliction of punishment, where it is due, cannot take place without injury to that justice on which it is incumbent to inflict the punishment. "For he that justi- "fieth the wicked, is an abomination to the "Lord." † And a heavy woe is pronounced on them "that call evil good, and good evil." It is true, that God neither injures nor can injure any one, either in what he hath done, or might do: "for who hath first given to him, "and it shall be restored to him again." Nor is it less true, that he *will not*, yea, that he *cannot* do injury to his own justice, which requireth the punishment of every sin. An earthly judge may oftentimes spare a guilty person without *injury* to another, but not without *injustice* in him-

* That both these *Relations*, viz, of a *Ruler* and *Judge*, are to be assigned to God, the Scriptures amply testify. See page 41, &c.

† Prov. xvii. 15. Isa. v. 20.

self;

ſelf; yea *Crellius* aſſerts, that God cannot forgive the ſins of ſome ſinners; namely, the *contumacious*, without injury to himſelf; for this, as he ſays, would be *unworthy of God*. But we are ſure, that every ſin, without exception, ſetting aſide the conſideration of the redemption by Chriſt, would be attended with contumacy for ever: were it not for that conſideration then, it would be unworthy of God to pardon the ſins of any ſinner.

SECT. VI. Crellius adds, "Puniſhment is "not owing to the ſinner, but he owes it, and "owes it to him, on whom all the injury will "ultimately redound, who is God. But becauſe puniſhment is *not owing to the ſinner*, but he owes it to the Ruler, it doth not follow, that the Ruler may not inflict that puniſhment: puniſhment, indeed, is not ſo owing to the *ſinner* that an injury would be done him, were it not inflicted: the debt of a ſinner is not of ſuch a kind, that he can aſk or enforce the payment of it: and a *debt*, properly ſpeaking, implies ſuch a condition.* But the ſinner hath merited puniſhment in ſuch a manner, that it is juſt he ſhould *ſuffer* it: but again, the infliction of

* The debt of a ſinner is not any valuable conſiderarion due *to* him, as a debt is to a creditor; but due *by* him as a debt is by a debtor: and in conſequence of the failure of payment, puniſhment becomes due to him, i. e. is or may be inflicted in vindication of violated juſtice; but this is what he could not either claim, or would wiſh to receive.

of punishment belongs not to God, as injured; which Crellius signifies, but as he is the Ruler of all, and the Judge of sinners, to whom it belongs to preserve *the good of the whole*, and the dependance of his creatures on himself.

Sect. VII. He thus proceeds: "But if "you consider the thing in itself, every one "has it in his power to prosecute his right, "and likewise not to prosecute it, or to yield "up of it as much as he pleases." *Ans.* As Socinus himself, in his *third book* "of the Saviour, chap. 2d," hath afforded an opportunity to all our Theologians who have opposed *Socinianism*, of discussing this foolish *Axiom*, "*that every one may recede from his right*;" we shall answer but in few words to these positions of Crellius, and to the conclusions which he there draws, as flowing from them.

Sect. VIII. There is then a double right: in the first place, *that of a debt*; in the second place, *that of government*: what is purely a debt, may be forgiven; for that only takes place in those things, which are of an *indifferent right*; the prosecution of which neither nature nor justice obliges. There is also a *debt*, though perhaps improperly so called, the right of which it is unlawful to renounce; but our sins, in respect of God, are not *debts* only, nor *properly*, but *metaphorically* * so called.

* Sin is most accurately defined by our Westminster Divines, in that inimitable compendium of sound doctrine, The Shorter Catechism, to be "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God."

Sect.

Sect. IX. The right of government, moreover, is either *natural* or *positive*; the *positive right* of government, so to speak, is that which magistrates have over their subjects; and he who affirms that they can recede wholly from this right, must be either a madman or a fool; but this right, as far as pertains to its exercise in respect of the infliction of punishment, either tends to the good of the whole republic, as in *ordinary* cases; or, as in some *extraordinary* cases, gives place, to its hurt: for it is possible that even the *exaction* of punishment, in a certain condition of a state, may be hurtful: in such a situation of things, the Ruler or Magistrate has a power not to use his right of government, in respect of particular crimes; or rather, he ought to use it in such a manner as is the most likely to attain the end: for he is bound to regard principally the good of the *whole*; and the safety of the people ought to be his supreme law. But he who affirms, that in *ordinary cases* a magistrate may renounce his right, when that renunciation cannot but turn out to the hurt of the public good, is a stranger to all right. The same person may also affirm, that parents may renounce their right over their children, so as not to take anycare at all about them; and that they might do so lawfully, that is, consistent with honour and decency. Yea, this is not *a cessation from the prosecution of right*, but *from the performance of a duty*: for

for the right of government ſuppoſes a duty: *For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil: wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame: for he is the miniſter of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the ſword in vain: for he is the miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.** The queſtion is not what magiſtrates do, but what as the guardians and protectors of the law they ought to do. See Pſal. ci. 8.

Sect. X. There is alſo a natural right of government: ſuch is the Divine right over the creatures: the right, I ſay, of God over rational creatures is natural to him, therefore immutable, indiſpenſable, and which cannot by any means be derogated: thence too the debt of our obedience is natural and indiſpenſable, nor is there any other kind of obligation to puniſhment. God, from the very nature of the thing, has dominion over us, and our ſubjection to him, is either by obedience or a vicarious puniſhment, which ſucceeds in caſe of any omiſſion or tranſgreſſion on our part, as Crellius himſelf acknowledges. Thoſe then who ſay, that it is free to God to uſe this right or not, as he pleaſeth, may as well ſay, that it is free to God, to be our God and Lord or

* Rom. xiii. 3, 4.

not.

not. For the demand of obedience, and the exaction of punishment, equally belong to God. But the Judge of the universe exercises his right; and his perpetual right, whence sinners are accounted worthy of death, he cannot but preserve unimpared and entire.

Sect. XI. The remaining objections which are interspersed here and there in that book of his "concerning God," against the vindicatory justice of God, either fall in with those which have been mentioned "from the Racovian Catechism," or shall be reduced to the order of those which follow.

Sect. XII. We think proper, by way of conclusion, to annex some concessions of Crellius. "There is (says he) a certain regard to honor "with which God himself cannot dispense.*" Every transgression then of that regard hath a punishment coeval with itself, which, from the justice of God must necessarily be inflicted. Yea, says he, neither the holiness nor majesty of God permit that his commands should, in any respect, be violated with impunity.† But the holiness of God is natural to him: an essential then and necessary attribute of God requires the punishment of sinners: but he himself further adds, "it is unworthy of God to "let the wickedness of obstinate sinners pass un-

* Book I. chap. xxiii page 180. Of the True Religion.

† Book I. chap. xxviii.

"punished

" puniſhed: for this is the firſt and perpetual ef-
" fect of Divine ſeverity, not to pardon thoſe
" who do not repent.*" But we know for certain, that all ſinners would continue obſtinate to all eternity, unleſs God be pleaſed, for Chriſt's ſake, to renew them by his omnipotent grace to repentance: Crellius then grants, that it is unworthy of God to let the ſins of thoſe paſs unpuniſhed, for whom Chriſt hath not made ſatisfaction. He again teſtifies alſo, that God hates and abhors all ſin;† and grants that the mode of conducting the puniſhment of ſin is derived from the Divine Juſtice.‡ But the thing itſelf is from that ſame being, from whom the mode or manner of it is derived: if the mode of puniſhment be from Divine Juſtice, the puniſhment itſelf can flow from no other ſource.

* Chap. xxii. 186. and chap. xxviii.
† Chap. xxx. 3, 9.
‡ Chap. i. page 78 of his Anſwer to Grotius.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The opinion of Socinus considered—What he thought of our present question, viz. that it is the hinge on which the whole controversy, concerning the satisfaction of Christ turns—His vain boasting, as if having disproved this vindicatory justice, he had snatched the prize from his adversaries—Other clear proofs of the satisfaction of Christ—That it is our duty to acquiesce in the revealed will of God—The truth not to be forsaken—Mercy and justice not opposite—Vain distinctions of Socinus concerning Divine Justice—The consideration of these distinctions—His first argument against vindicatory justice—The solution of it—The anger and severity of God—What—Universal and particular justice, in what they agree—The false reasoning and vain boasting of the adversary.*

SECT. I. WE come now to Socinus himself. In almost all his writings he opposes this punitory justice. We shall consider what he hath written against

* Viz. Whether vindicatory justice be essential and natural to God, and the exercise of it, or the punishment of sin, consequently necessary? See page 2d.

Covetus,

Covetus, in that Treatiſe of his entitled, "Of Jeſus Chriſt the Saviour;" and what he only repeats in other places, as occaſion required. In the firſt book, and firſt chapter; and alſo in the third book, and firſt chapter of that work, expreſsly, and of ſet purpoſe, he oppoſes himſelf vehemently, and with all his might, to the truth on this point. But becauſe he very well underſtood, that, by the eſtabliſhment of this juſtice, a knife is put to the throat of his opinion, and that it cannot be defended, (that is, that no reaſon can be given why Chriſt our Saviour is called JESUS CHRIST) he maintains that the whole controverſy concerning the ſatisfaction of Chriſt hinges on this very queſtion. The reader will perceive from the arguments already uſed, that I am of the ſame opinion. For, it being granted that this juſtice belongs to God, not even *Socinus*, though doubtleſs a man of a great, very artful, and fertile genius, could deviſe any way of obtaining ſalvation for ſinners without a *ſatisfaction*. For had he either found out one, or even *feigned it upon a ſuppoſition*, he would not have wanted the effrontery of impoſing it on the minds of the credulous and *fanatic*, which, however, he no where hath attempted.

SECT. II. But on the other hand, gallantly ſuppoſing that he had removed this juſtice out of the way, as if the buſineſs were entirely ſettled, and the ſtrong tower of his adverſaries

verſaries deſtroyed, he highly glories in the triumphs acquired for himſelf and his followers: *For*, ſays he, *having got rid of this juſtice, had we no other argument, that human fiction of the ſatisfaction of Jeſus Chriſt muſt be thoroughly detected and totally vaniſh.* This vain boaſting of his, the learned and pious have long ago ſufficiently checked by innumerable teſtimonies from Scripture.

SECT. III. And foraſmuch as the fact is abundantly clear, *that Chriſt bore our ſins*, God *laying them upon him*, and that by his ſatisfaction he purchaſed *eternal ſalvation*; though it had even pleaſed God to keep the cauſes and reaſons of this infinitely wiſe tranſaction, hid to all eternity, in the abyſs of his own goodneſs and wiſdom, it would have been our duty to acquieſce in the infinite holineſs and wiſdom of his will. So alſo it is beyond any doubt, that no helps of our faith are to be deſpiſed and that no revelations of the Divine nature and will are to be neglected, by which our *merciful Father* leads us into a more intimate and ſaving knowledge of this *myſtery* of *holineſs*.

SECT. IV. We alſo, to whom the moſt ſacred *depoſit* of this Divine truth hath been committed, would immediately judge ourſelves unworthy of it, ſhould we ſpontaneouſly betray any one *point or jot* of it, much leſs ſo *ſtrong* a *pillar* of our faith and hope to its adverſaries. Though then we have other unanſwerable proofs

proofs of the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, which the gates of hell ſhall in vain oppoſe, and numberleſs teſtimonies of *the God who cannot lie*; ſo that we may ſuppoſe Socinus is only idly inſulting thoſe, who grant that God *might* forgive ſin without any intervention of a ſatisfaction, but that he *would* not, an expreſſion which I by no means approve, we however think it neceſſary that this bulwark of punitory juſtice, a point beyond all doubt of the laſt importance to the cauſe, however it ſhall be diſpoſed of, ſhould be defended from the inſults of adverſaries.

Sect. V. In the firſt place then, in the 1ſt chapter of the beforementioned book, when going to diſpute againſt this juſtice, *he ſuppoſes, that according to our opinion, it is oppoſed to mercy, and that it is contrary to it*: and builds upon this falſe ſuppoſition, through the whole of his treatiſe, both in making his objections and anſwers. I acknowledge that he ſeized the opportunity of making this blunder from *Covetus*, againſt whom he is combating, who improperly and inaccurately hath ſaid, that this juſtice is oppoſed to mercy, becauſe they have different effects; but we have formerly ſhewn, that they are neither *eſſentially*, nor *actually*, nor *effectively* oppoſite, as both of them are the very perfection of Deity itſelf, but that they are only diſtinguiſhed as to their object, and not as to their ſubject. In all the ſophiſms then

then, in which he afterwards endeavours to prove, that the Scripture acknowledges no ſuch juſtice in God, as is oppoſed to mercy, he trifles through a perpetual miſtake of the argument. But that juſtice which we mean, he ſays, is two-fold, in God. " The firſt, as " he ſays, is that, by which he puniſhes and " deſtroys the wicked and ungodly, that is, " thoſe who obſtinately perſevere in wicked- " neſs, and who are not led from a repentance " of their ſins to have recourſe to God. The " ſecond is that, by which, even thoſe, whom " in his great goodneſs he approves as juſt, " were he ſo to will it, could not ſtand in his " preſence."

Sect. VI. But he again affirms in the ſame chapter, " *that the juſtice of God is two-fold; that one kind he always uſes when he puniſhes abandonedly wicked and obſtinate ſinners, ſometimes according to his law; the other kind when he puniſhes ſinners neither obſtinate, nor altogether deſperate, but whoſe repentance is not expected.* And of both theſe kinds of juſtice he brings ſome proofs from Scripture.

Sect. VII. That *punitory* juſtice is one alone and individual, we affirm; but that it is variouſly exerciſed, on account of the difference of the objects about which it is employed, we acknowledge: but this, by no means proves it to be *two-fold*; for he ought not, among men, to be ſaid to be endowed with

with a *two-fold* juſtice, who renders *different* recompences to thoſe who merit *differently*. But his whole treatiſe, from beginning to end, is diſgracefully built on a miſtaken and falſely aſſumed principle: for he ſuppoſes, that " every ſin ſhall not receive its juſt recompence of reward," from Divine Juſtice; but that God *puniſhes* ſome ſins, and *can* puniſh others only if he pleaſe. From an exceeding deſire to exclude all conſideration of the ſatisfaction of Chriſt entirely, in the matter of inflicting puniſhment for ſins, he ſtumbled againſt this ſtone: for God moſt certainly will finally puniſh the impenitent to all eternity; becauſe he is juſt, and becauſe *there is no ſacrifice for their ſins:* nor is it leſs true, that God caſts out and deſtroys many, " who are ſtrangers to the covenant of grace, not waiting for their repentance; but that he effectually leads others to repentance; not becauſe he exerciſeth a *two-fold* juſtice, but becauſe his juſtice hath been ſatisfied for the ſins of the latter by Chriſt, whereas it is not ſo with regard to the *former*." See Rom. xxiii. 5. But becauſe he would not acknowledge the foundation for that *diſtinction*, which may be ſeen in the acts or exerciſe of the Divine Juſtice concerning ſinners, to be laid in the blood of Chriſt, he hath feigned a *two-fold* juſtice, and a two-fold mercy oppoſed to it, of which there is not the moſt diſtant mention made in the Sacred Scriptures; and which ought not by any

means to be aſcribed to the Divine nature, which is in itſelf *moſt ſimple.*

Sect. VIII. But coming to himſelf again, he denies that in the ſacred writings there is any mention at all made of "*any kind of juſtice that is oppoſed to mercy*;" we, indeed, have never ſaid that juſtice is *oppoſed* to mercy; but as it clearly appears, that it is his wiſh to deny to God the whole of that kind of juſtice, whence in puniſhing ſins he is ſaid, or may be ſaid to be juſt, (which puniſhment is an effect different from the pardon of ſin that flows from mercy) we chooſe not to contend about words. Let us ſee then what kind of arguments he produces to ſupport his robbing God of this eſſential attribute. He ſays, "*that the word juſtice, when applied to God in the ſacred writings, is never oppoſed to mercy, but chiefly, and for the moſt part, means rectitude and equity.*"

Sect. IX. It hath been already ſeveral times ſhewn, that juſtice and mercy are not *oppoſite.* We have likewiſe demonſtrated by many proofs adduced before, that the rectitude or ſupreme perfection of the Divine nature, is often called juſtice in Scripture: but this, I am ſure, is by no means of advantage, but of much hurt to the cauſe of Socinianiſm. Let him proceed then.

Sect. X. "But that, (ſays he) which is op-
"poſed to mercy, is not named juſtice by the
"ſacred writers; but is called ſeverity, or an-
"ger,

" ger, or fury, or vengeance, or by ſome ſuch " name."

SECT. XI. But our opponent avails himſelf nothing by this aſſertion; for that which is falſe proves nothing. By that, which he ſays, is oppoſed to *mercy*, he underſtands that *virtue* in God, by which he puniſhes ſins and ſinners according as they deſerve. But that this is never called *juſtice* in Scripture; or that God is not thence ſaid to be *juſt*, is ſo manifeſtly falſe, that no body would dare to affirm it, but one determined to ſay any thing in ſupport of a bad cauſe. Let the reader but conſult the paſſages adduced on this head in the *third chapter*, and he will be aſtoniſhed at the impudence of the man. But all are agreed, that *anger*, *fury*, and words denoting ſuch *troubled affections*, ought not properly to be aſcribed to God, but only in reſpect of their effects: though *analogically* and *reductively* * they belong to corrective juſtice; becauſe, in exerciſing his judgments, God is ſaid to uſe them: but they do not denote any perfection inherent in God, any farther than they can be reduced to juſtice; but only a certain *mode* of certain divine actions: for God doth not puniſh ſins becauſe he is *angry*, but becauſe he is juſt; although in the puniſhment of them, according to our conception of things, he diſcovers anger.

SECT. XII. He next proceeds to produce ſome paſſages, in order to prove that the juſ-

* i. e. by conſequence.

tice of God, in the ſacred writings, viz. that *univerſal juſtice*, which we have before deſcribed, is often uſed for the infinite rectitude of the Divine nature (what no body ever denied) where, in mentioning the *juſtice of faithfulneſs* and *remunerative* juſtice, agreeable to his *faithfulneſs*, which always hath reſpect to the covenant of grace, ratified and eſtabliſhed in the blood of Chriſt, God is ſaid to *pardon* ſins, and to reward thoſe that believe according to his *juſtice:* * and thence he concludes, "that a juſtice, oppoſed to mercy, by "which God muſt puniſh ſin, is not inherent "in God." *For what*, ſays he, *is more agreeable to the Divine nature, and conſequently more equitable and juſt, than to do good to the wretched and deſpiſed race of mankind, though unworthy; and freely to make them partakers of his glory.*

SECT. XIII. This ſurely is trifling in a ſerious matter, if any thing can be ſo called, for even novices will not bear one to argue from a poſition of *univerſal juſtice* to a negation of *particular juſtice:* much leſs ſhall we readily aſſent to him, who maintain, that that *particular juſtice* is by no means diſtinguiſhed from the univerſal rectitude of the Divine nature; but that that rectitude is ſo called, in reſpect of the egreſſes, that it has, in conſequence of the ſuppoſition of ſin: but it is conſonant with ſound doctrine, "*that that which is agreeable to the*

* Many paſſages of this kind are adduced by our author in chap.

the Divine nature, ſhould be conſidered alſo as righteous and juſt;" and this *Socinus* acknowledges. We agree, that it is *agreeable* to the Divine nature to do good to ſinners; but at the ſame time we dare not deny, " that the *right* of God is, that thoſe who tranſgreſs *are worthy of death:*" both which properties of his nature, he hath very clearly demonſtrated in the ſatisfaction of Chriſt; " *whom he hath ſet forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteouſneſs for the remiſſion of ſins,*" whom, while the heretic rejecteth, he *walketh in darkneſs,* a ſtranger to the true and ſaving knowledge of God, and engaged wholly in his own vain imaginations.

Sect. XIV. But *Socinus,* as if having achieved ſome great exploit, at length thus concludes— " That punitory juſtice is not a virtue inhe- " rent in God, or a divine quality or proper- " ty, but the effect of his will; and that that " juſtice, by which God always puniſhes impe- " nitent ſinners, is ſo called, not properly, but " by accident, viz. becauſe it is agreeable to " true juſtice or rectitude." We have already conſidered the arguments that he has produced in ſupport of this opinion: whether they be of ſuch weight, that they ſhould induce us to deny this juſtice; and whether, " to puniſh ſinners be eſſential and proper to God, or only accidental," let the readers, from what hath been ſaid on the ſubject, determine. So much for our firſt ſkirmiſh with *Socinus.*

CHAP. XI.

The arguments of Socinus againſt Punitory Juſtice weigked—A falſe hypotheſis of his—Sins, in what ſenſe they are debts—The firſt argument of Socinus, in which he takes for granted what ought to have been proved—A trifling ſuppoſition ſubſtituted for a proof—Whether that excellence, by virtue of which God puniſhes ſins, be called Juſtice in the Scriptures—The ſeverity of God, what—Our opponent's ſecond argument—It labours under the ſame deficiency as the firſt—It is not oppoſite to mercy to puniſh the guilty—There is a diſtinction between acts and habits—Our opponent confounds them—The mercy of God infinite, ſo alſo is his juſtice—A diſtinction of the Divine attributes—In pardoning ſins through Jeſus Chriſt, God hath exerciſed infinite juſtice and infinite mercy—The concluſion of the conteſt with Socinus.

SECT. I. IN the *third part*, and *firſt chapter* of his Treatiſe, being determined to contend, to his utmoſt, againſt the *ſatisfaction* of Chriſt, he maintains, "That God, conſiſtent with his right, could pardon our ſins, "without any real ſatisfaction received for "them." And he endeavours to ſupport the aſſertion, chiefly by the following argument, viz.

viz. " That God is our creditor, that our ſins " are debts, which we have contracted with " him; but that every one may yield up his " right, and more eſpecially God, who is the " ſupreme Lord of all, and extolled in the " Scriptures for his liberality and goodneſs. " Hence, then it is evident, that God can par- " don ſins without any ſatisfaction received; " and that he is inclined to do ſo, he uſes his " beſt endeavours afterwards to prove."

Sect. II. But becauſe he foreſaw that his firſt *ſuppoſition*, the foundation of his whole future reaſoning, was too much expoſed and obnoxious to the Divine Juſtice, he labours hard, in the *firſt chapter*, to remove *that* out of the way entirely. Let us attend then to his reaſoning, and follow him *ſtep by ſtep*. For if he have not inſuperably, and *beyond all confutation* proved, that God can forgive ſins without a ſatisfaction; what he afterwards argues concerning the *will*, *liberality*, *and mercy* of God, will become of no weight or conſideration; yea, the foundation being deſtroyed, the whole edifice, or Babyloniſh tower, muſt inſtantly tumble to the ground. He thus proceeds.

Sect. III. " But you will ſay, it is neceſ- " ſary that God ſhould take care to ſatisfy his " juſtice, which he cannot, even himſelf, re- " nounce, unleſs he, in a manner, deny him- " ſelf."

Anſ. You are right, *Socinus:* we do affirm, agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, that the juſtice of God is in ſuch a manner natural to him, that if it be neceſſary that he ſhould preſerve the glory of his eſſential attributes undiminiſhed, he cannot but *indiſpenſably* exact the puniſhment of every ſin and tranſgreſſion of his law, and render *a juſt recompence of reward* to all ſinners, or to their ſurety: and therefore we contend, that without a ſatisfaction made, no one could obtain the remiſſion of ſins, and eternal ſalvation: let us ſee, *Socinus*, what you have to oppoſe to this.

SECT. IV. "All along from the beginning of this anſwer, (ſays he) I have ſufficiently ſhewn, that that juſtice which you contend ought at all events to be ſatisfied, is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will; for when God puniſhes ſinners, that we may call this work of his by ſome worthy name, we ſay that he then exerciſeth juſtice: wherefore, there is no need that God ſhould either provide for the ſatisfaction of that juſtice, or renounce it."

SECT. V. *Anſ.* We have already conſidered what *Socinus* ſays, in the beginning of his Treatiſe, againſt the juſtice of God: if I miſtake not, we have ſhewn, that the heretic had loſt his labour, and that it is far beyond his power to dethrone the Deity; *for he ſitteth on his*

his throne judging * *righteously*. But we diminutive beings have not *first*, or of our *own accord*, maintained, that God is *just*, and that he exerciseth *justice* in the punishment of sinners, " That we might call his work by some " worthy name;" but the Judge of all the earth himself, the God of Truth, in almost innumerable places, gives this testimony of himself in the sacred records, and these ought always to be the only, as they are the infallible guide of our judgments.

Distrusting then what he has formerly asserted, (or it being manifestly of no weight) he attempts again, by other sophisms, to establish the reasoning which he had formerly begun. And he thus proceeds.

Sect. VI. " But besides the arguments " which I have already used to prove, that that " justice is not inherent in God, it chiefly ap- " pears from this, that were it naturally re- " sident in God, he could never pardon not " even the least transgression to any one; for " God never doeth any thing, nor can do any " thing that is opposite to the qualities inhe- " rent in him: as for instance, as wisdom and " equity are naturally inherent in God, that " justice never doeth, or can do any thing " contrary to wisdom and equity, as we have " seen above, &c."

* Ps.

Sect. VII. The intelligent reader can eaſily perceive, that *Socinus* proves nothing by this argument, but that he even abſurdly adds heap upon heap to his own *ſuppoſition*; or that with a bold effrontery, he takes for granted *the thing to be determined.* It is, indeed, our opinion, that God cannot paſs the ſmalleſt ſin *unpuniſhed*, and that he cannot, becauſe he can do nothing that is oppoſite to the qualities inherent in him. But this our opponent brings forward as a great abſurdity, that muſt bear againſt us in ſupport of our own cauſe, but without even any appearance of a proof. But we have before demonſtrated the ſtate of the matter to be thus: that God neither actually pardons any ſin, without a ſatisfaction made, or can pardon it, without an infringement of his juſtice, by which he condemns ſinners *worthy of death.* So that, as God never doth, nor can do the things which are oppoſite to his equity and wiſdom; ſo he neither doth, nor can do thoſe which are oppoſite to his juſtice. But to pardon the ſins of believers, on account of the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, "whom he hath ſet forth as a propitia-"tion through faith in his blood, to declare "his righteouſneſs," is not oppoſite to his juſtice. But theſe ſeem abſurdities to *Socinus*, and why ſhould not they? *For we preach Chriſt crucified, unto the Jews a ſtumbling block, and unto*

unto the Greeks fooliſhneſs;--but this preaching of the croſs is to them that periſh fooliſhneſs.*

SECT. VIII. Yea, in common equity, nothing could be mentioned more unequitable and unwiſe, than this would be oppoſite to juſtice, viz. not to pardon thoſe ſins for which that juſtice hath been amply ſatisfied: and muſt then this heretic, not only, *for nothing*, ſubſtitute his own moſt abſurd, yea, *execrable* opinion, viz. "That Jeſus Chriſt hath not "made ſatisfaction for our ſins, nor borne "their puniſhment; that is, that he was not "made ſin for us, that we might be made the "righteouſneſs of God in him?" an opinion neither proved, nor that will ever be proved, to all eternity; but alſo inſinuate it as a proof of another error, which that alone, it is evident, firſt begot in his mind. Indeed, I cannot ſufficiently wonder, that ſome, by the ſophiſms of ſuch diſputants, are ſo eaſily transformed to another goſpel, "forſaking "him who called them to the grace of "Chriſt."

SECT. IX. "But that juſtice, (ſays Socinus) "which, as we have ſeen before, in the ſacred "writings, is not called juſtice, but ſeverity or "vengeance, or by ſome ſuch names, ſo far as "it is oppoſed to mercy, is nothing elſe but to "puniſh ſins; but to puniſh ſins, and to par-

* 1 Cor. chap. i.

"don

" don ſins, are entirely oppoſite to one ano-
" ther."

A fine painter's ſhew-board, but void of truth—

Sect. X. *Anſ.* What the adverſary ſo often yelps out, is totally without foundation, viz. that *that* juſtice is never called by its proper name in the Scriptures. It is not only called by its own name, but is alſo called *purity* and *holineſs*, which are eſſential attributes of the Deity. It is called *ſeverity*, *vengeance*, and *anger*, but only *improperly*, and *analogically*, and in reſpect of the effects which it produceth. What he aſſerts too of *this juſtice*, viz. *that it is nothing elſe but to puniſh ſin*, very improperly confounding a *habit*, an *act*, and an *effect*, is altogether without foundation, and moſt abſurd. *The Lord is juſt, and his judgments are righteous: the Judge of all the earth doeth right.* And in fine, it is falſe, *that this juſtice is oppoſed to mercy.* For it is beyond any doubt, that different operations and effects may, in different views, be aſcribed to one and the ſame *righteous principle.* To *puniſh ſins*, and to *pardon ſins*, unleſs ſpoken in the ſame point of view, are not oppoſed to one another. God, indeed, pardons to us thoſe ſins which he puniſhed in our ſurety; *which fooliſhneſs of God is wiſer than* * *men.*

* 1 Cor. i.—See notes on Chap. XI. Sect. X.

Sect.

Sect. XI. Our opponent thus proceeds: "If that juſtice be inherent in God; that is, "if there be any property in God, which is "altogether inclined expreſsly to puniſh any "ſins of mankind whatſoever, whether peni-"tent or impenitent, he neither ſpares, nor "can ſpare any one; for as to what you "Teachers in the Church have deviſed, that "according to this juſtice, he can puniſh ſin, "even though the ſinner ſhould not be pu-"niſhed; that is quite inconſiſtent with this, "and every other kind of juſtice."

Sect. XII. Our opponent again idly fancies, that we are hard preſſed by this concluſion: we grant, yea, we *ſolemnly* believe and declare, "That becauſe of his juſtice, God "can never ſpare any ſinner, unleſs he ex-"preſsly puniſh his ſins in another." But he artfully and ſhrewdly endeavours to load our opinion with prejudice, inſinuating, "That "God then could not even ſpare the penitent." But we believe all repentance of ſin to be founded in the ſatisfaction and blood of Chriſt; for, *him God hath exalted with his right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance to Iſrael, and forgiveneſs* * *of ſins.* God then both can ſpare the penitent, and according to the promiſes of the Goſpel, moſt certainly doth ſpare them: thoſe, viz. for whoſe ſins,

* Acts

ſatis-

ſatisfaction hath been made through the blood of Chriſt, *who gave himſelf a ranſom for them:* but, that to puniſh ſin, without the delinquent's being puniſhed, is neither contrary to this, nor to any other kind of juſtice, abſolutely conſidered, through Divine help, ſhall be demonſtrated in its proper place.

Sect. XIII. Hitherto our opponent hath diſcovered nothing but mere fancies, vain repetitions, abſurd allegations, and a ſhameful ignorance of the argument. He thus proceeds: "But ſhould you ſay, that by the ſame "reaſoning it may be proved, that mercy is "not inherent in God; for if it were, he "could never inflict puniſhment on any, as "mercy is nothing elſe, but to pardon thoſe "who have offended. I will anſwer, as I "have ſlightly noticed before, that it is very "true, that mercy, ſo far as it is oppoſed to "that juſtice, that is, to ſeverity and vengeance, is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his will: when then the Sacred Scriptures teſtify, that God is merciful, they "mean nothing more, than that God very "often, and very eaſily pardoneth ſin, if at "leaſt they ſpeak of this mercy; for there is "another kind of Divine mercy, of which, "according to the old tranſlation, mention is "frequently made in the ſacred writings, "which ought rather to be called goodneſs, "and hath a more extenſive ſignification; "for

" for it comprehends the whole Divine bene-
" ficence, whether it be exercised in the par-
" don of sin, or in communication of any
" other kind of benefit to mankind."

Sect. XIV. It hath been shewn already, that it is not proved by such reasoning as this, that justice is not inherent in God; nor from the force of such an argument will it easily appear, that the Divine mercy suffers any degradation: what he supposes, in the first place, is altogether without foundation, namely, *That the Divine mercy is nothing else than to forgive offenders*, whereas in this, an external effect of that mercy is only shewn, which is itself an essential property of the Divine nature; for he pardoneth sins, because he is merciful. The supposition also is groundless, *That if mercy were inherent in God, he could never inflict punishment on any*. For to inflict punishment on the impenitent, and those for whose sins the Divine Justice hath in no manner been satisfied, is not opposite to mercy.

Sect. XV. For mercy in God is not a *sympathy*, or *condolence with the miseries of others*, with an inclination of assisting them, a virtue which oft-times *borders* near upon vice, but is that supreme perfection of the Divine nature, whereby it is naturally disposed to assist the miserable, and which, the proper suppositions * being made, and the glory of his other per-

* That is, the existence and misery of a rational creature being supposed.

fections

fections preſerved, he willingly exerciſeth, and is inclined to exerciſe. But this is not oppoſed to the *juſtice* of God; neither is it an effect of his free-will, (which expreſſion, concerning the exerciſe of *juſtice*, our opponent fooliſhly wreſts to the *virtue* itſelf) but a natural attribute of the Deity. What he adds concerning a *two-fold mercy* of God, are idle fancies: for the *ſparing* mercy of which we are diſcourſing, by no means differs from that benignity, grace, or goodneſs of God, of which he makes mention; for that very *benignity*, with reſpect to the ſpecial egreſſes, which it hath towards miſerable ſinners, from the free-will of God, is that very mercy itſelf. That aſſertion of his too muſt alſo be noticed, *by the way*, viz. *That God very eaſily pardoneth ſin*, which, as it is a very precious truth, if a regard be had to the oblation and ſatisfaction of his Son; ſo, ſimply ſpoken of HIM, who hath threatened death to *every tranſgreſſion*, and whoſe *right* it is, that *ſinners ſhould be worthy of death*, all, whoſoever, ſhall be cited before his tribunal, *aliens* and ſtrangers to Chriſt, will find to be without foundation, and an abſolute falſehood.

SECT. XVI. "But it is evident, (ſays he) "that neither the juſtice, nor mercy, of which "we are treating, are inherent in God, from "what we read, viz. *That he is the Lord God, mer-*

" *ciful and gracious, long ſuffering and abundant in goodneſs,** " which plainly ſhews that theſe " two, viz. his long-ſuffering or ſlowneſs to an- " ger, and his abundant goodneſs or great " mercy, are the effects of his will, the one " of which is ſurpaſſed in greatneſs by the " other; and they cannot conſiſt with one ano- " ther; and they are limitted: whereas thoſe " qualities which are truly inherent in God, " have no limit, and are all conſiſtent with " one another, and in reſpect of their great- " neſs, are all abſolutely equal."

SECT. XVII. Our opponent again very improperly applies a compariſon made between *external acts*, to the *internal habits themſelves*. That, *anger* and *compaſſion*, which are only attributed to God *effectively*, are *free* effects of the Divine will *limited as to their object, and unequal*, which cannot be exerciſed about the *ſame perſon*, in their higheſt degree, we acknowledge.

But there is no reaſon that what is applicable to acts, or rather to effects, ſhould alſo be applicable to the perfections whence theſe flow. But in that pomulgation of the glory or name of God which we have in Exodus xxxvi. and 6th, he ſhews what and of what kind his diſpoſition is towards thoſe whom, viz. he hath purchaſed as his peculiar people through Jeſus Chriſt;

* See Exodus xxxiv. 6. and Numbers xiv. 18.

and

and what *patience*, *long ſuffering* and compaſſion he is diſpoſed to exerciſe towards them:* but in reſpect of all other ſinners, he concludes, *that he will by no means clear the guilty*, or deliver them from the guilt of ſin, which, indeed, ſtrikes at the very root of *Socinianiſm:* but to conclude from this, that the Divine perfections are oppoſite, one to another, unequal, or ſurpaſſing one another in greatneſs, is only the extreme folly of one, *ignorant of the righteouſneſs*, or juſtice, *of God, and going about to eſtabliſh a righteouſneſs*, or juſtice, *of his own*. He proceeds thus.

Sect. XVIII. " Hence it is manifeſt how " grievouſly they err, who affirm both this " juſtice and mercy of God to be infinite: for " as to juſtice, being deceived by the appear- " ance of the word, they ſee not, that they ſay " no more than this, that the ſeverity and an- " ger of God are infinite, contrary to the " moſt expreſs teſtimonies of the Sacred Scrip- " tures, which, as we have juſt now ſaid, de- " clare God to be ſlow to anger: that Divine " Juſtice which hath no limit, is not this of " which we are diſcourſing; but that which " alone, as we have ſeen before, is diſtin- " guiſhed by this illuſtrious name in Scrip- " ture, and which by another name may be " called rectitude and equity. This indeed is

* See 2 Peter iii. 9, &c.

" inherent

" inherent in God, and is moſt conſpicuous in " all his works; and by virtue of this alone, " as we ſhall ſee hereafter, even, if we had no " other proof, that human fiction of the ſatis- " faction of Chriſt, would be thoroughly de- " tected and vaniſh."

Sect. XIX. Our opponent here ſerves up again nothing but his old diſh variouſly dreſſed, and repeatedly refuſed: we declare juſtice to be infinite, not deceived by the ſhew of a word, but being ſo taught by the expreſs teſtimonies of the Sacred Scriptures, and by the moſt convincing and unanſwerable arguments; and we ſolemnly maintain it, not only with regard to *that univerſal juſtice* which may be called *rectitude*, (though improperly) but alſo concerning that *particular* ſin-avenging juſtice, which we deny to differ either eſſentially or ſubjectively† from the former: but that, *anger* or *ſeverity*, ſo far as they denote *effects* of Divine Juſtice, or puniſhment inflicted, are infinite only in duration. " Seeing it is a right- " eous thing with God, to take vengeance on " them who know him not, and that obey " not the Goſpel of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt; " who ſhall be puniſhed with everlaſting deſ- " truction from the preſence of the Lord, and " from the glory of his power.*" But in reſpect of that Divine excellence which they

* See 2 Theſſ. i. 6, 8, 9.

† That is, as it relates to God, who is the ſubject of it.

point

point out, we affirm them to be in every reſpect infinite.

Sect. XX. But it would be altogether ſuperfluous, here again to repeat what we have before clearly ſettled concerning *this juſtice*, or again to recite the texts of Scripture formerly adduced. The ſum is this: ſin-avenging juſtice differs not in reality, from that *univerſal juſtice*, which our opponent does not deny to be perpetually inherent in God, and a natural attribute: it is only diſtinguiſhed from it, in reſpect of its egreſs to its own proper object; for the egreſſes of juſtice againſt ſin, flow from the moſt holy perfection of Deity itſelf. But anger and ſeverity, ſo far as they may be reduced to that juſtice which is manifeſted in them, are alſo infinite; in reſpect of their *effects*, they have their limits aſſigned them by the wiſdom and juſtice of God: theſe things, however, have been proved before.

Sect. XXI. But let the pious reader judge, whether our opponent, *who hath preſumed to call*, the higheſt myſtery of the Goſpel, the alone foundation of the ſalvation of ſinners, the darling jewel of our religion, the greateſt teſtimony of the Divine love, our victory over the Devil, Death and Hell, *a human fiction*, had ſufficient cauſe to annex ſo dreadful an expreſſion to the concluſion of this ſo long continued debate. He adds, *in the laſt place*,

Sect.

SECT. XXII. " But as to mercy, that is " the pardon of ſins, how dare they affirm that " to be infinite, when it is evident from the " whole of Scripture, that God doth not al- " ways uſe it, but frequently exerciſeth ven- " geance and ſeverity. Why, but becauſe they " have ſo ſhockingly blundered, that they have " not attended to this, that theſe are only diffe- " rent effects of the Divine will, but are not any " properties, and have perſuaded themſelves, " that both of them are inherent in God: but " how could they ever entertain ſuch a perſua- " ſion, when, as we have ſaid, the one deſtroys " the other? But this they deny, and main- " tain that God exerciſed both of them per- " fectly in the ſalvation procured for us by " Chriſt, which will more clearly appear from " what follows to be not only falſe, but ridi- " culous. Mean time let them tell us pray, " when God puniſhes the guilty, but eſpeci- " ally when he doth not even grant them time " to repent, what kind of mercy he exerciſeth " towards theſe? But if God doth many " things, in which not even any trace of that " mercy appears, although he be ſaid to be " merciful and full of compaſſion in Scripture, " muſt we not ſay that he doeth many things, " in which that juſtice is by no means diſcern- " ible, to which he is ſaid to be exceeding " ſlow? We muſt then conclude, according to " our opinion, that there is no ſuch juſtice in

" God

" God, as expreſsly dictates the neceſſary pu-
" niſhment of ſin, and which he hath not a
" power to renounce. And ſince this is the
" caſe, it is abundantly evident, that there is
" no reaſon why God cannot freely pardon the
" ſins of whomſoever he may pleaſe, without
" any ſatisfaction received."

SECT. XXIII. Anſwer: On theſe heads a few obſervations ſhall ſuffice: 1ſt. it is affirmed, without any ſhew of reaſon, that mercy in God is not infinite, becauſe ſometimes he exerciſeth ſeverity, that is, that God cannot be called merciful, if he puniſh any guilty and impenitent ſinners: to prove mercy to be an eſſential property of God, it is ſufficient, that he exerciſes it towards any: for in this very matter, that ought to be ſet down as a natural perfection in God, which is the proper and immediate ſource and ground of that operation. Which attributes have no egreſs but towards objects placed in particular circumſtances; nor have they any effects, without ſome free act of the Divine will* intervening: nor does it any more follow that the effects of mercy ought to be infinite, if it be itſelf infinite, than that the works of God ought to be *immenſe*, becauſe *immenſity* is an eſſential property of his nature.

* See Rom. ix. 13.

SECT.

Sect. XXIV. 2d. By what argument will our opponent prove, that the relation between *mercy* and *juſtice* is, in ſuch a manner, the ſame, that becauſe God exerciſeth no mercy towards ſome, that is, ſo as to pardon their ſins, that therefore he ſhould not account it neceſſary to exerciſe *juſtice* towards every ſin? We have formerly mentioned in what view they are diſtinct; namely, that God is bound to exerciſe mercy to none: but that, he cannot but exerciſe his juſtice towards ſinners, (provided he be inclined to be juſt) if he would preſerve his natural right and dominion over his creatures, and the *holineſs* and *purity* of his nature un-injured and entire; for diſobedience would take away all dependance of the creature on God, unleſs a compenſation were made to him by a vicarious puniſhment: but according to the Sacred Scriptures we maintain, that God exerciſed both the one and the other, both juſtice and mercy; in *juſtly puniſhing Chriſt*, in *mercifully pardoning ſins which he laid upon him*, to us, who deſerved everlaſting puniſhment; which things, though they may be ridiculous to Socinus (for the things of the ſpirit of God are fooliſhneſs to him) no Divine truth however, of any kind whatever, is more frequently, more plainly, or more clearly declared in the ſacred writings: *For all have ſinned, and come ſhort of the glory of God; being juſtified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Chriſt Jeſus,*

*Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood; to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God: to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him, who believeth in Jesus.** But, setting the consideration of Christ altogether aside, there is no doubt, but that Socinus would carry off the prize in this contest. But while it is reckoned worth while to have any regard to him, it is easy to perceive that this heretic uses nothing but continued false reasonings and false conclusions. For it is made evident to us in Christ the Son, how, and by what means, God, infinitely merciful and infinitely just, acting on the principles of strict justice with some, and of mere grace with others, but in exercising both the one and the other, both justice and mercy, in and through the Mediator; the one indeed, in his own proper person, and the other towards those for whom he was Surety, hath declared himself.

But while Socinus despised and set at nought him and his grace, is it to be wondered at, "if he became vain in his imaginations, and "that his foolish heart was darkened?"

SECT. XXV. For what need I say more? doth not God exercise supreme and infinite

* Rom. iii. 23, 24, 25, 26.

mercy

in mercy towards us miſerable and loſt ſinners, in *pardoning our ſins* through Chriſt? Have we deſerved any ſuch thing, who, after doing all that we can do, even when rouſed and aſſiſted by his grace, are ſtill unprofitable ſervants? Did we appoint a ſacrifice, that his anger might be averted, and that an atonement to his juſtice might be made, from our own ſtore-houſe, ſheep-fold, or herd? Yea, when we were *enemies* to him, *alienated from his life, without help, and without ſtrength, dead in treſpaſſes and in ſins*, knowing of no ſuch thing, wiſhing for, or expecting no ſuch thing, he himſelf *made Chriſt to be ſin for us who knew no ſin: that he might free us from the wrath to come*; that an expiation being made for our ſins, we might be preſented blameleſs before him, to the praiſe and the glory of his grace. But whether he ſhewed the ſtricteſt juſtice and ſeverity towards our *ſurety*, over whom he exerciſed a moſt gracious care, both on his own* account, and for our ſakes, and whom he did not ſpare, ſhall afterwards be conſidered.

SECT. XXVI. Whether then, when our opponent relying on theſe ſubtilties of his, concludes, "That there is no juſtice in God which "dictates the neceſſity of puniſhing ſin; and that "therefore, there is no reaſon why God can-

* *Behold my ſervant whom I uphold; mine elect in whom my ſoul delighteth.* Iſa.

" not freely pardon the ſins of whomſoever he " may pleaſe, without any ſatisfaction re- " ceived;" and then, as if he had accompliſhed a glorious achievement, triumphs over the croſs of our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, be not acting the part of a moſt ſilly trifler, and abſurd heretic, let the reader determine. But as all the arguments which he afterwards uſes againſt the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, have their foundation, *in this moſt falſe ſuppoſition*, which the Scriptures, as hath been ſhewn, ſo often contradict, and on which he always depends in all his diſputations; whether thoſe have acted for the intereſt of the church of God, who have voluntarily ſurrendered to him this impregnable tower of truth, which he hath in vain laid ſiege to, that he might with greater audacity carry on his attacks upon the Goſpel, is well known to God. We, as we hope, inſtructed by his word, entertain very different ſentiments from theirs on this point.

Sect. XXVII. But when our opponent has come to the concluſion of this diſpute, he introduces many fictions *about the mere good-will of God*, in pardoning ſins, *about his ceaſing from his right*, without injury to any one, *about the injuſtice of the ſubſtitution of a ſurety*, in the room of ſinners: all which arguments, as they depend on a falſe foundation, yea, on a moſt baſe

baſe error, it would be eaſy here to ſhew, how vain, falſe, and abſurd they are; unleſs we had determined, with God's will, to explain the doctrine of the ſatisfaction of Jeſus Chriſt, the greateſt *treaſure* of the Goſpel, and to defend and vindicate it from the unjuſt calumnies of heretics, in the proper place and time.

CHAP. XII.

The progreſs of the diſpute to the Theologians of our own country—The ſupreme authority of Divine Truth—Who they are, and what kind of men, who have gone into factions about this matter—The Coryphæus of the adverſaries, the very illuſtrious Twiſs—The occaſion of his publiſhing his opinion—The opinion of the Arminians—The effects of the death of Chriſt, what—Twiſs acknowledges punitory juſtice to be natural to God—The diviſion of the diſpute with Twiſs—Maccovius's anſwers to the arguments of Twiſs—The plan of our diſputation.

SECT. I. WE come now to thoſe, and the conſideration of their opinion, who * agreeing with us concerning the *ſatisfaction* of Jeſus Chriſt, as revealed in the Scriptures, yet, it being ſuppoſed that God willed the ſalvation of ſinners, contend, that the whole *neceſſity of it* flowed from the *moſt free-will* of God; though they by no means deny ſin-avenging juſtice to be natural to God.

* They agree, that the ſatisfaction by Chriſt is the way of ſalvation revealed in the Scriptures; but that it is ſo, becauſe God willed it ſhould be ſo: and deny, that there was any neceſſity for ſuch a ſatisfaction ariſing from the nature of Divine Juſtice.

SECT.

Sect. II. But those who maintain this opinion are so *numerous* and *respectable*, and men who have merited so highly of the church of God, that, although *the free man of Christ, and taught to call no man on earth master, in matters of religion*, unless I had on my side, not fewer, and *equally famous* men, I should have a religious scruple, publicly to differ from them. I acknowledge, that every, even the least particle of Divine Truth is furnished from Heaven with authority towards every disciple of Jesus Christ, *who is the way, the life, and the truth*, of holding it fast in the love and admiration of it, and of enforcing its claim, defence and declaration, even though the whole world should rise up against him. But, perhaps, it would be unbecoming in one who would chearfully enter as a disciple, to oppose such great *learned men*, and those too so well trained to the field of dispute, unless supported by the dignity and suffrages of others, not inferior even to these in merit.

Sect. III. But if modesty must be violated, all will agree, that it ought to be violated in the cause of Truth; and especially, as I perceive, that the *authority* of some Theologians is of so great weight with many of our countrymen, that not having duly weighed and pondered the matter, but relying on *this*, they go into the opinion, contrary to that which we have undertaken to defend.

Conſidering it of importance to weigh the arguments which theſe *very illuſtrious men* have uſed, although I knew myſelf not only *unequal* to the taſk, but that in marſhalling the line for ſuch a controverſey, I am not deſerving of even a *third* or *fourth* place from the van, having been only accuſtomed to the popular mode of declaiming; however, I do not fear to engage in this undertaking, whatever it be; nothing doubting, but that from my attempt, though *weak*, the readers will eaſily perceive, that the Truth might triumph glorioufly, were any one furniſhed with better abilities to come forward in its defence.

Sect. IV. But here, firſt, of all the antagoniſts, and who indeed is almoſt equal to them all, *the very learned Twiſs* oppoſes himſelf to us; concerning whoſe opinion, *in general*, a few things are to be premiſed, before we come to the anſwers of objections.

Sect. V. The conſideration of *Arminius's opinion concerning the efficacy of the death of Chriſt, and its efficiency*, gave occaſion to this learned man of firſt publiſhing his own ſentiments. Arminius contends, " That Chriſt, " by his ſatisfaction only accompliſhed this " much, that God now, conſiſtent with the " honour of his juſtice, (as it had been ſatis- " fied) might pardon ſinners, if he willed ſo " to do."

This

This moſt abſurd opinion, ſo highly derogatory to Divine grace, and the merit of the death of Chriſt, this illuſtrious man was inclined to differ from, ſo far, that he maintained, that, that conſideration, viz. " That " God could forgive ſins, his juſtice not op- " poſing it, (as having been ſatisfied) had no " place among the effects of Chriſt's death."

Sect. VI. But Arminius is the only one, ſo far as I know, among our opponents of this opinion: and he himſelf, in aſſerting it, is ſcarcely uniform and ſelf conſiſtent: I may venture to affirm, that of his followers there are none, unleſs it be ſome mean ſkulker, who ſwears by the words of his maſter. The opinion of Corvinus, which Twiſs afterwards diſcuſſes, is plainly different. Epiſcopius, *likewiſe, after Arminius, the Coryphæus of that cauſe, and by far its moſt noble champion, defends this* very ſentiment of this learned man. The Pelagian tribe have become reconciled with the Socinians, rather than brandiſh any more that very ſharp-pointed weapon which cut the throat of their own deſperate cauſe.

Sect. VII. Nor can I at all ſee how this Divine truth of ours ſhould contribute to the ſupport of Arminianiſm, as *this illuſtrious writer* ſeems to ſignify: for is he who ſays that Chriſt by his death and ſatisfaction effected this, *That God might forgive ſins, his juſtice not oppo-*

ſing, bound alſo to affirm, that he accompliſhed nothing further? God forbid. Yea, he who without the conſideration of the oblation of Chriſt, *could not but puniſh ſins*, (that oblation being made) cannot puniſh thoſe ſins for which Chriſt offered * himſelf. Yea, that he is more bound in ſtrict right, and in juſtice, in reſpect of Jeſus Chriſt, to confer grace and glory on all thoſe for whom he died, I have, in its proper ſeaſon, elſewhere demonſtrated.

SECT. VIII. The learned Twiſs grants, "That *punitory*, or ſin-avenging juſtice, is "natural to God; or that it is an eſſential attribute of the Divine nature." This he very eloquently maintains; and ſeveral times, when it is introduced by the † adverſaries, whom he ſelected, to refute, he gives his ſuffrage in its favour. But what elſe is that juſtice, but a conſtant will of puniſhing every ſin, according to the rule of his right? The learned Gentleman then grants, "That an "immutably conſtant will of puniſhing every "ſin, is natural to God: how then is it poſ-"ſible that he ſhould not puniſh it? *For who* "*hath oppoſed his will?*"

SECT. IX. There are *two parts* of the Twiſſian controverſy. The *firſt* is contained

* Rom. iii. 23, 24, 25.

† Viz. Piſcator and Lubbertus.

in

in four *principal arguments*, ſupported by various reaſons, in which he attacks this ſentiment, viz. " That God cannot, without a ſa-" tisfaction, forgive ſin." In the *ſecond*, he endeavours to anſwer the arguments of Piſcator and Lubbertus, in confirmation of this point; and he interſperſes, every where, according to his cuſtom, a variety of new arguments on the ſubject. We ſhall briefly conſider what this learned man hath done in both parts.

SECT. X. As to what relates to the firſt or introductory part, perhaps our labour may appear ſuperfluous. The *judicious* Maccovius hath, with great ſucceſs, performed this taſk; giving, by no means, trifling, but rather, for the moſt part, very ſolid anſwers to theſe *four arguments*, which Twiſs calls his principal; and in a very plain and perſpicuous manner, as was his general cuſtom, in all his writings.

SECT. XI. But neither the plan of our work permits us to withdraw from this undertaking, though unequal to it; nor perhaps hath Maccovius ſatisfied his readers in every particular. Indeed, ſome things ſeem neceſſary to be added, that this controverſy with Twiſs may occaſion no trouble to any one for the future. This veteran leader then, ſo well trained to the ſcholaſtic field, going before,

and pointing us out the way, we ſhall, with your good leave, Reader, briefly try theſe arguments by the rule of *Scripture* and *right reaſon*; and I doubt not, but we ſhall clearly demonſtrate, to all impartial judges of things, that this *learned man* hath by no means proved what he intended.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Twiss's first argument—His answer—A trifling view of the Divine attributes—Whether God could, by his absolute power forgive sins without a satisfaction: to let sins pass unpunished, implies a contradiction; and that two-fold—What these contradictions are—Whether God may do, what man may do?—Whether every man may renounce his right?—Whether God cannot forgive sins because of his justice?—The second argument—Its answer—Distinctions of necessity—God doth no work, without himself, from absolute necessity—Conditional necessity—Natural necessity two-fold—God doth not punish to the extent of his power, but to the extent of his justice—God always acts with a concomitant liberty—An argument of the illustrious Vossius considered—God a consuming fire, but an intellectual one—An exception of Twiss's---Whether independent of the Divine appointment, sin would merit punishment?—In punishment, what things are to be considered—The relation between obedience as to reward, and disobedience as to punishment not the same---The comparison between Mercy and Justice, by Vossius, improperly instituted.

SECT. I. THE first argument of this great man is this: "If God cannot "forgive sins without a satisfaction, 'tis either "because

" becauſe he cannot, on account of his juſtice, " or becauſe he cannot by his power: but " neither of theſe can be affirmed."

Sect. II. *Anſ.* That *enumeration* of the Divine attributes, as to the preſent cauſe, is mere trifling; for what God cannot do, in reſpect of one attribute, he can do in reſpect of none: or, in other words, that which cannot be done, becauſe of any one eſſential property, cannot be done, becauſe of them all. As for inſtance, if there be any thing which God cannot do, in reſpect of *truth*, he cannot do that in any manner, or in any reſpect. In the acts of the Divine will, purely free, the caſe is otherwiſe; for, in a *divided ſenſe*, God may do any thing, (that is, he may create new worlds) which, if a *decree* of creating this, and no other, *be ſuppoſed*, he could not do. But the objects preſented to any attribute of the Divine nature, admit not of various reſpects, but are in their own kind abſolutely neceſſary: *therefore, we deny the minor.* Neither in reſpect of *juſtice*, nor in reſpect of *power*, can this be done.

Sect. III. But our learned antagoniſt leads the proof of it through its parts; and firſt, after a marginal animadverſion on a certain dream of Piſcator's, he affirms, that it cannot be maintained, that God cannot forgive ſins by his power without a ſatisfaction.

Sect.

SECT. IV. "For (says he) if God by his "might, or absolute power, cannot pardon "sin, then it is absolutely impossible for sin "to be pardoned, or not to be punished; "therefore, not to pardon sin, consists of con- "tradictory terms: the contradiction then "ought to be shewn, as none appears from "the formal terms. And on the other "hand, it is evident, that man not only can "pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon "his enemies, when they transgress against "him."

SECT. V. *Anſ. The non-puniſhment* of sin, implies a contradiction; not indeed *formally*, and in the terms, but *virtually*, and *eminently*, in respect of the thing itself: for, *in the firſt place*, it implies, that *God is the Lord of mankind*, by a natural and indispensable right, but that mankind are not subject to him, neither as to *obedience*, nor as to *puniſhment*; which would be the direct case, if sin should pass with impunity. For that natural and necessary dependance being cut off, (which also in another respect is moral) which accords to a rational creature in respect of its *creator*, and *ſupreme Lord*, which really comes to pass by means of sin, it cannot be renewed, or made amends for, but by *puniſhment*. In the second place, *to hate ſin*, that is, to will to punish it, *and not to hate ſin*, to will to let it pass unpunished, are manifestly contradictory.

SECT.

SECT. VI. If you say that God hath it in his power, not to hate sin, you say that he hath the contrary in his power, that is, *that he can love sin*; for if he hate sin, of his free-will, he may will the contrary. For the Divine will is not so determinately inclined towards any secondary object, by any thing in itself, that can justly oppose its inclination to its opposite; this Scotus maintains, and Twiss agrees with him. But *to will good*, and *to love justice*, are not less natural to God, than to be himself. Here then a double contradiction in that assertion of this very learned man, viz. "That "God can forgive sin, absolutely, without "any satisfaction received."

SECT. VII. "But it is manifest, (says "he,) that man not only can pardon, but "that it is his duty to pardon his enemies, "and therefore, this does not imply a contra-"diction."

Answer: The supposition is denied, *that God may do, what man may do.* That learned man raises this objection himself, *that man may sin, which God cannot do*, and at great length, and with much erudition, explains away this example. But as this instance of *Twiss's* is not quite satisfactory to us, we think proper to proceed in a different manner.

SECT. VIII. I say then, *in the first place*, that Divine and human forgiveness are plainly of a different kind; the forgiveness of man only respects

reſpects the *hurt*, the forgiveneſs of God reſpects the *guilt*. Man pardons ſins, ſo far as any *particular injury* hath been done himſelf; God pardons ſin, as the good of the univerſe is injured. Secondly, neither is it in the power of any man to let ſins paſs unpuniſhed, yea, of none abſolutely, to whom the right of puniſhing is competent; for although a *private perſon* may recede from his right, which, for the moſt part, is of charity; yet it is, by no means allowed to a *public perſon* to renounce his right, which is a right of government, eſpecially if that renunciation ſhould in any way turn out to the hurt of the public. *In the third place*, then, I ſay that, *that inſtance* is nothing to the purpoſe: for although a *private perſon* may at certain times renounce his right and dominion in certain caſes, and ought to do ſo, it doth not follow from that that God, whoſe right and dominion is *natural* and *indiſpenſable*, *and which* he cannot renounce *unleſs he deny himſelf*, can do the ſame. In the fourth place, the non-puniſhment of ſin, is an injury to the univerſe; for the glory of Divine Juſtice would be affronted with impunity.

Sect. IX. Our celebrated antagoniſt proceeds to the conſideration of Divine Juſtice: "but neither (ſays he) can it be conſiſtently "ſaid, that God cannot do this becauſe of his "juſtice; if it be ſuppoſed, that he can do it "by his power." But Scotus reaſons with more

more judgment and accuracy on this point. "The Divine will is not so inclined towards "any secondary object, by any thing in itself, "(says he) that can oppose its being justly "inclined towards its opposite, in the same "manner as without contradiction it may will "its opposite; otherwise, it may will abso-"lutely and not justly, which is inconsistent "with Divine perfection."

Sect. X. Answer: We maintain that God, from his nature cannot do this; and therefore, that he cannot either by his *power* or his *justice*; and as our learned antagonist produces no argument to prove that God can do it without resistance from his justice, but what flows from this false supposition, that he can do it by his power, it is not necessary to give ourselves any trouble on this head. But to *Scotus* we answer: the Divine will may incline to things opposite, in respect of the egresses of all those Divine attributes which *constitute* and *create* objects to themselves; but not in respect of those attributes which have no egress towards their objects, but upon a *condition supposed:* as for instance, God may *justly speak* or *not speak* with man: but it being supposed that he wills to speak, the Divine will cannot be indifferent, whether he speak truth or not. So much for his *first principal* argument.

The *second* is this:

Sect.

SECT. XI. " If God cannot let ſin paſs " unpuniſhed, then he muſt puniſh it, from " an abſolute neceſſity: but this no one can " maintain conſiſtent with reaſon."

SECT. XII. This conſequence the learned Doctor ſuppoſes, without any argument to ſupport it: but we deny the conſequence, nor will he ever be able to prove, that there is no other kind of neceſſity but an abſolute neceſſity. There is alſo a neceſſity ariſing from a *ſuppoſed condition*, and which deprives not the agent of a concomitant liberty. God could not but create the world; but God did not create the world from an *abſolute nececeſſity*, although it was neceſſary, *upon a ſuppoſition*, that it ſhould be created. It is neceſſary that God ſhould ſpeak *truly*, but he doth not ſpeak from an abſolute neceſſity; but it being ſuppoſed that he wills to ſpeak, it is impoſſible, that he ſhould not ſpeak *truly*. We ſay therefore, that God cannot but puniſh ſin, or, that he neceſſarily puniſhes ſin, not, however, from an abſolute neceſſity of nature, as a father begets a ſon, but upon the ſuppoſitions* before mentioned, by a neceſſity which excludes an *antecedent indifference*, but not a *concomitant liberty in the agent*; for in puniſhing ſins he acts by volition, and with underſtanding.

* Viz. That he willed to create a rational being, and to permit it to tranſgreſs the law of its creation.

SECT.

Sect. XIII. " But that neceſſity, (you " will ſay) of what kind ſoever it be, flows " from the nature of God, not his will or " decree." But all neceſſity of nature ſeems to be abſolute. I acknowledge, indeed, that all neceſſity of nature, conſidered in the *firſt act*, and thing ſignified, is abſolute in its kind; but in the *ſecond act*, and in its exerciſe, it is not ſo. The reader will eaſily perceive now, that our very learned antagoniſt had no reaſon for freely ſuppoſing that conſequence, which I reckon the very loweſt of all the devices he has fallen upon.

Sect. XIV. " If then (ſays he) God muſt " puniſh ſin from a natural neceſſity, he muſt " neceſſarily puniſh it, to the extent of his " power; but this, with great accuracy, he " ſhews to be abſurd, by a variety of argu- " ments.

Sect. XV. *Anſ.* Maccovius hath, ſometime ago, very clearly anſwered this reaſoning. We reject his *conſequence*, as built upon a *falſe ſuppoſition*. For that neceſſity, from which God puniſheth ſin, does not require that he ſhould puniſh it *to the extent of his power*, but *ſo far as is juſt*. We do not conceive God to be a ſenſeleſs inanimate agent, as if he acted from principles of nature, after a natural manner, without a concomitant liberty; for he doth all things freely with underſtanding and by volition, even thoſe things which, by ſuppoſition

poſition, he doeth neceſſarily, according to what his moſt holy nature requires.

Sect. XVI. The argument which the celebrated *Voſſius* uſes againſt our opinion is of no greater weight. "Every agent, (ſays that "very learned man,) that acts naturally, acts "upon an object naturally receptive of its "action: wherefore, if to puniſh were natu- "ral, viz. in that acceptation which neceſ- "ſity carries with it, ſuch action could not "paſs from the perſon of a ſinner, to another "perſon."

Sect. XVII. But this learned man is miſtaken, when he imagines that we affirm God to be *ſuch a natural agent*, as muſt, without ſenſe, and immediately operate upon the object that is receptive of it, in a * manner altogether natural, and without any *concomitant liberty*, that is, without any free act of underſtanding or volition. For although God be a *conſuming fire*, he is an *intellectual one*. Nor is a ſinner alone an object properly receptive of the exerciſe of God's vindicatory juſtice, as he hath committed the tranſgreſſions in his own perſon; for antecedent to every act of that juſtice, properly ſo called, in reſpect of the elect, God appointed a Surety, and this Surety being appointed, and all the ſins of the elect laid upon him, he in their room and

* As fire doth upon wood, &c.

ſtead,

ſtead, is the proper object of this vindicatory juſtice, ſo far as relates to their ſins.

Sect. XVIII. But *Twiſs* thus replies, "If "God puniſh, as far as he can, with juſtice; "that is, as far as ſin deſerves; then it muſt be "either as far as ſin deſerves, according to the "free conſtitution of God; or without any re- "gard to the Divine conſtitution. If according "to the Divine conſtitution, this is nothing "elſe but to aſſert, that God puniſhes not ſo "far as he can; but ſo far as he wills. If "without any regard to the Divine conſtituion, "then without the Divine conſtitution, ſin ſo "deſerves puniſhment, that God ought to puniſh "ſin, becauſe of his juſtice: but I conclude "this to be falſe in this manner: if diſobedi- "ence deſerve puniſhment in this manner, "that is, without the Divine conſtitution; "therefore obedience will alſo, in like manner, "deſerve a reward, without the Divine con- "ſtitution; for no reaſon can be ſhewn, that "any one ſhould maintain that even Angels "have merited by their obedience, that God "ſhould reward them with celeſtial glory."

Sect. XIX. But although theſe arguments are *ſpecious*, yet ſtrictly conſidered, they have no greater weight than thoſe already diſcuſſed; for in the puniſhment of ſin two things are to be conſidered: 1ſt. The puniſhment itſelf, ſo far as it is in its own nature ſomething *grievous* and troubleſome to the creature; and proper

proper to recover the violated right of God. In this reſpect, we ſay, that ſin merits puniſhment antecedently to every free act of the Divine will, or to the *Divine conſtitution:* or, if you would rather have it thus expreſſed; "that it is juſt that God ſhould inflict puniſhment, conſidered as ſuch, on the tranſgreſſor, without regard to any free conſtitution; for, if without regard to ſuch a *conſtitution*, ſin be *ſin*, and evil, *evil*; and unleſs it be ſo, to *hate the greateſt and beſt of* beings, may be the higheſt virtue, and *to love* him the greateſt vice; why may not puniſhment be due to it, without regard to ſuch a conſideration? 2dly. In *puniſhment*, the *mode*, *time*, and *degree*, are ſpecially to be conſidered: in reſpect of theſe, God puniſhes ſin according to the Divine conſtitution; for the *juſtice* of God, only demanding *puniſhment in general*, as including in it the nature of puniſhment, nothing hinders but that God ſhould freely appoint the mode and degree of it: he puniſhes them becauſe it is *juſt* that he ſhould do ſo; and conſequently, indiſpenſably neceſſary: he puniſhes, in one mode or in another, in one degree or in another; becauſe according to his wiſdom he hath determined freely ſo to do.—What we underſtand by *modes* and *degrees* of puniſhment, ſhall be afterwards explained.

Sect. XX. "But, (ſays our celebrated antagoniſt) if diſobedience thus deſerves puniſhment

" ment, why ſhould not obedience in like " manner deſerve a reward? for no reaſon to " the contrary can be aſſigned." I wiſh this learned man had not ſo expreſſed himſelf; for he will never be able to prove that the relation *between obedience, as to reward, and diſobedience, as to puniſhment, is the ſame:* for between *obedience* and the reward, there intervenes no natural obligation: God is brought under an obligation to no one, for any kind of obedience; "*for after we have done all, we are ſtill unprofitable ſervants.*" But God's right, that rational creatures ſhould be ſubject to him, either by obedience or a vicarious puniſhment, is indiſpenſable. In a word, obedience is due to God, in ſuch a manner, that from the nature of the thing, he can be *debtor* to none, in conferring rewards: but diſobedience would deſtroy all dependance of the creature upon God, unleſs a recompence be made by puniſhment.

SECT. XXI. The celebrated *Voſſius* again reaſons improperly, in the paſſage before quoted, from a compariſon made between *juſtice* and *mercy*. " The queſtion is not, (ſays " he) whether it be juſt that a ſatisfaction be " received; but whether it be unjuſt that it " ſhould not be received: for it doth not fol- " low, that if God be merciful in doing one " thing or another, that he would be unmer- " ciful in not doing it." I acknowledge, that it does not follow; for although mercy be natural

tural to God, as to the *habit*, yet becauſe there is no natural obligation between it and its proper object, it is, as to all its acts, entirely free: but the nature of the thing, about which it is employed, is not indiſpenſable; as we have ſhewn before to be the caſe with regard to juſtice.—So much for the learned Twiſs's *ſecond argument*, with the conſideration of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Twiſs's third argument—A diſpenſation with regard to the puniſhment of ſin, what, and of what kind—The nature of puniſhment, and its circumſtances—The inſtance of this learned opponent refuted—The conſiderations of rewarding and puniſhing, different—How long, and in what ſenſe God can diſpenſe with the puniſhment due to ſin—God the ſupreme Governor of the Jewiſh polity: alſo, the Lord of all—The fourth argument of Twiſs—The anſwer—Whether God can inflict puniſhment on an innocent perſon—In what ſenſe God is more willing to do acts of kindneſs than to puniſh—What kind of willingneſs that aſſertion reſpects—The concluſion of the anſwer to Twiſs's principal arguments.

SECT. I. THE third argument is this: "God "can inflict a milder puniſhment "than ſin deſerves; therefore he can by his "abſolute power, ſuſpend the puniſhment al- "together."

Anſ. I anſwer, that the puniſhment which a ſin deſerves, may be conſidered in a two-fold point of view. 1ſt. As by mens of it God compels to order a diſobedient creature, that hath caſt off its dependance on his ſupreme and natural dominion, in ſuch a manner that his

his will may be done with that creature that is itſelf unwilling to do it: and in this point of view he cannot inflict a *more mild* puniſhment than ſin deſerves. Yea, properly ſpeaking in this reſpect, it cannot be ſaid to admit of *degrees*, either *milder* or *more ſevere*. And in this ſenſe alone we deny the foregoing propoſition. 2dly. It may be conſidered in this other point of view, viz. as God, for the greater manifeſtation of his glory, hath aſſigned to it *modes*, *degrees*, and other circumſtances; but if puniſhment be conſidered in this view, we deny the * ſequel: for though it be granted that he exerciſeth liberty as to the *modes* and *degrees*, as theſe flow from the free appointment of God, it doth not follow, that the puniſhment itſelf, ſo far as the nature of puniſhment is preſerved in it, and which takes its riſe from the natural juſtice of God, can be altogether diſpenſed with.

SECT. II. What ſays our *learned antagoniſt* to this? He ſuppoſes the *author of the ſupplement* his opponent, and diſcuſſes his opinion in a variety of ſubtle reaſonings, in his anſwer concerning the extent and different degrees of juſtice But he confeſſes that theſe have no relation to *Piſcator:* and, as they are of no avail to the argument, we therefore paſs over the conſideration of them

* Viz, "That God, by his abſolute power, can ſuſpend the puniſhment of ſin altogether.

Sect. III. But this *learned gentleman* has ſtill ſomething to oppoſe to our reaſoning; for he thus proceeds: "God may reward be-"yond merit; therefore he may puniſh leſs than "what is merited." But this reaſon is evidently of no force: for, beſides that arguments from oppoſites do not always hold good in theology, as hath been ſhewn in various inſtances by *Maccovius*, we have before demonſtrated at large, that the relation between *remunerating grace* and * *punitory juſtice* is not the ſame. Moreover, theſe conſiderations all along ariſe not from the nature of puniſhment, but from its *degrees*; about which we have no controverſy; for we have never ſaid that God, in puniſhing ſins, acts without any concomitant liberty which reſpects thoſe degrees.

Sect. IV. But foraſmuch as † *Socinians* argue from the divine diſpenſations with regard to the puniſhment of ſins, to the free pardon of them without any ſatisfaction, we muſt ſay a few things in reply to this argument of our *learned antagoniſt*, as he ſeems pretty near a kin to them; and as they are ſo very eager

* That is, their relation to their objects, or their qualities conſidered in this point of view, is different: Divine Juſtice neceſſarily operates towards its object to puniſh the ſinner, otherwiſe it would not be juſtice; but as no creature can merit any thing of God, it depends on God's good pleaure whether he beſtow rewards or not.

† *Crellius*, "of the True Religion," p. 308.

in wreſting every thing to favour their own ſide of the queſtion.

Sect. V. The Divine diſpenſation then, with the puniſhment of ſins, reſpects either *temporary* or *eternal* puniſhment; but a *temporary puniſhment* may be conſidered either in reſpect of *monitory threats*, or of a *peremptory decree*, and both in reſpect of the *time* of the infliction, and of the *degrees* in the puniſhment to be inflicted. But God, as the avenger of ſin, is conſidered in Scripture in a two-fold point of view. 1ſt. As the *Legiſlator* and *ſupreme Lord* of the *Jews*, and their *common-wealth*; whoſe ſtate, from that circumſtance, Joſephus calls a * *Theocracy:* or, 2dly, As the ſupreme Lord and juſt Judge of the univerſe. If theſe conſiderations be properly attended to, the ſubtilties of Crellius are eaſily diſſolved: for God, as the *Legiſlator* and *ſupreme Ruler* of the Jewiſh Republic, oftimes diſpenſed with temporary puniſhments, as denounced in his threatenings; both as to the place, degree, and time of their execution: but God, as the *ſupreme Lord*, and juſt Judge of the univerſe, doth not diſpenſe with the *eternal puniſhment of ſin, to be inflicted at the proper and appointed time.*—The learned Twiſs's *fourth argument* remains only to be conſidered.

Sect. VI. "God is able, ſays he, to inflict "any torture, however great, even an infer-"nal one, upon any perſon, without the con-

* A political conſtitution, of which God was the head.

" ſideration of any demerit; therefore, he is " alſo able, notwithſtanding the greateſt de- " merit, to ſuſpend the greateſt puniſhment " whatever. The antecedent hath been prov- " ed: the conſequence from it is notorious; as " God is more willing to do good than to " puniſh."

Anſ. 1ſt. We have before obſerved, that this mode of reaſoning does not always hold good in theology. Neither, however, in the 2d place, are theſe oppoſites, viz. *to inflict torture*, and *to ſuſpend puniſhment:* for torture and puniſhment are different: but to inflict an infernal puniſhment upon any innocent perſon is a thing impoſſible; for puniſhment ſuppoſes a tranſgreſſion; and therefore not to inflict puniſhment upon a guilty perſon, is alſo impoſſible; for tranſgreſſion, from the very nature of the thing, requires puniſhment: but it is aſtoniſhing, that this learned writer ſhould inſiſt on the proof of the ſequel, viz. " That God is more willing " to do good than to puniſh," as he hath many times, by very ſtrong arguments, diſallowed the natural inclination of the Deity towards the good of the creature: nor will he ever be able to prove, that God is inclined to beſtow ſuch kind of benefits on a ſinful creature, as are oppoſite to the puniſhment due to ſin, without regard to Chriſt, and his ſatisfaction: but that difference reſpects a will, commanding and exhorting according to morality, not decreeing or acting naturally.

SECT.

SECT. VII. And these are what this learned writer calls his *principal arguments*; in which he contends that God can let sin pass unpunished, without any satisfaction. I hope, that impartial judges, however great respect they may have for the name of *Twiss*, will not be offended, that I have made these short answers to his arguments, as certainly they have been conducted without violence or scarcasm, and by no means from any weak desire of attacking so very *illustrious a man*, for whose many and great qualities, none can have a greater respect: but I have engaged in this task from an earnest desire of preserving, undiminished, the glory of Divine Justice, and of establishing the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, lest the *Socinians* should wrest to their purpose the arguments of this learned man; on the principal of which they place a principal dependance, and by which they acknowledge that they have been induced to adopt heretical opinions.

SECT. VIII. Our *very learned antagonist* adds other arguments to these; some of which have been satisfactorily answered by Maccovius; others belong not, according to our view of it, to the present controversy; and others will come to be considered in our vindication of the arguments of *Piscator* and *Lubbertus*, impugned by this celebrated writer, of which we shall take a short review; and therefore shall not now enter into any particular consideration of them.

CHAP. XV.

The defence of Sibrandus Lubbertus *againſt* Twiſs—*The agreement of theſe very learned men in a point of the utmoſt importance—A vindication of his argument from God's hatred againſt ſin—Liberality and juſtice different—A ſentiment of* Lubbertus *undeſervedly charged with Atheiſm—What kind of neceſſity of operation we ſuppoſe in God: this pointed out—The ſophiſtical reaſoning of this learned writer—How God is bound to manifeſt any property of his nature—The reaſons of* Lubbertus *and* Twiſs's *objections to the ſame, conſidered—That paſſage of the apoſtle,* Rom. i. 32. *conſidered and vindicated—His * mode of diſputing rejected.—The force of the argument from* Rom. i. 32.—The RIGHTEOUS JUDGMENT OF GOD, *what—Our federal repreſentative, and thoſe repreſented by him, are one myſtical body.—An anſwer to* Twiſs's *arguments,* Exodus xxxiv. 7—*The learned writer's anſwer reſpecting that paſſage—A defence of the paſſage—Punitory Juſtice a name of God—Whether thoſe for whom Chriſt hath made ſatisfaction, ought to be called guilty—*Pſal. v. 5, 6, 7. *the ſenſe of that paſſage conſidered—From theſe three paſſages the argument is one and the ſame—* Lubbertus's *argument from the definition of juſtice,*

* Viz. Twiſs's.

juſtice, weighed—How vindicatory juſtice is diſtinguiſhed from univerſal—The natures of liberality and juſtice evidently different—Puniſhment belongs to God—In inflicting puniſhment, God vindicates his right—Will and neceſſity, whether they be oppoſite—The end of the defence of Lubbertus.

SECT. I. THE learned *Twiſs*, when about to reply to the arguments of *Lubbertus*, brings forward two aſſertions of his; to the firſt of which he conſents, but not to the latter. The firſt maintains, "Corrective juſtice to be eſſential to God;" which he approves: and herein we congratulate this very learned man, that thus far, at leaſt, he aſſents to the truth; and in ſo doing hath given cauſe to the Socinians to grieve. But, "that it is natural to God to hate and "puniſh ſin;" which is *Lubbertus's* ſecond aſſertion, he denies: the nicety of his diſcrimination here is truly aſtoniſhing: for what is God's hatred againſt ſin, but this corrective juſtice? how then is it poſſible that that juſtice ſhould be natural to God, and the hatred of ſin not ſo likewiſe? I very well know that the learned man will not allow that there is any ſuch affection as hatred in God, properly ſo called. What is it then elſe, *than the conſtant will of puniſhing ſin?* but *that is the very vindicatory* juſtice of which we treat. Beſides, if to hate

ſin be not natural to God, then it is a thing free and indifferent to him: he may then not hate it; he may, according to the opinion of *Scotus*, formerly mentioned as approved by *Twiſs*, will its contrary; that is, he may love and approve of ſin, though *He be of purer eyes than to behold iniquity*. But, with good reaſon, he farther maintains, that "Mercy is eſ-"ſential to God, and yet that it is not neceſ-"ſary that he ſhould ſhew mercy to any one; "but of his free good pleaſure he ſheweth "mercy to whomſoever he ſheweth mercy." We have again and again before ſhewn that juſtice and mercy, in reſpect of their exerciſe, are different: God is under no obligation to exerciſe mercy towards any one; but he owes it to himſelf to preſerve his own natural right and dominion over his rational creatures: and the learned gentleman cannot ſhew that there is any ſuch obligation, ariſing from the nature of the thing itſelf, between *remunerating juſtice* and *liberality*, on which he next inſiſts, and their objects, as there is between corrective juſtice and its objects.

SECT. II. But he brings a grievous charge, no leſs than even that of *Atheiſm*, againſt this ſentiment of *Lubbertus*; and on a double account: for, 1ſt, he ſays, "that hence it fol-"lows, that God is a neceſſary, and not a free "agent:" and he calls that propoſition, a *ſpreading gangrene*. But Theologians agree, and without

without any risk of Atheism, that God is, in respect of his operations, *within himself*, a necessary agent. 2dly, If it be necessary that God should do any thing upon *some condition supposed*, is he therefore to be accounted a necessary, and not a free agent? Perhaps never any one hath made God more a necessary agent, than *Twiss* himself doth; for he every where maintains, that upon the supposition of a decree, it is necessary that God should do all things in conformity to it: which, however, I do by no means mention as finding fault with. Upon the supposition of a decree, *for instance*, God could not but create the world; but is he therefore to be called a necessary agent in the creation of the world? By no means. But you will say, *that necessity flows from the free will of God; but that which you dream of arises from the principles of his nature, and therefore how widely different!* I willingly grant, indeed, that the decree of creating the world, flowed from the free will of God; but this being supposed, it was necessary to the Divine nature, which is immutable, that it should be created. Nor do we ascribe any other kind of natural necessity to God in punishing sins. The decree of creating rational ceatures bound to render him obedience, and *so far* liable to his right and dominion; and that he willed to permit these creatures to transgress the law of their creation, flowed merely from his free will; but these

things being once ſuppoſed, it neceſſarily belongs to the Divine nature, as it is *juſt*, to puniſh thoſe who ſo tranſgreſs: but that God exerciſeth a concomitant liberty in puniſhing them, we have ſeveral times allowed; and we have no doubt, but if this be *Atheiſm*, it is alſo *Chriſtianity*.

Sect. III. 2dly, "Is God at all bound, (ſays "our very learned antagoniſt) or in any man-"ner obliged to manifeſt his juſtice, more than "to manifeſt his mercy, munificence, and "liberality? It is evident that God is not "bound to exerciſe any one property whatever, "more than another: wherefore, either all "things muſt be ſaid to be neceſſarily perform-"ed by God; and even that the world was not "made of his free will, but from a natural "neceſſity; or that all things have been, and "ſtill are, freely done by God." But beſides that, this reaſoning is ſophiſtical; it injures not our cauſe. The whole matter may be clearly explained in one word, God is not *abſolutely* bound to *manifeſt* any property of his nature, much leſs one more than another, for this reſpects the free purpoſe of God; but upon a *condition ſuppoſed* God may be more bound to *exerciſe* one property than another; for this relates to its exerciſe. But none of us have ſaid that it is neceſſary that God ſhould puniſh ſin, becauſe he is neceſſarily bound to demonſtrate his juſtice; for in this very thing he demonſtrates

trates his * juſtice; but it is neceſſary that he ſhould puniſh becauſe he is *juſt*. The learned writer then confounds the decree of manifeſting the glory of the Divine properties, to which God is abſolutely bound by none of his properties, with the exerciſe of theſe properties upon a *condition ſuppoſed*; which we have endeavoured to prove to be neceſſary, with reſpect to vindicatory juſtice.

SECT. IV. In what ſenſe all things are ſaid to be done by God *neceſſarily*, though he be a free agent, hath been already explained. By theſe arguments then, whereby he endeavours to weigh down our opinion with prejudices, it is evident that our antagoniſt hath nothing availed himſelf: let us now ſee whether he hath been more ſucceſsful in his replies to *Lubbertus*, than in his ſyſtem of oppoſition.

SECT. V. He briefly ſtates five arguments of *Lubbertus*, to each of which he anſwers in order.

SECT. VI. That paſſage of the apoſtle to the Romans, chap. i. 32. *Who knowing the judgement*, i. e. that the juſt right, or righteous judgment *of God is, that they who do ſuch things are worthy of death*, is quoted as a proof of this doctrine, by *Lubbertus*. *Twiſs* thus replies: "I acknowledge, *that they who commit* "*ſuch things, are worthy of death*:—but it by no

* Rom. i. 18.

means

" means follows from this, that it is *ne-*
" *ceſſary* that God ſhould puniſh them; which
" I ſhall demonſtrate by a two-fold argu-
" ment; for if that followed, it would follow
" that they who commit ſuch things muſt ne-
" ceſſarily be puniſhed; but the elect, becauſe
" of ſin, are worthy of death; but they are not
" puniſhed at all, much leſs neceſſarily. Will
" you ſay, becauſe they who have committed
" ſuch things are worthy of death, that there-
" fore it is neceſſary, from an abſolute neceſſity,
" that either they or others, that is, that either
" they themſelves, who are deſerving of death,
" or ſome one elſe, on their account, though
" innocent, ſhould be puniſhed? Who can di-
" geſt ſuch a conſequence as this? Again, if
" they are worthy of death, then they ſhall
" die the death; either then a temporal
" or eternal one: beyond all doubt, *he will*
" *anſwer*, an eternal death. It is neceſſary,
" therefore, that they ſhould exiſt to all eter-
" nity, and by an abſolute neceſſity; to the
" end, that they may be puniſhed to all eter-
" nity. And ſo then God cannot annihilate a
" creature."

SECT. VII. But, with this great man's good leave, neither his mode of diſputing, viz. by ſubſtituting a *double* argument in the place of *one* ſolid and clear anſwer, is at all ſatisfactory; nor are theſe arguments of any ſervice to his cauſe; the firſt of which is *captious*, and not all ſolid; the other too *nice* and *curious*.

For,

For, 1ſt. *Lubbertus* does not contend that God cannot pardon ſin without a ſatisfaction, becauſe ſimply, by ſome reaſon or other, ſinners are worthy of death: but for this reaſon only, becauſe the *righteous judgment*, or *juſt right of* God is, *that they who commit ſuch things are worthy of death*; and that therefore it would be unjuſt in God not to inflict that puniſhment; namely, becauſe, according to the juſtice of God, which *Twiſs* himſelf acknowledges to be natural and eſſential to him, *they are worthy of death*; and therefore neceſſarily to be puniſhed. But the arguments of *Twiſs* do not prove the contrary; for the Elect themſelves are worthy of death, and therefore neceſſarily to be puniſhed; not from an abſolute neceſſity in reſpect of the mode of acting in God the puniſher, but in reſpect of a *condition ſuppoſed*, and which excludes not the liberty of the agent: that is to ſay, God may inflict the puniſhment due to one on another, after, in conſequence of his own right, and the conſent of that other, he hath laid the ſins upon that other, on account of which he inflicts the puniſhment; he might puniſh the Elect, either in their own perſons or in their ſurety ſtanding in their room and ſtead; and when he is puniſhed, they alſo are puniſhed: for in this point of view the *federal head*, and thoſe repreſented by him, are not conſidered as diſtinct, but as *one*: for although they are not *one* in reſpect of

of perſonal unity, they are however *one*; that is, one *body*, in myſtical union: yea, *one myſtical* CHRIST:* viz. the *ſurety* is the *head*, thoſe repreſented by him the *members*; and when the head is puniſhed, the members alſo are puniſhed. Nor could even he himſelf be called a ſurety abſolutely innocent; for although he was *properly* and *perſonally* innocent, he was *imputatively* and *ſubſtitutively* guilty. *For God made him to be ſin for us:* † *he laid the ſins of us all upon him.*

The ſecond argument which this learned writer uſes to confute the concluſion of *Lubbertus*, is of no greater weight: we are not in the councils of God, ſo that we can preciſely pronounce, with regard to his judgments and his ways: that God is able abſolutely to reduce to nothing any creature that he hath created out of nothing, no one can doubt; but it being ſuppoſed, that that creature is guilty of ſin, and that that ſin, according to the right and juſtice of God, deſerves eternal death, we, with confidence maintain, that God, *who cannot deny himſelf, cannot reduce it to nothing*; neither is there any thing abſurd that can be inferred from this.

SECT.

* See 1 Cor. xii. 12, &c. "For as the body is one, and "hath many members, and all the members of that one "body being many, are one body; ſo alſo is Chriſt, &c."

† 2 Cor. v. 21. Iſa. liii. 6.

SECT. VIII. To the second proof brought from the word of God, declaring himself by that name of his—*who will by no means clear the* * *guilty*, he answers, "'Tis true that God will "by no means clear the guilty; yet it is evi- "dent that not a few are cleared by God: "the guilty then, whom he doth not clear, "must be those who have neither repented nor "believed in Christ. Hence it follows, that "every one hath either been punished, or will "be punished, either in himself or in Christ; "which we do not at all deny: but it doth not "at all follow hence, that God doth this from a "necessity of nature, for it is possible that it "may proceed from the free will of God; "neither doth it belong to him to exercise "his mercy and bounty from a necessity of "nature, but of his free will."

SECT. IX. But 1st, It is of no service to his cause, to urge, that God does not punish some guilty sinners in their own persons, but clears them, when this learned man grants, yea contends that they have all been punished in Christ their head; by whom justice was fully satisfied. 2dly, It hath been several times shewn before how God, from a necessity of nature, punishes sin, and yet with a concomitant *liberty of will*; and the difference between justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise and egress towards their proper

* See Exod. xxxiv. 6th and 7th verses.

per objects, hath been shewn; so that we do not think it proper to insist further on these at present. These considerations then being set aside, it is evident that this learned man has not attended to the force of the argument: for that conclusion does not arise from the passage, that in respect of the event God clears none unpunished either in themselves or in their surety: an assertion which no body but a *Socinian* speaks against; but rather this, that as punitory justice is a natural attribute of God, a very considerable portion of his essential glory, yea, *a well-known name of God, he can by no means clear the guilty*, unless he were to deny himself, *and deliver up his glory to another*, than which nothing is farther from God. But those, for whom the Divine Justice hath been satisfied by Christ, ought not, in respect of the demand of that justice, to be called guilty; for their obligation to punishment, viz. the guilt of sin, is taken away; so that it is just with God to deliver them from the wrath to come, although it be free to him at what time he may will, that that deliverance, in respect of them, should take place, and be manifested to their consciences, *that so being justified by faith, they may have peace with God.*

Sect. X. To these verses, cited by *Lubbertus* from the fifth Psalm, * ver. 4th, 5th, and 6th,

* The words are, "For thou art not a God that hath "pleasure in wickedness; neither shall any evil dwell with "thee."

6th, he thus replies, "The prophet is teſtify-
"ing, (ſays he) that God hates all who work
"iniquity; however, it is ſufficiently evident,
"that God does not puniſh all who work ini-
"quity; for he does not puniſh the elect: I
"acknowledge, that God will in his own time
"deſtroy all the wicked out of Chriſt; but of
"his free will, and from no conſideration of
"neceſſity, as he is an agent, entirely free."

SECT. XI. I am not altogether ſatisfied with this aſſertion, "that God doth not puniſh "all who work iniquity; neither does the in-"ſtance of the Elect confirm it: for even the "learned gentleman does not deny that all "their ſins have been puniſhed in Chriſt." We maintain alone, that God cannot but puniſh every ſin, becauſe he is juſt: but whether he chooſe to do this in their own perſons, or in their ſurety, reſts entirely with himſelf: therefore, it doth not derogate from his juſtice, that he transferred the ſins of ſome upon Chriſt, and puniſhed them in him; but they themſelves, though perſonally guilty, before Chriſt took their guilt upon himſelf, are not however puniſhed, nor can be accounted guilty, in reſpect of the judgment of God, their ſins not being imputed to them; or they ought to

"thee. The fooliſh ſhall not ſtand in thy ſight: thou
"hateſt all workers of iniquity. Thou ſhalt deſtroy
"them that ſpeak leaſing: the LORD will abhor the
"bloody and deceitful man."

be

be said to have been punished in Christ their head, with whom they are now closely united. In the second place, we have shewn before, and the learned gentleman acknowledges it, that a free act of the will may be consistent with some regard to necessity.

Sect. XII. Allow me then, from these three passages of Scripture, cited by *Lubbertus*, to collect one argument only; which, if I mistake not, no one of the various arguments of our very learned antagonist, nor even all of them, will be able to overthrow. It is to this purpose: "If that *just right* or *righteous* "*judgment* of God be essential, viz. that which "is made manifest and known to all by na- "ture: * if his avenging justice be such, that "he will by no means clear the guilty: † If, "as he hates sin, so he will destroy all the "workers of ‡ iniquity; then it is natural to "God to punish sin, and he cannot let it pass "unpunished; for he can do nothing contrary "to his natural attributes, exercised about "their proper objects: but the former part of "the argument is true, § so also must the "latter."

Sect. XIII. But *Lubbertus* likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common de-

* See Rom. i. 32.
† See Exod. xxxiv. 4.
‡ Psal. v. 4, 5, 6.
§ Being founded on the words of Scripture.

finition

finition of juſtice; to which *Twiſs* alſo refers: "Vindicatory *juſtice*, (ſays he) is the eternal "will of God, to give to every one his own; "therefore it belongs truly or naturally to "God." *Twiſs* cites theſe words from *Lubbertus*; for his writings againſt *Voſſius* I have not by me at preſent. Now although this juſtly celebrated man ſometimes agrees to this concluſion, yet as he twitches the argument various ways, we ſhall, as briefly as poſſible, bring it in regular order to a point. "Firſt of all, "(ſays he) allow me to put you in mind that "that definition of juſtice holds good "only with regard to juſtice in general; but "not with regard to vindicatory juſtice in "particular; for the whole of juſtice is em-"ployed in giving to every one his own." I have ſaid before, that that definition of the *Civilians* was not quite agreeable to me; nor in every reſpect ſatisfactory: but the objection of *Twiſs's* is of no weight; for vindicatory juſtice is not diſtinguiſhed from univerſal juſtice, or juſtice generally ſo called, as to its habit; but only in reſpect of its egreſs to its proper object: and therefore nothing ought to be included in the definition, which is not found alſo in the thing itſelf. Although then the learned opponent throws obſtacles in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory juſtice is, "a will to give to every one his own, or "what is due to him."

Sect. XIV. "But let *Lubbertus* bethink himself, (says *Twiss*) whether the Divine bounty "is not likewise the eternal will of the Deity "to give to some, beyond what is their own? "would it not then justly follow that it is ne- "cessary, and even from absolute necessity, "that he should exercise his bounty towards "some?"

Sect. XV. But neither is this comparison, between things dissimular of the smallest advantage to our adversary's cause: for 1st, The objects themselves, about which these attributes are employed, are very different: for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison formed, *between the giving to every one according to his right, and giving to some beyond their right.* That, *to give to any one beyond his right*, is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares: but *to give to every one his own*, or *what is due to him*, the very thing itself requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of the Deity, whether he may will to be bounteous towards any: but who, but an impious wretch, would be bold enough to dispute whether he may will to be just towards any? but besides, supposing a constant will in the Deity, of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them more than they deserve, in what respect it would not be necessary, the (question does not respect absolute

ſolute neceſſity) to him to exerciſe that bounty towards theſe ſome, I abſolutely do not comprehend. But, with regard to the Divine bounty, and in what ſenſe that is aſcribed to God, and what kind of habitude of the Divine will it denotes, this is not the place to enquire.

Sect. XVI. He *again* ſays, "If hence it "follow, that it is neceſſary that God ſhould "give to each his due, it will certainly be "neceſſary that he ſhould give to each of us "eternal damnation."

Sect. XVII. Thus: That puniſhment belongs not to us, but to God himſelf; the learned gentleman will afterwards acknowledge: but God may give to every one his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of puniſhment, although he do not inflict it on the ſinners themſelves, but on their ſurety, ſubſtituted in their room and ſtead. Thus he gives glory to his juſtice, and does no injury to us; for no one can demand it as *his right* to be puniſhed; for no one hath a right to require puniſhment, which is an involuntary evil; but rather becomes ſubject to the right of another.

Sect. XVIII. To theſe he replies, "If "juſtice be only the will of giving to every "one his own, it is not the neceſſity of giv-"ing it."

But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will and neceſſity are not oppoſed, as a thing

a thing itſelf may be prior, and the mode or affection of it poſterior to ſome other things, either in the firſt or ſecond act.* Neither hath any one defined the juſtice of God by neceſſity, although from his juſtice it is neceſſary that he ſhould act juſtly: though it be the will of God, viz. "to give every one what is his "due," yet it is a conſtant and immutable will; which, as it differs not in any reſpect from the Divine Eſſence itſelf, muſt exiſt neceſſarily; and a proper object for its exerciſe being ſuppoſed, it muſt neceſſarily operate, though it act freely.

SECT. XIX. In the laſt place then, this celebrated writer denies, "That puniſhment "can properly be called *ours*, in ſuch a ſenſe, "that from his will of giving to every one his "own, it ſhould be neceſſary that God ſhould "inflict it upon us ſinners; but he aſſerts, that it "belongs to God, as having the full power "either of inflicting or relaxing it." That puniſhment is ours, or belongs to us, cannot be ſaid with propriety; it muſt be traced to the ſource whence it hath its riſe; that is, whence it is juſt that it ſhould be inflicted upon ſinners: but

* God's will of giving to every man his own, was from everlaſting, juſtice being an eſſential attribute of his unchangeable nature; but 'tis only after the ſuppoſition of a rational being that had ſinned, that he muſt *neceſſarily*, i. e. from the very principles of his nature, exerciſe that will towards ſinners; and give them the wages of ſin, viz. Death.

but this is the *juſt right* or *righteous judgment* of God, Rom. i. 32.—Thus far then, it may be reckoned among the things that belong to God, as it is his *juſtice* that requires it ſhould be inflicted: but it does not follow, that God has a full power of inflicting it, or relaxing it, becauſe in this ſenſe it may be accounted among the things which belong to him: God owes it to himſelf to have a proper regard to the honour of all his own perfections.

Sect. XX. We chooſe not to enter any farther on the arguments which this learned writer advances either in his diſputations againſt *Lubbertus*, or in his anſwers to his arguments; partly, as they coincide with thoſe mentioned before, and have been conſidered in the vindication of the argument taken from the conſideration of God's *hatred* againſt ſin; and partly as they militate only againſt a *natural* and *abſolute* neceſſity; which, in the preſent caſe, we do not aſſert.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Piſcator's *opinion of this controverſy—How far we aſſent to it*—Twiſs's *arguments militate againſt it—How God puniſhes from a natural neceſſity—How God is a conſuming fire—God's right, of what kind—Its exerciſe neceſſary, from ſome thing ſuppoſed—Whence the obligation of God to exerciſe it ariſes—Other objections of* Twiſs *diſcuſſed.*

SECT. I. THE conſideration of what our *juſtly celebrated antagoniſt* hath advanced againſt *Piſcator*, whom he declares to hold the *firſt* place among the Theologians of the preſent day; *and to ſhine as far ſuperior to the reſt, as the moon doth to the leſſer ſtars*, ſhall put an end to this diſpute. He has choſen *Piſcator*'s notes upon his *collation* of *Vorſtius*, as the ſubject of his conſideration and diſcuſſion. In general we are inclined to give our voice in favour of the ſentiments of *Piſcator*; but as the diſciples of Chriſt ought to call none on earth *maſter*, in matters of religion, we by no means hold ourſelves bound to ſupport all the *phraſes*, *arguments*, or *reaſons* that he may have uſed in defence of his opinion. Setting aſide then all anxious ſearch after words, expreſſions, &c. the minutiæ of ſimilies, which I could

I could wish this distinguished writer had paid less attention to; we will endeavour to repel every charge brought against our common and principal cause; and to place this truth, which we have thus far defended, as we are now speedily hastening to a conclusion, beyond the reach of attacks, and trouble *from its adversaries.*

Sect. II. The first argument then of *Piscator*, to which he replies, is taken from that comparison made in Heb. xii. 2. between God, in respect of his vindicatory justice, and a consuming fire. From this passage *Piscator* concludes, "That as fire, from the property of its "nature, cannot but burn combustible matter "when applied to it; and that by a natural "necessity; so God, from the perfection of "his justice, cannot but punish sin when com-"mitted; that is, when presented before that "justice." What he asserts, with regard to a *natural* and absolute necessity, we do not admit; for God neither exerciseth, nor can exercise any act towards objects *without himself* in a *natural* manner, or as an agent merely natural. He indeed is a *fire*, but rational and intelligent fire; although then it be no less necessary to him to punish sins, than it is to fire to burn the *combustible matter* applied to it: the same manner of operation, however, accords not to him as to fire, for he worketh as an intelligent agent; that is, with a concomitant

mitant liberty in the acts of his will, and a conſiſtent liberty in the acts of his underſtanding. We agree then with *Piſcator* in his concluſion, though not in his manner of leading his proof: the objections made to it by the learned *Twiſs*, we ſhall try by the ſtandard of truth.

SECT. III. 1ſt, Then he maintains, and with many laboured arguments, that God doth not puniſh ſin from *a neceſſity of nature*, which excludes every kind of liberty. But whom do theſe kind of arguments affect? they apply not at all to us: for *Piſcator* himſelf ſeems to have underſtood nothing elſe by a *natural neceſſity*, than that neceſſity which we have ſo often diſcuſſed, particularly modified. For he ſays, "That God doth ſome things by "a natural neceſſity; becauſe by nature he "cannot do otherwiſe." That is, ſin being ſuppoſed to exiſt, from the ſtrict demands of that juſtice, which is natural to him, he cannot but puniſh it, or act otherwiſe than puniſh it; although he may do this, without any encroachment on his liberty. As his intellectual will is inclined to happineſs, by a natural inclination, yet wills happineſs with a concomitant liberty; for it would not be *a will*, ſhould it act otherwiſe, as freedom of action is the very eſſence of the will. But the arguments of *Twiſs* do not oppoſe this kind of neceſſity, but that only which belongs to inanimate,

animate, merely natural agents;* which entirely excludes all ſorts of liberty, properly ſo called.

Sect. IV. Let us particularly examine ſome of this learned gentleman's arguments. "If, (ſays he) God muſt puniſh ſin from a neceſſity of nature, he muſt puniſh it as ſoon as committed." Granted; were he to act by ſuch a neceſſity of nature, as denotes a neceſſary *principle* and *mode* of acting; but not, if by a neceſſity that is improperly ſo called, becauſe it is ſuppoſed that his nature neceſſarily requires that he ſhould ſo act: as for inſtance, ſuppoſe that he wills to ſpeak, he muſt by neceſſity of his nature ſpeak truly, for God cannot lie; yet he *ſpeaks* freely, when he ſpeaks truly.

Sect. V. Again, "If (ſays he) God puniſhed from a neceſſity of nature, then, as often as he inflicted puniſhment, he would inflict it to the utmoſt of his power, as fire burns with all its force: but this cannot be ſaid without blaſphemy."

Here again, this learned man draws abſurd concluſions from a falſe ſuppoſition. The nature of God requires that he ſhould puniſh as far as is juſt, not as far as he is able. It is neceſſary, ſin being ſuppoſed to exiſt, that he ſhould inflict puniſhment; not the greateſt

* As fire, wind, water, &c.

that he is able to inflict, but as great as his *right* and *juſtice* require: for in ordaining puniſhment he proceeds freely according to the rule of *theſe*. It is neceſſary that the glory of the Divine *holineſs*, *purity*, and *dominion*, ſhould be vindicated; but in *what manner*, *at what time*, *in what degree*, *or by what kind of puniſhment*, belongs entirely to God; and we are not of his counſels: but I am fully confident, that the arguments laſt urged by this learned gentleman, may be anſwered in one word. I ſay then, God puniſhes according to what is due to ſin by the rule of his right, not to what extent he is able. As for inſtance, God does not uſe *his omnipotence* from an abſolute neceſſity of nature; but ſuppoſing that he wills to do any work *without himſelf*, he cannot act but omnipotently. Neither, however, doth it hence follow, that God acts to the utmoſt extent of his power; for he might have created more worlds. We do not then affirm, that God is ſo bound by the laws of an *abſolute neceſſity*, that like an *inſenſible* and merely *natural* agent, it would be impoſſible for him, by his infinite wiſdom, to aſſign, according to the rule and demand of his juſtice, degrees modes, duration and extenſion of puniſhment; according to the degrees of the demerit, or circumſtances of the ſin; or even to transfer it upon the Surety, who has voluntarily, and with his own approbation, ſubmitted himſelf in the

room

room of ſinners; but we only affirm, that his natural and eſſential juſtice indiſpenſibly requires that every ſin ſhould have its juſt recompence of reward: and were not this the caſe, a ſinful creature might emancipate itſelf from the power of its Creator and Lord. This very learned man having, according to his uſual cuſtom, introduced theſe preliminary obſervations, at length advances his anſwers to *Piſcator*'s argument; the nature and quality of which we ſhall particularly conſider. That which he chiefly depends upon, which he forges from the Scripture, that aſſerts God, in reſpect of ſin, to be a *conſuming fire*, we have examined in the proof of our ſecond argument, and have ſhewn of how little weight it is to invalidate the force of our argument.

SECT. VI. To that aſſeveration of *Abraham*, " *Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* he thus anſwers, " He will do right certainly; but " his own right, and will exerciſe it according " to his own free appointment; but without " the Divine appointment, I acknowledge no " right; to the exerciſe of which God can be " influenced by any kind of neceſſity."

SECT. VII. *Anſ.* That God exerciſeth his right, or doeth right, according to his own free appointment, may be admitted in a ſound ſenſe;

ſenſe; for in that exerciſe of his right he uſes volition and underſtanding: or more properly, he hath not appointed or determined ſo to act; for ſo to act is natural and eſſential to him concerning the things about which there is *no free* determination. It is indeed of the free determination of God, that any right can be exerciſed, or any attribute manifeſted; for he freely decreed to create creatures, over which he hath a right; but he might not have decreed it ſo: and in every exerciſe of his right, there are certain things which we have mentioned before, which are not the objects of free determination: but that no right belongs to God, without his Divine appointment, to the exerciſe of which he is bound, is aſſerted without probability, and appears evidently falſe; for ſuppoſing that God willed to create rational creatures, does it depend upon his free determination, that the *right of dominion*, and the exerciſe of it ſhould belong to him? If ſo, God might be neither the Lord nor God of his creatures; and a *rational creature* may be neither *creature* nor *rational*; for both its *creation* and *reaſon* ſuppoſe a dependance on, and ſubjection to ſome Lord and Creator. If the right then of dominion depended on the free determination of God, then God might freely and juſtly determine that he would neither have nor exerciſe ſuch right: for he might determine the contrary of that which he hath

hath *freely* determined, without any injuſtice, or any incongruity. From himſelf then, and not from any one *without himſelf*, that is, from his own nature, he receives the obligation to exerciſe his *right*, both of dominion and of juſtice: thus, by nature, he muſt ſpeak truly, if he wills to ſpeak.

Sect. VIII. "But I cannot, (ſays this renowned man) ſufficiently expreſs my aſtoniſhment at this very grave Divine's aſſertion,* viz. That God, without injury to his juſtice, may will evil antecedently to whomſoever he pleaſes, (for which I do not find fault with him) but that he does not avert that God, for the ſame, or a better reaſon, might do good to a creature, notwithſtanding its demerit, by pardoning its ſin."

Sect. IX. If by *willing evil antecedently* be underſtood his willing to inflict evil without regard to the demerit of ſin, 'tis a point too intricate for me to determine: if the *evil* refer to the *infliction* of it, I muſt differ from this learned Doctor. If it refer to the *willing*, the aſſertion avail not his cauſe; for, if we ſuppoſe that God, without doing injury to any one, without diſhonouring any of his own attributes, without regard to ſin, hath decreed to puniſh a creature for the ſin that it was to commit; would it not thence follow, that God

* Viz. Piſcator's.

might let ſin paſs unpuniſhed, in deſpite both of his own glory, and to the entire deſtruction of the dependance of rational* creatures: nor is the following comment of our celebrated opponent of any greater weight, viz. "That God "would not be omnipotent, if he neceſſarily "puniſhes ſin; for thence it would follow, that "God cannot annihilate a ſinful creature which "he created out of nothing; which, (ſays he) "is evidently contrary to omnipotence."

Sect. X. But how many things are there which this learned gentleman himſelf acknowledges, that God, with reſpect to his decree, cannot do without any diſparagement to his omnipotence: he could not break the bones of Chriſt. But the perſon muſt be deprived of reaſon who would aſſert, that this is any diminution of the Divine omnipotence. If then there be many things which God cannot do without any the ſmalleſt detraction from his omnipotence, becauſe by a free determination he hath decreed not to do them, is he to be thought leſs omnipotent, ſo to ſpeak, becauſe he cannot, on account of his juſtice, let ſins committed paſs unpuniſhed? Is God not omnipotent, becauſe on ac-

* Becauſe if he puniſhed a creature for ſin merely, becauſe he willed or determined ſo to do; and not becauſe the nature of ſin neceſſarily ſo required; he might as eaſily will the contrary, and conſequently the ſubordination of the creature would be entirely ſubverted.

count

count of his nature he cannot lie? Yea, he would not be omnipotent if he could renounce his right and juſtice: for to permit a ſinful creature to ſhake off his natural dominion, is not a mark of omnipotence but of impotence; than which nothing is more remote from God.

SECT. XI. After having brought the diſpute thus far, and accurately weighed what remains of Dr. *Twiſs*'s anſwer to *Piſcator*, there ſeemed to me nothing that could occur to give any trouble to an intelligent reader; as there is no reaſon then either to give further trouble to the reader or myſelf on this point, we here conclude the controverſy: and this I do with entertaining the ſtrongeſt hopes that no perſon of diſcretion, or who is unacquainted with the pernicious devices which almoſt every where abound, will impute it to me as a matter of blame, that I, a perſon of no conſideration, and ſo very full too of employment, that I could devote only a few leiſure hours to this diſputation, ſhould have attacked the Theological *digreſſion* of a man ſo very illuſtrious and renowned; not only among our own countrymen, but even in foreign nations; as the attack has been made in the cauſe of truth.

CHAP. XVII.

Rutherford *reviewed—An overſight of that learned man—His opinion of punitory juſtice—He contends that Divine Juſtice exiſts in God freely—The conſideration of that aſſertion—This learned writer and* Twiſs *diſagree—His firſt argument—Its anſwer—The appointment of Chriſt to death two-fold—The appointment of Chriſt to the mediatorial office, an act of ſupreme dominion—The puniſhment of Chriſt an act of punitory juſtice—An argument of that learned man, eaſy to anſwer—The examination of the ſame—The learned writer proves things not denied; paſſes over things to be denied—What kind of neceſſity we aſcribe to God in puniſhing ſins—A neceſſity upon a condition ſuppoſed—What the ſuppoſitions are upon which that neceſſity is founded—A difference between thoſe things which are neceſſary by a decree, and thoſe which are ſo from the divine nature—The ſecond argument of that learned man—His obſcure manner of writing pointed out—Juſtice and Mercy different in reſpect of their exerciſe—What it is to owe the good of punitory juſtice to the univerſe—This learned man's third argument—The anſwer—Whether God could forbid ſin, and not under the penalty of eternal death—Concerning the management*

management of punishment in human courts from the Divine appointment—The manner of it—What this learned author understands by the internal court of God—This learned author's fourth argument-All acts of grace have a respect to Christ—His fifth argument—The answer—A dissertation on the various degrees of of punishment—For what reason God may act unequally with equals—Concerning the delay of punishment, and its various dispensations.

SECT. I. THE consideration of the arguments advanced by Mr. *Samuel Rutherford** against this truth which we are now maintaining, shall conclude this dissertation. He maintains, as I have observed before, "That punitory justice exists not in "God by necessity of nature, but freely." And he has said, that *Twiss* hath proved this, by a variety of arguments; one of which, in preference to the others, he builds on, as unanswerable.

SECT. II. But, with this great man's leave, I must tell him, that *Twiss* hath never even said, much less proved, "That punitory justice ex- "ists freely in God, and not from a necessity "of nature;" nor, indeed, can it be said by *any one*, with any shew of reason: for *punitory justice* denotes the habit of justice; nor is it

* In his book on Providence, chap. xxii. page 345.

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leſs *juſtice* becauſe it is *punitory*. But be aſſured the accurate *Twiſs* hath never maintained that any habit exiſts in God *freely*, and not from a neceſſity of nature. We have before accounted in what ſenſe habits are aſcribed to God: even the more ſagacious *Socinians* do not fall into ſuch a blunder; but they deny ſuch a habit to exiſt in God at all, and entirely diveſt him of this juſtice. *Twiſs* indeed maintains, that the *exerciſe* of that juſtice is *free* to God, but grants that juſtice itſelf is a natural attribute of God. The *Socinians*, that it is only a free act of the Divine will; which *party* this learned author favours, appears not from his words. If by juſtice he means the *habit*, he ſides with the *Socinians:* if the *act* and *exerciſe*, he is of the ſame opinion with *Twiſs*, although he expreſſes his ſentiments rather unhappily. But let us conſider this learned writer's arguments.

Sect. III. The firſt, which he acknowledges to be taken from *Twiſs* (the ſame thing may be ſaid of moſt of his others) and which he pronounces unanſwerable is this: "God "gave up his moſt innocent Son, our Lord "Jeſus Chriſt to death, in conſequence of his "punitory juſtice, and it was certainly in his "power not to have devoted him to death; "for from no neceſſity of nature did God de-"vote his Son to death; for if ſo, then God "would not have been God, which is ab-

"ſurd,

" ſurd; for of his free love he gave him up " to death." John iii. 6. Rom. viii. 32.

SECT. IV. As there is no need of a ſword to cut this *indiſſoluble knot*, as he calls it, let us try by words what we can do to untie it. I anſwer then, " The devoting of Chriſt to " death is taken in a two-fold ſenſe: 1ſt. For " the appointment of Chriſt to the office of " ſurety, and to ſuffer the puniſhment of our " ſins in our room and ſtead. 2dly, For the " infliction of puniſhment upon Chriſt, now " appointed our ſurety; and our delivery " through his death being now ſuppoſed."

The devoting of Chriſt to death, conſidered in the firſt ſenſe, we deny to be an act of punitory juſtice, or to have ariſen from that juſtice. For that act by which God *deſtined* his Son to the work of mediation, by which, in reſpect of their guilt, he transferred from us all our ſins, and laid them upon Chriſt, are acts of *ſupreme dominion*, and breathe love and grace rather than avenging juſtice. But the puniſhment of Chriſt, *made ſin for us*, is *an act of punitory juſtice*. Nor upon the ſuppoſition that he was received in our room as our ſurety, could it be otherwiſe; and although in drawing ſuch conſequences, I think we ought to refrain as to what might be poſſible, I am not, however, afraid to affirm, that God could not have been God, that is, juſt and true, if he had not devoted to death his Son, when thus appointed our mediator.

SECT.

SECT. V. What ſhall we ſay, when we conſider that even this learned man was aware of this two-fold ſenſe of the phraſe, ("the devoting of Chriſt to death,") he even had thoroughly weighed *that diſtinction*, or elſe he is inconſiſtent with, and ſhamefully contradicts himſelf; for in the beginning of the argument he aſſerts, "That the devoting of Chriſt to "death has its riſe from punitory juſtice:" but in the end, he ſays, it was from "free "love;" but certainly puniſhing juſtice is not free love; he muſt then either acknowledge a two-fold appointment of Chriſt to death, or he cannot be conſiſtent with himſelf. But the paſſages of Scripture that he quotes, evidently mean the appointment of Chriſt to death, as we have explained it in the firſt ſenſe of the phraſe.

SECT. VI. What reaſon this learned man had for ſo much boaſting of this argument, as unanſwerable, let the reader determine: to me it appears not only very eaſily anſwerable, but far beneath many others, that one, diſputing on ſuch a ſubject, muſt encounter.

SECT. VII. But he introduces ſome as making anſwers to his argument, who "af-"firm that Chriſt was not innocent, but a "ſinner by imputation, and made ſin for us, "and that it was neceſſary, from the eſſential "juſtice of God, and his authority as enjoin-"ing, that he ſhould make atonement for ſin, "in himſelf, and in his own perſon."

SECT.

Sect VIII. I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who from no kind of *neceſſity*, but *freely*, frames anſwers to his own arguments: here he has exhibited ſuch a one, as no body but himſelf would have dreamed of. For although what your diſputants, or this learned Divine, fighting with himſelf, ſay be true, he muſt however be a fool, who can believe that it has any relation to the preſent ſubject. To thoſe adverſaries who urge, "That God freely puniſhes ſin becauſe he "puniſhed his Son, who knew no ſin, and "who contend that God may equally not "puniſh the guilty, as puniſh the innocent," we anſwer, that Chriſt, though *intrinſically* and perſonally innocent, yet as he was by *ſubſtitution*, and conſequently *legally* guilty, is no inſtance of the puniſhment of an *innocent* perſon; for he was not puniſhed as the moſt innocent Son of God. Paſſing over theſe things then, and indeed they are of no import to the preſent ſubject, he endeavours to prove, by ſeveral arguments, that God laid our ſins upon Chriſt, by conſtituting him Surety, and from no neceſſity of nature: but even this effort is of no ſervice to his cauſe, for this we by no means deny, ſo that his labour is entirely ſuperfluous. At length, however, in the progreſs of the diſpute, this learned gentleman advances ſome arguments that ſeem ſuitable to his purpoſe.

Sect.

SECT. IX. "We readily grant, (says he) "upon supposition, that Christ was made our "surety by the decree of God, that he could "not be but punished by God, and yet freely, "as God created the world of mere free-will, "though necessarily, in respect of his immu- "tability; for it cannot be that a free action "should impose on God a natural or physical "necessity of doing any thing."

SECT. X. We have shewn before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God, in punish- ing sins. It is not an *inanimate* or merely physical necessity, as if God acted from prin- ciples of nature in a manner altogether natu- ral, that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; *for he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.* But it is such a necessity as leaves to God an entire concomitant liberty in acting; but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent indifference, ac- complishes its object, viz. the punishment of sin, the *justice*, *holiness*, and *purity* of God, so requiring. But this necessity, though it hinder- eth not the Divine liberty, any more than that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a decree from the immuta- bility of his nature; yet it arises not from a decree, but from things themselves, particular- ly constituted, and not as the other kind of ne- cessity from a decree only: and therefore, in those things which God does necessarily, mere- ly from the supposition of a decree, he has a

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regard to the decree, accompliſhes the thing to be done, antecedently to the conſideration of any neceſſity incumbent on him; but in thoſe whoſe neceſſity ariſes from the demand of the Divine nature, a *decree* only ſuppoſes a certain condition of things, which being ſuppoſed, immediately and without any conſideration of any reſpect to a *decree*, it is neceſſary that one or another conſequence ſhould follow. As for inſtance, after God decreed that he would create the world, it was impoſſible that he ſhould not create it, becauſe he is *immutable:* and the decree immediately reſpected that very thing, viz. the creation of it. But the neceſſity of puniſhing ſin ariſes from the *juſtice* and *holineſs* of God; it being ſuppoſed that in conſequence of a decree, a rational creature exiſted, and were permitted to tranſgreſs: but he puniſhes the tranſgreſſion which he decreed to permit, becauſe he is juſt, and not only becauſe he decreed to puniſh it. The neceſſity then of creating the world ariſes from a decree; the neceſſity of puniſhing ſin from juſtice.

SECT. XI. "But it is impoſſible, (ſays "Rutherford) that a free action can impoſe "a natural or phyſical neceſſity of doing any "thing upon God."

SECT. XII. But by a free action it can be proved, that certain things may be placed in ſuch a condition, that God could not but exerciſe

exercise certain acts towards them, on account of the strict demand of some attribute of his nature, though not from a *physical* and *insensible* necessity, which excludes all liberty of action: for it being supposed, that in consequence of a free decree God willed to speak with man, it is necessary from the *decree* that he should speak; but that he should speak truth is necessary from the necessity of his nature. Supposing then a free action, in which he hath decreed to speak, a natural necessity of *speaking truth*, is incumbent on God, nor can he do otherwise than speak truth. Supposing sin to exist, and that God willed to do any thing with regard to sin, (although perhaps this is not in consequence of a decree) it is necessary, by necessity of nature, that he should do justice; that is, that he should punish it: *for the righteous judgment of God is, that they who do such things*, viz. who commit sin, *are worthy of death*. There are certain attributes of the Deity, which have no egress but towards certain objects particularly modified; for they do not constitute or create objects to themselves, as other Divine attributes do; but these objects being once constituted by a free act of the Divine will, they must necessarily, for such is their nature and manner, be exercised.

Sect. XIII. What this learned writer further adds in support of his argument, is founded on a mistaken

a miſtaken idea of the ſubject in queſtion: for as the neceſſity of puniſhing ſin ariſes from the *right* and *juſtice* of God, it is by no means neceſſary that he ſhould puniſh it in *one* ſubject more than *in another*, but only that he *ſhould puniſh it*; and that thereby his right may be reſtored, and his juſtice ſatisfied.

Sect. XIV. The ſecond argument of this learned writer is this: "As God freely has "mercy on whom he will, for he is under "obligation to none, and yet mercy is eſſen- "tial to him; ſo God does not, by any ne- "ceſſity of nature, owe puniſhment to a ſin- "ner: although then man owe obedience to "God, or a vicarious compenſation by means "of puniſhment from the neceſſity of a decree; "yet thoſe who ſay, that God, by neceſſity of "nature, owes the good of punitory juſtice to "the univerſe, which were he not to execute, "he would not be God; thoſe, I ſay, indirect- "ly deny the exiſtence of a God."

Sect. XV. Although any one may perceive that theſe aſſertions are unſubſtantial, unfounded, and more obſcure than even the books of the Sybils; we ſhall, however, make a few obſervations upon them. In the firſt place then, it muſt be abundantly clear from what has been already ſaid, that *mercy* and *juſtice* are different in reſpect of their exerciſe; nor need we now farther inſiſt on that point. But how this learned man will prove

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that *ſparing* mercy, which, as not only the nature of the thing itſelf requires, but even the *Socinians* with the orthodox agree, ought to be viewed in the ſame light as *punitory* juſtice, is eſſential to God, when he affirms punitory juſtice to exiſt in God *freely*, I cannot conjecture: but as there is no one who doubts but that God does all things for the glory and manifeſtation of his own eſſential attributes, why it ſhould be more acceptable to him in his adminiſtration reſpecting ſin committed, to exerciſe an *act of the will* purely free, no excellence of his nature ſo requiring, than of an eſſential property * to do in all reſpects whatſoever he pleaſeth; and to ſpread abroad its glory, it will be difficult to aſſign a reaſon. God, I ſay, has a proper regard for the glory of his attributes; and as mercy earneſtly and warmly urges the free pardon of ſins, if no attribute of the Divine nature required that they ſhould be puniſhed; it is ſtrange that God, by an act of his will, entirely *free*, ſhould have inclined to the contrary. But we have ſhewn before that the Scriptures lay a more ſure foundation for the death of Chriſt.

Secondly, God does not owe to the ſinner puniſhment from a neceſſity of nature, but he owes the infliction of puniſhment on account of ſin, to his own *right* and juſtice: for thence

* Viz. Mercy.

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the obligation of a ſinner to puniſhment ariſes; nor is the debt of obedience in rational creatures reſolvable into a decree in any other reſpect than as it is in conſequence of a decree, that they are *rational creatures*.

Sect. XVI. In the third place, the concluſion of this argument would require even the *Delian* Swimmer's abilities to ſurmount it; ſo very puzzling and harſh is the diction, that it is difficult to make any ſenſe of it; for what means that ſentence, "That God, by a neceſſity of nature, owes "the good of punitory juſtice to the uni-"verſe." The good of the univerſe is the glory of God himſelf: "to owe then the good "of punitory juſtice to the univerſe," is to owe the good of an eſſential attribute to his own glory. But again, what is "the good of "punitory juſtice?" Juſtice itſelf, or the exerciſe of it? neither can be ſo called with any propriety. But if the learned author mean this, that God ought to preſerve his own right and dominion over the univerſe, and that this is juſt, his nature ſo requiring him, but that it cannot be done, ſuppoſing ſin to exiſt without the exerciſe of punitory juſtice; and then that thoſe who affirm this, indirectly deny the exiſtence of God, this is eaſy for any one to *aſſert*, but not ſo eaſy to prove.

Sect. XVII. This learned author's third argument is taken from ſome abſurd conſequences

quences which he ſuppoſes to follow from our opinion; for he thus proceeds to reaſon: "Thoſe who teach that ſin merits puniſh- "ment, from a neceſſity of the Divine na- "ture, without any intervention of a free de- "cree, teach at the ſame time, that God can- "not forbid ſin to man, without neceſſarily "forbidding it under the penalty of eternal "death. As if, (ſays he) when God forbids "adultery or theft in a human court, he "forbid them with a modification of the pu- "niſhment, namely, that theft ſhould not "be puniſhed with death, but by a quadruple "reſtitution, he could not forbid them with- "out any ſanction of a puniſhment, and as "he commands theſe to be puniſhed by men, "becauſe they are ſins, why cannot he for "the ſame reaſon manage matters ſo in his "own internal court, and ſuſpend all puniſh- "ment; and nevertheleſs forbid the ſame "tranſgreſſions?"

A fine ſhew of reaſoning; but there is no real ſolid truth in it; for all is falſe.

Sect. XVIII. In what ſenſe ſin deſerves puniſhment from the neceſſity of the Divine nature, we have already ſhewn at large. Neither, however, do we think ourſelves bound to teach, that God could not forbid ſin but under the penalty of eternal death: for we hold that not *one* or *another kind* of puniſhment is neceſſary; but that puniſhment itſelf is neceſſary; and the puniſhment, according

cording to the rule of God's wisdom and justice is death. Moreover, a rational creature, conscious of its proper subjection and obediential dependence, being created and existing, God did not account it at all *necessary* to forbid it to sin by a *free* act of his will, under *one* penalty or *another*; for both these follow from the very *situation* of the creature, and the order of *dependance*, viz. that it should not *transgress* by withdrawing itself from the *right* and *dominion* of the Creator; and if it should *transgress*, that it should be obnoxious, and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation, the *appointment* of punishment, even though there should be no mention made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.

SECT. XIX. "But God, (says he) in his "human court, forbids sin by a modification "of the punishment annexed; as for instance, "theft, under the penalty of a quadruple res- "titution: why may he not do likewise in "his own internal court, and consequently "suspend all punishment?"

SECT. XX. There is no need of much disputation, to prove that there is nothing sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punishment respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment itself is considered either in respect of its general end, which is the *punishment* of *transgression*,

greſſion, and has a regard to the condition of the creatures with reſpect to God; or in reſpect of ſome *ſpecial end*, and has a reſpect to the condition of the creatures among themſelves. But whatever *modification puniſhment* may undergo, provided it attains its proper end, by accompliſhing the object in view, the nature of puniſhment is preſerved no leſs than if numberleſs degrees were added to it. As to the eſtabliſhment of puniſhment then in a human court, as it has not primarily and properly a reſpect to the puniſhment of tranſgreſſion, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures, with reſpect to God; but with reſpect to one another, that *degree of puniſhment* is juſt, which is *fit* and proper for accompliſhing the propoſed *end*.

Sect. XXI. The puniſhment then of theft, by a *quadruple* reſtitution had, in its appointment, no ſuch modification conjoined with it, as could render it unfit and improper in reſpect of the end propoſed, among that people to whom that law concerning retributions was given: but as the infliction of puniſhment, according to the ſentence of the law, depended on the *ſupreme Ruler* of that people, it belonged to him to provide, that no temporal diſpenſation with puniſhment, exerciſed by him, in right of his dominion, ſhould turn out to the injury of the commonwealth.

Sect. XXII. But hence this learned writer concludes, "That in his own internal forum, "God may modify and ſuſpend puniſhment."

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We can only conjecture what he means by the *internal court of God:* From the juſtice of God the appointment of puniſhment is derived; but that is *improperly* called a *court.* How far God is at liberty, by this juſtice, to exerciſe his power in pardoning ſins, the Scriptures ſhew. " The juſt right of God is, *that they* " *who commit ſin are worthy of death:* but he " may modify the puniſhment," (ſays our author.) But not even in a human court can any ſuch modification be admitted, as would render the puniſhment uſeleſs in reſpect of its end; nor in reſpect of God do we think any *degree* or *mode* of puniſhment neceſſary, but ſuch as may anſwer the *end* of the puniſhment, ſo far as reſpects the ſtate of the creatures with reſpect to God. Nor is any argument from a *human court* applied to the Divine Juſtice; nor from the *modification* the *ſuſpenſion* for a limited time; nor from a *ſuſpenſion* to the total puniſhment; all which this learned author ſuppoſes, of any force.

Sect. XXIII. The ſum of the whole is this; as we have laid it down, that God muſt neceſſarily, from his right and juſtice, inflict puniſhment on ſin, ſo far as this puniſhment tends to preſerve the ſtate of the *creature's dependance* on its Creator, and proper and natural Lord; ſo whatever conſtitutions or inflictions of puniſhment, with any particular modification or diſpenſation we have admitted, do not, as the ſupreme judgment of all is reſerved to

the deſtined time, at all operate againſt our opinion.

Sect. XXIV. The other reaſons advanced by this learned author in ſupport of this argument, are not of ſufficient weight to merit attention. It hath been clearly proved already, that the ſuppoſition of the pardon of ſin, without an intervening ſatisfaction, implies a contradiction, though not in the terms, in the very thing itſelf. Nor does it follow that God can, without any puniſhment, forgive ſin; to avoid which, all rational creatures are indiſpenſably bound, from his natural right over them; becauſe any diſtinguiſhed action among mankind, to the performance of which they are bound by no law, may be rewarded; there being no threatening of puniſhments for the neglect of it, annexed, that has a reſpect to a privilege not due: by ſuch conſequences drawn from ſuch arguments, the learned gentleman will neither eſtabliſh his own opinion, nor prejudice ours.

Sect. XXV. He proceeds in the fourth place: "God (ſays he) worketh nothing "*without himſelf*, from a neceſſity of nature." This objection hath been already anſwered, by a diſtinction of neceſſity into that which is abſolute, and that which is conditional; nor ſhall we now delay the reader, by repeating what has been ſaid elſewhere. "But "to puniſh ſin, (ſays he) is not in any reſpect "more

" more agreeable to the Divine nature, than " not to punish it; but this is an act of grace " and liberty; that is, an act which God " freely exerciseth."

Sect. XXVI. But according to *Rutherford*, it is much more *disagreeable*, to speak in his own words, to the Divine nature, to *punish* sin, than *not* to *punish* it: for *not to punish* it, or to forgive it, proceeds from that mercy, which is essential; but to *punish* it from that justice which is a free act of the Divine will: but such things as are *natural* and *necessary* have a previous and weightier influence with God, than those which are free, and may, or may not take place. Our learned author means, " that setting aside the consideration " of his free decree, God is indifferent to " inflict punishment, or not inflict it." But by what argument will he maintain this absurd expression? Does it follow from this, that God is said in Scripture, *to restrain his anger, and not to cut off the wicked?* But surely he is not ignorant that such declarations of Divine grace have either a respect to Christ, by whom satisfaction for sin was made; or only denote a temporal suspension of punishment, till the day of public and general retribution.

Sect. XXVII. In the fifth place, he maintains, " that a natural necessity will admit of " no dispensation, modification, or delay,

" which, however, it is evident, that God " either uſes, or may uſe, in the puniſhment of ſin." *Anſ.* With reſpect to *abſolute* neceſſity, which excludes all liberty, perhaps this is true; but with reſpect to that neceſſity which we maintain, which admits of a concomitant liberty in acting; it is altogether without foundation. Again, a *diſpenſation with*, or *delay of puniſhment*, regards either *temporary* puniſhment, with which we grant that God may freely diſpenſe; when the immediate end of that puniſhment hath not a reſpect to the creatures, in that ſtate of ſubjection which they owe to God: or, *eternal* puniſhment, and in reſpect of that, the time of inflicting it, &c. and freely to appoint it belongs entirely to God: but that he ſhould inflict the puniſhment itſelf, is juſt and neceſſary.

Sect. XXVIII. Nor does that inſtance, brought from the various degrees of puniſhment at all, avail him, viz. " That if God can " add or take away one degree of puniſhment, " then he may two, and ſo annihilate the whole " puniſhment:" for we are ſpeaking of puniſhment, as it includes in it the nature of puniſhment, and is ordained to preſerve God's right and dominion over his creatures, and to avenge the *purity* and *holineſs* of God; not of it, as in conſequence of the Divine wiſdom and juſtice being *this* or *that* kind of puniſhment, or conſiſting of degrees: for thus far extends

extends that *liberty* which we aſcribe to God in the exerciſe of his juſtice, that it belongs to him entirely to determine according to the counſel of his will, with regard to the degrees, mode, and time to be obſerved in the infliction of puniſhment: and no doubt but a *proportion* of the puniſhment to the faults is obſerved; ſo that by how much one ſin exceeds another in quality, by ſo much one puniſhment exceeds another puniſhment in degree: and in the infliction of puniſhment God has a reſpect to the *comparative* demerit of ſins among themſelves. We acknowledge, indeed, that God acts *differently with perſons in the ſame ſituation*; but not without a reſpect to Chriſt and his ſatisfaction. The ſatisfaction of Chriſt is not indeed the cauſe of that decree, by which he determined ſuch a diſpenſation of things; but the mediation of Chriſt, "who was made ſin for thoſe to whom "their ſins are not imputed," is the foundation for the *actual adminiſtration* of the whole of that decree, reſpecting that part of it which conſiſts in the diſpenſation of free grace and ſparing mercy. What this learned writer adds, namely, "That not to puniſh is ſometimes "an act of ſevere juſtice; and that therefore "God does not puniſh from a neceſſity of "nature," is groſsly *ſophiſtical*; for *not to puniſh* denotes either the total removal of puniſhment altogether, as is the caſe with

the *elect*, for whom Chriſt died; which, ſo far from being an act of ſevere *juſtice*, that this learned man will not deny to proceed from the higheſt *grace* and *mercy*: or it denotes only a ſuſpenſion of ſome *temporal* puniſhment, and for a ſhort time; to the end that *ſinners may fill up the meaſure of their iniquity*. But this is not, properly ſpeaking, *not to puniſh*, but to puniſh in a different manner, and in a manner more ſevere than that to which it ſucceeds.

SECT. XXIX. What obſervations our learned author adds in the cloſe of his arguments, are either ſophiſtical or very *untheological*: he ſays, viz. "That God, influenced by our "prayers, averts even an eternal puniſhment "after that we have deſerved it:" but what? Is it to be *imputed to our prayers*, that God averts from us the *wrath to come?* What occaſion is there, pray then, for the ſatisfaction of Chriſt? We have hitherto been ſo *dull* and *ſtupid* as to believe, that the *turning away from us of puniſhment*, which has a reſpect to *our faith and prayers*, conſiſted in the *diſpenſation* of grace, peace, and the remiſſion of the ſins, for which Chriſt made ſatisfaction; and that God averted from us no deſerved puniſhment but what was laid upon Chriſt; *Who hath redeemed us from the curſe of the law, by being made a curſe for us?*

SECT. XXX. In his proofs of the ſixth *argument*, which this learned author adds to his former

former from *Twiſs*, he ſays, " There is neither " reaſon, nor any ſhadow of reaſon in it, that " the delay of puniſhment, or a diſpenſation " with it, as to time and manner, can be de- " termined by the free good pleaſure of God, " either one way or other; if *to puniſh*, or pu- " niſhment in itſelf, and abſolutely conſider- " ed, be neceſſary."

Sect. XXXI. We have explained before what were our ſentiments, as to what relates to the diſtinction between *puniſhment ſimply* conſidered, and attended with particular circumſtances in the manner of its infliction. We affirm, that a puniſhment proportioned to ſin, according to the rule of the Divine Juſtice, from God's natural right, and from his eſſential juſtice and holineſs, is neceſſarily inflicted to vindicate his glory, eſtabliſh his government, and preſerve his perfections entire and undiminiſhed: and God himſelf hath revealed to us, that this juſt *recompence of reward* conſiſts in *death eternal*; *for the righteous judgment of God is, that they who commit ſin are worthy of death.* It is *juſt* then, and conſequently *neceſſary* that that puniſhment of death viz. eternal ſhould be inflicted; but as God, though *a conſuming fire*, is a *rational* or *intellectual* fire, who in exerciſing the excellencies or qualities of his nature, proceeds with reaſon and underſtanding, it is free to him to appoint the *time*, *manner*, and ſuch-like circumſtances as muſt neceſſarily at-

that punishment in general, so as shall be most for his own glory, and the more illustrious *display of his justice.* But when *Rutherford* says, "That there is neither any reason, or "shadow of reason in this;" let us see what solidity there is in the arguments by which he supports his assertion.

SECT. XXIII. "The determination of an "infernal punishment, as to its manner and "time, and consequently as to its eternal "duration, will then depend on the mere "good pleasure of God: therefore, God can "determine the end and measure of infer-"nal punishment; and therefore he is able "not to punish, and to will not farther to "punish those condemned to eternal tor-"ments; therefore it is not of absolute ne-"cessity *that he punishes.*" But here is nothing but dross, as the saying is, instead of a treasure. The time concerning which we speak, is of the infliction of punishment, not of its duration. He who asserts, that an end may be put to *eternal* punishments, expressly contradicts himself: we say, that God hath revealed to us, that the punishment *due* to every sin, from his right and by the rule of his justice, is eternal: nor could the thing in itself be otherwise, for the punishment of a finite and sinful creature could not otherwise make any compensation for the guilt of its sin: but as it is certain, that God in the *first threatening*,

threatening, and in the curſe of the law, obſerved a ſtrict impartiality, and appointed not any kind of puniſhment, but what according to the rule of his juſtice, ſin deſerved; and as the apoſtle teſtifies, *That the righteous judgment of God is, that they who commit* ſin, *are worthy of death:*" and we acknowledge that death to be eternal, and that an injury done to God, infinite, in reſpect of the object, could not be puniſhed in a *ſubject* in *every* reſpect finite, otherwiſe than by a puniſhment infinite in reſpect of duration; that the continuation or ſuſpenſion of this puniſhment, which it is juſt ſhould be inflicted, does not undermine the Divine liberty, we are bold to affirm: for it is not free to God to act juſtly or not. But we have ſhewn before how abſurd it is to imagine that the Divine Omnipotence ſuffers any degradation; becauſe upon this ſuppoſition he muſt neceſſarily preſerve *alive* a ſinful creature to all eternity, and be unable to annihilate it.

CHAP. XIII.

The concluſion of this diſſertation—The uſe of the doctrine herein vindicated--God's hatred againſt ſin revealed in various ways—The dreadful effects of ſin all over the creation—Enmity between God and every ſin—Threatenings and the puniſhment of ſin appointed—The deſcription of ſin in the Sacred Scriptures—To what great miſeries we are liable through ſin—The excellency of grace, in pardoning ſin through Chriſt—Gratitude and obedience due from the pardoned—An hiſtorical fact concerning Tigranes king of Armenia—Chriſt to be loved for his croſs above all things—The glory of God's juſtice revealed by this doctrine; and alſo of his wiſdom and holineſs.

SECT. I. LET us at length put an end to this diſpute; and as all *acknowledging of the truth ought to be after godlineſs*,* we ſhall adduce ſuch uſeful and practical evident concluſions, as flow from this truth which we have thus far ſet forth and defended, that we may not be thought to have ſpent our abour in vain.

* Titus i. v.

SECT.

SECT. II. First then, hence we sinners may learn the *abominable nature* of sin. Whatever there is in heaven or in earth that we have seen, or of which we have heard; whatever declares the glory of the Creator, also exposes this disgraceful fall of the creature. The genuine offspring of sin are death and hell; *for sin, when it is finished bringeth forth death.** That the heavens cast out their native inhabitants, viz. *the angels, who kept not their first estate, but who left their own habitations, &c.* That the earth is filled with darkness, resentments, griefs, malediction, and revenge, is to be attributed entirely to this cankerous ulcer of nature. Hence *the wrath of God is revealed from heaven.* The earth, lately founded by a most beneficent Creator, is † cursed. Hence the old world, having but just emerged from the deluge, *when the heavens and the earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men* ‡.

SECT. III. Yea, forasmuch as in this state of things which we have described, as being permitted by the will of God, *the creature was made subject to vanity*, there is none of the creatures, which by its confusion, vanity, and inquietude does not declare this detestable poi-

* James i. 15. Jude 6. † Gen. iii. 17. ‡ 2 Pet. iii. 7. Rom. viii. 20.

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ſon with which it is thoroughly infected, to be *exceeding ſinful*. This is the ſource and origin of all evils to ſinners themſelves; whatever *darkneſs, tumult, vanity, ſlavery, fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation to conſume the adverſaries*, oppreſſes, tortures, harraſſes, vexes, burns, corrupts, or kills; whatever *from without* penal, grievous, ſad, dire, dreadful, even *the laſt unavoidable calamity itſelf*, is all to be attributed to this prolific parent of miſeries. Some one perhaps will wonder what this ſo great a plague is; which perverts the *courſe of the creation, what crime, what kind* of inexpiable wickedneſs, that it hath procured to creatures, ſo very highly exalted, and created in the *image* of God to ſhare of his glory, after being baniſhed from heaven and paradiſe, an eternal deprivation of his glory, puniſhment to which no meaſure or end is appointed; what hath ſo incenſed the mind of the moſt bountiful and merciful father of all, and embittered his anger, that he ſhould bring eternal ſorrows on the work of his own hands " and kindle a fire that ſhould " burn to the loweſt bottom, and inflame the " foundations of the mountains ?" I will tell him in one word.

Sect. IV. Is it to be wondered at, that God ſhould be diſpoſed ſeverely to puniſh that which earneſtly wiſhes him *not to be God*, and ſtrives to accompliſh this with all its

its might. Sin oppoſes the Divine nature and exiſtence; *it is enmity againſt God*, and is not an idle enemy; it has even engaged in a mortal war with all the attributes of God. He would not be God if he did not avenge, by the puniſhment of the guilty, his own injury. He hath often and heavily complained in his word, that by ſin he is *robbed of his glory and honour, affronted*, expoſed to calumny and blaſphemy; that neither his *holineſs*, nor his *juſtice*, nor *name*, nor *right*, or *dominion*, are preſerved pure and untainted. For he hath created all things *for his own glory*, and it belongs to the natural right of God to preſerve that glory entire by the ſubjection of all his creatures, in their proper ſtations, to himſelf: and ſhall we not reckon that ſin is entirely deſtructive of that order which would entirely wreſt that right out of his hands, and a thing to be reſtrained by the ſevereſt puniſhments? Let ſinners then be informed, that every the *leaſt tranſgreſſion* abounds ſo much with hatred againſt God, is ſo highly injurious to him; and ſo far as is in its power, brands him with ſuch folly, impotence, and injuſtice; ſo directly robs him of all his honour, glory, and power, that if he *wills to be God*, he can by no means ſuffer it to eſcape unpuniſhed.

Sect. V. It was not for nothing that on that day on which he *made man a living ſoul*, he *threatened him with* death, even *eternal* death;

death; that in *giving his law*, he thundered forth so many dread execrations against this fatal evil: that he hath threatened it with such punishment, with so great anger, with *fury*, *wrath*, *tribulation*, and *anguish*: that with a view to vindicate his own glory, and provide for the salvation of sinners, he made his most holy Son, *who was holy*, *harmless*, *undefiled*, *and separate from* * *sinners*;—*sin* and a *curse*; and subjected him to that *last punishment*, the death of the cross, including in it the satisfaction due to his violated law. All these things Divine Justice required as necessary to the preservation of his *honour*, *glory*, *wisdom*, *and dominion*: let every proud complaint of sinners then be hushed; *for we know that the judgment of God is according to truth against them that do* † *evil*.

Sect. VI. But sin, in respect of the creature is *folly*, *madness*, *fury*, *blindness*, *hardness*, *darkness*, *stupor*, *giddiness*, *torpor*, *turpitude*, *uncleanness*, *nastiness*, *a stain*, *a spot*, *an apostacy*, *degeneracy*, *a wandering from the mark*, *a turning aside from the right path*, *a disease*, *a languor*, *destruction*, *DEATH*. In respect of the Creator, it is *a disgrace*, *an affront*, *blasphemy*, *enmity*, *hatred*, *contempt*, *rebellion*, *an injury*. In respect of its own nature it is *poison*, *a stench*,

* Heb. xi. 2, 7. 2 Cor. v. 21. Gal. xiii. 13.
† Rom. ii. 2.

dung,

dung, a vomit, polluted blood, a plague, a peſtilence, an abominable thing, a curſe; which by its moſt pernicious power of metamorphoſing, hath transformed *angels* into *devils, light* into *darkneſs, life* into *death, paradiſe* into *a deſert*, a pleaſant, fruitful, bleſſed *world* into a vain dark, accurſed *priſon*; and the *Lord of All*, into *a Servant of ſervants:* which hath rendered man the glory of God, an enemy to *himſelf*, a wolf to *others*, hateful to God, *his own* deſtroyer, the deſtruction of *others*, the plague of the *world*, a monſter, and a ruin; attempting to violate the eternal, natural, and indiſpenſable right of God, to cut the thread of the creature's dependance on the Creator, it introduced with it this world of *iniquity*.

SECT. VII. Firſt then, to addreſs you, "Who live, or rather are dead, under the "guilt, dominion, power, and law of ſin:" how ſhall ye eſcape the damnation of hell? The judgment of God is, that they who commit thoſe things, to which you are totally given up, and which you cannot refrain from, are worthy of death: *It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living* * *God:* ſince it is a juſt thing with him, *to render to every one according to his works:* and who ſhall deliver you out of his mighty hand? Wherewith can the *wrath to come* be averted? Wherewithal

* Heb. x. 31.

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can you make atonement to so great a Judge? Sacrifices avail nothing; hence those words in the prophet, which express not so much the language of enquiry, as of confusion and astonishment. *Wherewithall shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the most high God? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgressions, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?* Would you attempt an obedience, arduous and expensive beyond all credibility? By such *dreadful propitiations*, by such dire and accursed sacrifices, at the thought of which human nature shudders, would you appease the offended Deity? You are not the first whom *a vain superstition* and ignorance of the justice of God hath forced to turn away their ears from the sighs and cries of tender infants, breathing out their very vitals, your own blood, in vain. These *furies*, which now by starts, agitate us within, will, by their vain attempts against the snares of death, torment us to all eternity: for God, the Judge of all, will not accept of *sacrifice, or offering, or burnt offerings for sin—with these he is not at all delighted; for the redemption of the soul is precious, and ceaseth for ever*, * God cannot so lightly es-

* Ps. lxix. 8.

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teem or disregard his holiness, justice, and glory, to which your sins have done so great an injury, that he should renounce them all for the sake of hostile conspirators; unless there should be some other remedy quickly provided for us; unless the Judge himself shall provide a lamb for a burnt-offering; unless the gates of a *city of refuge* shall be quickly opened to you, exclaiming and trembling at the avenging curse of the law, unless you can find access to the *horns of the altar*. If God be to remain blessed for ever, you must doubtless perish for ever. If then, you have the least concern or anxiety for your eternal state, hasten, *while it is called to-day, to lay hold on the hope that is set before you*. Give yourselves up entirely to him; receive him *whom God hath set forth as a propitiation, through faith in his blood; that he might declare his righteousness*. But what, and how bitter a sense of sin, how deep a humiliation, contrition and dejection of heart and spirit, what self-hatred, condemnation, and contempt, what great self-indignation and revenge; what esteem, what faith in the necessity, excellence, and dignity of the *righteousness* and *satisfaction* of Christ, especially if God hath graciously condescended to bestow his Holy Spirit, *to convince* men's hearts *of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment*, (without whose effectual aid and heart-changing grace, even the most *apposite* remedies applied

ed to this diſeaſe, will be in vain) and to excite and work ſuch ſentiments concerning the tranſgreſſion of the Divine Law, the nature of ſin, or the diſobedience of the creatures. *A perſuaſion* how fit and proper, thoſe who have ſpiritual eyes will eaſily perceive.

SECT. IX. To thoſe happy perſons, *whoſe ſins are forgiven, and to whom God will not impute iniquity*, becauſe he hath laid their tranſgreſſions upon Chriſt, the knowledge of this Divine truth is as a ſpur to quicken them to the practice of every virtue, and to ſincere obedience: for in what high, yea infinite honour and eſteem muſt God be held by him, who, having eſcaped from the ſnares of death, and the deſtruction due to him, through his inexpreſſible mercy, hath thoroughly weighed the nature of ſin, and the conſequences of it, which we have mentioned before? for whoſoever ſhall reflect with himſelf, that ſuch is the *quality* and *nature* of ſin, and that it is ſo impiouſly inimical to God, that unleſs by ſome means his juſtice be ſatisfied by *the puniſhment of another*, he could not pardon it, or let it paſs unpuniſhed, will even acknowledge himſelf indebted to eternal love for the remiſſion of the leaſt tranſgreſſion; becauſe in inexpreſſible grace and goodneſs it hath been forgiven. And hence too we may learn, how much beyond *all other objects of our affection*, we are bound to love with our heart and ſoul, and

and all that is within us, our dear and beloved deliverer, and moſt merciful Saviour, JESUS CHRIST; *who hath delivered us from the wrath to come.*

SECT. X. When *Tigranes*, ſon of the king of *Armenia*, had ſaid to *Cyrus* that he would purchaſe his wife's liberty at the price of his life, and ſhe was conſequently ſet free by *Cyrus*, while ſome were admiring and extolling one virtue of *Cyrus*, and ſome another; ſhe being aſked what ſhe moſt admired in that illuſtrious hero, anſwered, "My thoughts were not turned upon him." Her huſband again aſking her, "Upon whom then?" She replied, "Upon him who ſaid that he would redeem "me from ſlavery at the expence of his life." Is not HE then to be careſſed and dearly beloved, to be contemplated with faith, love and joy, who anſwered for our lives with his own: devoted himſelf to puniſhment: and at the price of his blood, *while we were yet enemies*, purchaſed us, and rendered us *a peculiar people to himſelf?* We, now ſecure, may contemplate in his *agony*, *ſweat*, *tremor*, *horror*, *exclamations*, *prayers*, *croſs*, *and blood*, what is God's ſeverity againſt ſin, what the puniſhment of the broken law and curſe are. Unleſs God, the *Judge* and *Ruler* of all, after having thoroughly examined the *nature*, *hearts*, *breaſts*, *ways*, and *lives* of us all, had thence collected whatever was *contrary to his law*, *improper*, *unjuſt*

unjuſt, and impure; whatever diſpleaſed the eyes of his purity, provoked his juſtice, rouzed his anger and ſeverity, and laid it all on the ſhoulders of our Redeemer, and *condemned it in his fleſh*; it had been better for us, rather than to be left eternally entangled in the ſnares of death and of the curſe, never to have enjoyed this common air, but to have been annihilated as ſoon as born. *Wretched men that we are, who ſhall deliver us from this* moſt miſerable ſtate by nature? *Thanks be to God, through our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* May we always then be *ſick of love*, towards our deliverer: may he always be our *beloved, who is white and ruddy, and the chiefeſt among ten thouſand.*

SECT. XI. The acknowledging of this truth has a reſpect not only to the manifeſtation of his juſtice, but alſo of the *wiſdom, holineſs*, and *dominion* of God over his creatures: for that juſtice, which in reſpect of its effect and egreſs we call vindicatory, which as we have before demonſtrated is natural to God, and eſſential; and therefore abſolutely perfect in itſelf, or rather perfection itſelf; this very truth, which we have thus far defended, evidently illuſtrates: as alſo his ſupreme rectitude in the exerciſe of it, *when he ſits on his throne judging righteouſly*; and how ſevere a judge he will be towards impenitent ſinners, whoſe ſins are not expiated in the blood of Chriſt. That juſtice is not a free act of the Divine

Divine will, which God may uſe or renounce at pleaſure; nor is ſin only *a debt of ours*, which as we were unable to pay, he might forgive, by only freely receding from his right: for what reaſon then could be aſſigned why the *Father of mercies* ſhould ſo ſeverely puniſh his moſt holy Son on our account, that he might, according to juſtice, deliver us from our ſins; when without any difficulty, by one act of his will, and that too a moſt free and holy act, he could have delivered both *himſelf*, and us wretched ſinners, from *this evil?* but it exiſts in God in the manner of a *habit*, natural to the Divine Eſſence itſelf, perpetually and immutably inherent in it; which, from his very nature, he muſt neceſſarily exerciſe in every work that reſpecteth the proper object of this juſtice; for ſin is that ineffable evil, which would overturn God's whole right over his creatures, unleſs it were puniſhed. As then the perfection of *Divine Juſtice* is infinite, and ſuch as God cannot by any means relax, it is of the laſt importance to ſinners ſeriouſly and deeply to bethink themſelves how they are to ſtand before him.

Sect. XII. Moreover, the infinite wiſdom of God, the traces of which we ſo clearly read in *creation*, *legiſlation*, and in the other works of God, are hereby wonderouſly diſplayed

played, to the eternal aſtoniſhment of men and angels: for none but an infinitely wiſe God, could bring it about; that that which in its own nature is oppoſite to him, inimical, and full of obſtinacy, ſhould turn out to his higheſt honour, and the eternal *glory of his grace.* Yea, the Divine wiſdom not only had reſpect to God himſelf, and to the ſecurity of his *glory, honour, right, and juſtice,* but even provided for the *good* of miſerable ſinners, for their beſt *intereſts, exaltation, and ſalvation*; and from the impoiſened bowels of ſin itſelf. *Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the ſtrong came forth ſweetneſs*; by interpoſing a ſurety and covenant-head between ſin and the ſinner; between the tranſgreſſion of the law and its tranſgreſſor, he condemned and puniſhed *ſin,* reſtored the law, and freed the *ſinner* both from ſin, and from the law. *He hath abounded towards us in all wiſdom and prudence.* Eph. i. 8. *When he made all men ſee what is the fellowſhip of the myſtery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God,* chap. iii. 9. *For in Chriſt Jeſus all the treaſures of wiſdom and knowledge are hid,* Col. ii. 3.

SECT. XIII. It will be read and attended to, as an eternal miracle of God's providence, that he ſhould have made the captivity, or wicked ſale of *Joſeph,* by means of ſo many windings, perplexed

perplexed mazes, and ſtrange occurrences, iſſue at laſt in his own exaltation and the preſervation of his brethren, who impiouſly ſold him. But if any one, though endowed *with the tongues of angels and of men*, ſhould attempt to deſcribe this myſtery of Divine wiſdom, whereby it is evident that God exalts his own name, and not only recovers his former honour, but even raiſes it, manifeſts his *juſtice*, preſerves inviolable his right and dominion in pardoning ſin, wherewith he is highly pleaſed, and incredibly delighted, (and unleſs this *heavenly diſcovery*, a truly God-like invention, had intervened, he could not have pardoned even the leaſt ſin) he muſt feel his language not only deficient, but the eye of the mind overpowered with light, will fill him with *awe* and *aſtoniſhment:* that that which is the greateſt, yea the only *diſgrace* and *affront* to God, ſhould turn out to his higheſt *honour* and *glory*; that that which could not be permitted to triumph without the greateſt injury to the *juſtice*, *right*, *holineſs* and *truth* of God, ſhould find grace and pardon to the eternal and glorious diſplay of *juſtice*, *right*, *holineſs*, and *truth*, was a work that required infinite wiſdom: an arduous taſk, and every way worthy of God.

Sect. XIV. Finally. Let us conſtantly contemplate in the *mirror* of this truth, the holineſs

holineſs of God, whereby *he is of purer eyes than to behold evil: in whoſe preſence the wicked ſhall not ſtand:* that we ourſelves may become more pure in heart, and more holy in life, ſpeech, and behaviour.

THE END.